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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the history and development of a suburban school district, as 
its surrounding community transformed from a quiet village to a white, blue-collar suburb, then 
to an urban space with predominantly non-white residents and students.  The study’s five 
chapters present an analysis of fifty years (1950–2000) of the history of Hickman Mills, a small 
community on the south side of Kansas City, Missouri.  The history of the school district and the 
neighborhoods it served reveals the flawed distinctions often made between rural, suburban, and 
urban spaces.  In particular, this study questions the common definitions assigned to urban and 
suburban communities, as well as schools.  In analyzing this suburban space, my methodology 
includes documentary analysis, personal interviews to collect oral histories, quantitative data 
collection from the U.S. Census, as well as spatial analysis in the form of census tract maps 
within the school district.  I employ geographic and sociological theories of urbanization and 
racial change to examine the transformation of Missouri’s first consolidated school district from 
suburban to urban, white to black. 
 Chapter one primarily explores the postwar period for Kansas City and Hickman Mills, 
with rapid population growth within district borders as white families moved to the area and sent 
their children to school.  Chapter two provides an analysis of two early crises within the school 
district, both occurring between 1957 and 1960, with an explanation of how the events in these 
three years helped shift district and community identity.  Chapter three further addresses 
questions of community identity during the 1960s when Kansas City, Missouri annexed the 
district neighborhoods, as well as reticence on the part of Hickmanites to support their schools 
through increased tax levies.  Chapter four demonstrates another change in community identity 
during the 1970s and 1980s as residents largely banded together to fight what they saw as threats 
to the community, chief among them low-income housing, school consolidation with Kansas 
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City, Missouri, and the entrance of large numbers of African-American families.  Chapter five 
focuses on Hickman Mills in the 1990s, as local white perception of the community and the 
schools deteriorated when larger numbers of black families moved to the area.   
At the same time that this study adds to a burgeoning scholarship on race in suburban 
communities and school districts, it also complicates traditional stories of white flight and 
urbanization.  The history of Hickman Mills’s transformation from a “suburban” community to 
an “urban” one, as well as the perception of the school district changing from “good” to “bad,” 
broadens our understanding of the history of race and schooling as well as the effects of 
desegregation upon communities.  I argue that the change Hickman Mills underwent was largely 
a result of how its neighborhoods were perceived as racial spaces, first as white and “normal,” 
then as black and “unsafe.”  Ultimately, this study exemplifies how the social construction of 
space plays a significant role in neighborhoods and schools. 
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Introduction: Hickman Mills  
 
Perception and Reality in School and Community Identity 
The story of the rise and fall of urban communities and the schools that serve them are 
not rare in educational and historical research.  At the same time, emerging scholarship on 
suburban school districts and communities highlights the growth of neighborhoods along the 
edges of metropolitan areas and the school districts that exist within them.  Less has been written 
about places that have come to exist between these extremes, as little scholarship focuses on 
communities that exhibit both urban and suburban qualities and often serve as a type of buffer 
between more distant suburbs and the city core.  Often comprised of a racial or ethnic minority 
and a lower middle-class/blue-collar populace, these places typically began as all-white rural and 
suburban neighborhoods that, in the past thirty years, have become an extension of the urban 
core, sometimes exhibiting some of the problems that inner cities face.1  More studies of these 
communities throughout the nation are valuable because the history of urban sprawl suggests the 
creation of more locales that do not fit the categorization of urban or suburban spaces.  Most 
recent scholarship is beginning to look at these areas across the country, with some prominent 
social scientists arguing that racial and economic change in suburban America is the next great 
crisis we need to more fully address.2 
One such example of a space that exists as such a transition zone comes from the chief 
neighborhoods constituting the Hickman Mills C-1 School District in Kansas City, Missouri.  
                                                 
1 Two excellent examples of these spaces come from Emily Strauss’ dissertation on Compton, California, and Mary 
Pattillo-McCoy’s ethnography of “Groveland” on the south-side of Chicago.  Emily Strauss, “The Making of the 
American School Crisis: Compton, California and the Death of the Suburban Dream” (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis 
University, 2006); Mary Patillo-McCoy, Black Picket Fences: Privilege and Peril Among the Black Middle Class 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). Also of note are Bruce Haynes, Red Lines, Black Spaces: The Politics 
of Race and Space in a Black Middle-Class Suburb (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001) and Andrew 
Wiese, Places of Their Own: African American Suburbanization in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004). 
2 Gary Orfield and Erica Frankenberg, eds., The Resegregation of Suburban Schools: A Hidden Crisis in American 
Education (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press, 2012), 2-5. 
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Hickman Mills has the historical distinction of being the first consolidated school district in 
Missouri.  It originated as an all-white school system, yet recently has become majority black.  
Additionally, having boasted a triple ”A” rating from the Missouri Board of Education early in 
its existence, Hickman Mills now struggles to maintain its state accreditation.  After 
experiencing a housing boom immediately following World War II, the neighborhoods 
comprising Hickman Mills now are a mix of middle and lower-income housing.  Yet the district 
itself serves a student body that is overwhelmingly poor.3  On the surface, this story seems to 
match that of many inner-city school districts such as Detroit, which in some ways it does.4  
However, the history of Hickman Mills is unusual in that it did not start as an inner-city school 
district and still is not “inner-city” even if it’s demographic profile has changed.  This school 
district on the south side of Kansas City, Missouri (and technically part of the city itself) has 
undergone a significant shift from a prosperous to a struggling institution, just as the community 
shifted from a growing suburb to a collection of stagnant neighborhoods. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to address why and how this transformation occurred.  More specifically, my 
purpose is to analyze the growth of Hickman Mills as a community and a school district, as well 
as its struggle to remain separate from Kansas City, even as the city absorbed the suburb. 
The Larger Context 
Because the story of Hickman Mills is both suburban and urban in nature, other studies of 
both types of school systems are relevant to an analysis of the district.  In the early part of the 
twentieth century, an important demographic change began to occur within the urban centers, an 
alteration that had a deep impact on the course of schooling in urban America.  Black migration 
                                                 
3 Seventy-seven percent of Hickman Mills students are registered as receiving free and/or reduced lunches.  Reduced 
lunches do not necessarily match poor students, but the free and reduced category in schools serves as a useful tool 
for measuring the socio-economic status of pupils in the area. 
4 See Jeffrey Mirel, The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System: Detroit, 1907-81 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1993). 
 
 
 3 
from the South to northern cities had been occurring since the end of the Civil War, but around 
1890, rural southern blacks began to move in large numbers to cities in the northeastern and 
northcentral areas of the country.5   Lawrence Cremin’s discussion of city schools suggests that 
black families and their children faced considerable difficulty in migration and procuring an 
education in light of white prejudice.6  
Other historians, including David Tyack, Larry Cuban, William Reese, Jeffrey Mirel, and 
John Rury, argued that the quality of education in the city largely depended upon race, as whites 
were given much greater opportunities than black students.  Before the Great Migration, northern 
blacks either established their own separate schools or attended schools created by abolitionists, 
such as the Manumission Society’s African Free School in New York.7  However, the school 
reforms of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, focusing on scientific management 
and social efficacy, did not focus much on with African Americans.  Black families were 
relegated to the poorest parts of the city, often segregated in overcrowded schools with 
inexperienced teachers.8  As of 1896, black students in many parts of the country were forbidden 
to attend white schools.  Although the legal definition of “separate but equal” under the Plessey v 
Ferguson decision influenced local boards to provide some education for black students and  
funding for facilities, segregated schools were often underfunded and neglected by white school 
                                                 
5 Lawrence A. Cremin, American Education: The Metropolitan Experience, 1876-1980 (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1988), 123.  Cremin shows that by 1980, over half of black Americans lived outside of the South, with three 
quarters living in urban centers. 
6 Ibid., 123-126. 
7 John L. Rury, Education and Social Change: Contours in the History of American Schooling, 4th ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 45-47, 114.  Cremin describes the schools that African Americans created for themselves in the 
cities as extensions of their churches (American Education, 124-25).  This is parallel with the formation of schools 
for whites in New England, for whom school and church shared a special relationship.  See Carl E. Kaestle, Pillars 
of the Republic: Common Schools and American Society, 1780-1860 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011), 3. 
8 Rury, Education and Social Change, 194.   
 
 
 4 
boards.9  Before World War II, urban schools were often strong institutions for white students; 
they were well funded and provided a comprehensive education with a curriculum aimed at 
preparing students for vocations or to enter college.10  In the years before the widespread 
popularity of suburban living, middle-class whites lived in cities and they happily and proudly 
sent their children to local schools.11     
The plight of African Americans was not confined to schooling.  As the black population 
began to expand in the cities during the 1940s and 1950s, urban whites often displayed open 
hostility to blacks who tried to cross residential or school lines.  Arnold Hirsch and Thomas 
Sugrue demonstrate that many northern whites were just as reluctant to integrate with blacks as 
their southern counterparts.  They employed intimidation tactics, including violence, to keep 
blacks out of predominantly white neighborhoods in Chicago and Detroit.12  In a separate work, 
Hirsch describes how the confluence of working-class whites in Chicago who fought to keep 
blacks out of their neighborhoods and the white elites who manipulated housing agencies led to 
the creation of what historians call “the second ghetto.”13  In his insightful essay on the interplay 
between urban, suburban, and education history, Jack Dougherty pointed out that the rise of the 
                                                 
9 William J. Reese, America’s Public Schools: From the Common School to “No Child Left Behind” (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 210-11; Mirel, Rise and Fall, 156.   
10 David Tyack, The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1974), 275; Rury, Education and Social Change, 179. 
11 David Tyack and Larry Cuban, Tinkering Toward Utopia: A Century of Public School Reform (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), 12-13.  Tyack and Cuban explain that polls in 1938 showed that when asked what 
changes should be made to their local school, 24 percent of respondents replied “none.”  29 percent did not respond 
to the question, and 47 percent marked that they had minor complaints about their local schools.  Jeffrey Mirel, “The 
Politics of Educational Retrenchment in Detroit, 1929-1935,” in Urban Education in the United States: A Historical 
Reader, ed. John L. Rury (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 179-81. 
12 Arnold R. Hirsch, “Massive Resistance in the Urban North: Trumbull Park, Chicago, 1953-1966,” The Journal of 
American History 82, no. 2 (September 1995): 522-50; Thomas J. Sugrue, “Crabgrass-Roots Politics: Race, Rights, 
and the Reaction Against Liberalism in the Urban North, 1940-1964,” The Journal of American History 82, no. 2 
(September 1995): 551-78. 
13 Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1983), 13-15. 
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suburbs, growing numbers of African Americans in the cities, and educational policies worked 
together to bring about the downfall of the urban educational system.14   
The transition middle-class whites made as they moved from urban centers to suburban 
communities was slow at first, just as the economic decline of the cities did not reach a nadir 
until the 1970s and 1980s.15  The implementation and failure of desegregation efforts played a 
vital part in the ongoing development of urban education, which occurred during this complex 
period of suburbanization and economic change from the 1950s through the 1980s.  In 1954, the 
Supreme Court overturned Plessey v. Ferguson, deciding that separate was inherently unequal 
and declaring that the schools of the nation must integrate.16  A year later, the Supreme Court 
addressed its first ruling and determined that school districts needed to desegregate “with all 
deliberate speed.”17  Gary Orfield demonstrates that the vagueness of that phrase allowed anti-
integration interests to bring case after case to the courts questioning any desegregation 
measures.  Combined with this ambiguous language was a political shift within the Supreme 
Court as President Nixon appointed justices who were opposed to desegregation.18  Overall, 
Brown v. Board was taken apart piece by piece through political wrangling, complicated by 
spatial changes in the cities that occurred as whites moved from the city centers to the 
peripheries, as well as to the suburbs.  By the 1980s and 1990s, American suburbs were 
                                                 
14 Jack Dougherty, “Bridging the Gap Between Urban, Suburban, and Educational History,” in Rethinking the 
History of American Education, ed. William J. Reese and John L. Rury (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 
250-54. 
15 Ibid., 252-56.   
16 For a very moving, yet long and complex, story on how Brown v. Board occurred, see Richard Kluger, Simple 
Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1975). 
17 Ibid., 749. 
18 Gary Orfield and Susan E. Eaton, eds., Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of 
Education (New York: The New Press, 1996), 7-13. 
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predominantly white and the central core of American cities were largely non-white.19  
Essentially, the excellent urban school white parents sent their children to through the 1950s 
changed as whites moved away and sent their children to suburban schools.  Residents who 
stayed in the cities were welcome to the buildings in urban areas, but much of the infrastructure 
by way of teachers and leadership had left.   At the same time, America experienced an 
economic recession and manufacturing jobs in the cities became scarcer as plants permanently 
closed or were relocated elsewhere.20   
The work of Jeffrey Mirel highlights the shift an urban school district underwent as it 
transformed from a functioning, healthy provider of urban education (for white students) to a 
largely dysfunctional, underfunded institution supplying relatively poor schooling for urban 
children, who were mostly non-white.  He explores how the Detroit public school system 
changed from being a paragon of progressive education in the early twentieth century to a 
“dismal failure” by the end of the same century.21  Public schools in Detroit were not segregated 
until black migration to the city and white migration to the suburbs began to re-shape the racial 
characteristics of the inner city in the early 1930s through the 1950s.22  The corresponding city 
schools became heavily segregated because the neighborhoods were doing the same.  However, 
Mirel showed how school boards took an active part in separating white and black students, 
enabled white outmigration, and contributed to the decay of the urban school.  School boundaries 
shifted according to where white students were living and white families were given permission 
                                                 
19 Jennifer Hochschild and Nathan Scovronick, The American Dream and the Public Schools (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 37.  Also of note is a study reflecting on Charles Tilly’s conception of “opportunity 
hoarding” as it applies to the suburbs.  After analyzing census data on seventeen-year olds in suburbs and cities after 
World War II, the authors concluded that suburban, white students gained and held on to academic advantage, which 
was “linked to forms of social exclusion.”  See John L. Rury and Argun Saatcioglu, “Suburban Advantage: 
Opportunity Hoarding and Secondary Attainment in the Postwar Metropolitan North,” American Journal of 
Education 117, no. 3 (May 2011), 330. 
20 Dougherty, “Bridging the Gap,” 255-56. 
21 Mirel, Rise and Fall, ix-x. 
22 Ibid., 152-154. 
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to send their children to school buildings outside the local school’s boundaries.  These options 
were not always extended to black students.  The schools that came to serve a primarily African-
American student body then began to receive less funding than their white, suburban 
counterparts.  Thus, Mirel asserts that the deplorable condition of the overwhelmingly black 
urban schools was a result of both larger social and economic factors as well as poor choices on 
the part of the educational establishment.23 Additionally, Mirel makes clear in his analysis of the 
Detroit school district that the two vital elements of general urban decline are problems of 
“resources and politics.”24  Mirel is not alone in his assertion, as other scholars have repeated his 
observation about unequal resources and political will.  Gary Orfield observes that segregated 
schools will never be equal “so long as the rest of society is profoundly unequal.”25  John Rury 
and Argun Saatcioglu argue that without “dramatic, sweeping policy measures” like increased 
funding of city schools, “exclusion and inequity will continue to shape educational outcomes for 
the foreseeable future.”26   
Bringing the issue of schooling between the suburbs and the cities closer to Hickman 
Mills, Sherry L. Schirmer writes about color separation in schools in the Kansas City, Missouri 
School District.  Focusing chiefly upon court decisions to segregate the public schools, Schirmer 
laid out four themes that are helpful in understanding attitudes surrounding the issue of school 
segregation.  The first outlines an “overriding concern over use and control of urban space.”27  
White flight, highway construction, and residential versus commercial zoning changes 
demonstrated an emphasis on the needs of a white middle class over African-American families.  
                                                 
23 Ibid., 188-90, 253-54. 
24 Ibid., 401. 
25 Orfield and Eaton, Dismantling Desegregation, 361. 
26 Rury and Saatcioglu, “Suburban Advantage,” 333. 
27 Sherry L. Schirmer, A City Divided: The Racial Landscape of Kansas City, 1900-1960 (Columbia, MO: 
University of Missouri Press, 2002), 2. 
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The second theme involves the use of misdirection, as whites claimed that segregation was for 
the protection of non-whites, or that segregation among the schools was a natural occurrence and 
not racially based.  For example, opposition to subsidized housing in many white neighborhoods 
was couched in the language of worries over the possibilities of increased crime.28   
Schirmer’s third theme deals with the coded language whites used when talking about 
minorities, especially African Americans.  Assumptions about black citizens made for quick and 
easy labels of black students, such as “low-achieving…undisciplined, violent students with low 
test scores, apathetic parents, and a fondness for vandalism.”29  Finally, Schirmer did provide 
one positive element in the segregation of the Kansas City schools:  “a minority of whites sought 
interracial contacts in the belief that integration would uplift individual and community 
values.”30  Some whites opposed segregation, just as some white families refused to move to the 
suburbs when their neighborhoods became increasingly black.  These whites insisted on sending 
their children to multiracial schools, believing that cultural diversity made for a better education.  
This group, however, was a small minority.31 
 Kevin Fox Gotham’s study of race and housing in Kansas City demonstrates that urban 
and suburban areas are inherently racialized, with uneven development and unequal prospects for 
“quality education, employment opportunities, and other tangible resources.”32  Kansas City is 
an example of a “hypersegregated” metropolitan area in particular, as many of the surrounding 
suburbs on both the Kansas and Missouri side have enjoyed prosperous economic growth 
coupled with high quality school districts since World War II, while the core area of the city has 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 3. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 2. 
31 Ibid., 4. 
32 Kevin Fox Gotham, Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City Experience, 1900-2000 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 13. 
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experienced severe economic and scholastic decline.33  Thus, the scholarship tends to place a 
distinct line between urban and suburban communities, or between white and black 
neighborhoods.34   
Suburban scholarship in the past has added to this dichotomy, as influential historians 
Kenneth Jackson and Arnold Hirsch effectively write the story of the middle-class/elite white 
suburb resisting the entrance of non-whites, resulting in the intensifying of racial segregation in 
both the city and the suburb.35  More recent scholarship on suburban communities complicates 
the dominant narrative of the powerful, wealthy, white suburb versus the poor non-white city.  
Becky Nicolaides’s work explores the experiences of working-class whites in suburban 
California, arguing that the blue-collar suburbanites banded together to create their own power 
base and further their own interests within their neighborhoods.36  Andrew Wiese brings readers’ 
attention to black suburbanites throughout the country in the twentieth century, demonstrating 
the tenacity of black homeowners in gaining and keeping their suburban homes in the face of 
personal and institutional racism.37   
Hickman Mills then serves as an example of a homogenous community that, like other 
suburbs, fought against desegregation, lost, and ultimately transformed as many middle-class 
whites left for other places.  As black families moved into the communities and sent their 
children to Hickman Mills’ schools, white families largely opted to leave, mostly for other 
                                                 
33 Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 75-77; Gotham, Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development, 
12-13. 
34 Gotham’s major argument is that Troost Street is the color line in Kansas City—this demarcation was not 
Gotham’s creation, as residents throughout the greater Kansas City metropolitan area consider Troost to be the 
barrier between white and non-white, as well as middle-class/affluent and poor/working class. 
35 See Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984); Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto.  Also see Thomas J. Sugrue, Origins of the Urban 
Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
36 Becky Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002). 
37 Wiese, Places of Their Own, 291-92. 
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homogenous locales close by such as Raytown, Lee’s Summit, and Independence.  The story of 
Hickman Mills then to a degree holds true to the predominant scholarship on communities that 
urbanize and the effect that urbanization has upon the school district.  However Hickman Mills’s 
difficult relationship with Kansas City as a suburb and as a part of the city significantly affected 
the development and trajectory of the school district.  This relationship, coupled with the actions 
taken (or sometimes not taken) by residents of Hickman Mills towards schooling, housing, and 
urbanization helps add to the growing scholarship on suburbs and suburban school districts. 
Hickman Mills 
The Hickman Mills School District, located within ten miles of downtown Kansas City, 
is separated from the Kansas City Missouri School District (KCMSD) by a small portion of the 
Central and Raytown school districts.  Located near the intersection of US highways 470 and 
435, Hickman Mills is a medium to small-sized metropolitan district, extending east from the 
Blue River to Longview Lake, and south from 87th Street to Harry Truman Drive (Map 1).  
Map 1: Hickman Mills C-1 school district boundaries 
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The borders of the school district form a misshapen rectangle, with the most populous 
neighborhoods located in the center and southeast corner of the district, as the southwest portion 
of the region remains relatively sparse.  The district itself serves six thousand students as of the 
2012-2013 school year, which is impressive compared to its small beginnings as a school body 
of two hundred.  At the same time, it is less imposing when compared to the boom of the 1950s 
and 60s, resulting in an enrollment of thirteen thousand children.   
Having been largely a small, rural community since its inception during the Civil War 
era, the neighborhoods that together comprise the Hickman Mills school district exist as a “first 
ring” suburb and mostly grew with the population and housing explosion that occurred after 
World War II.38  Largely racially and economically homogenous, Hickman Mills was annexed 
by Kansas City in 1961, which predated by seven years the trickle of non-white residents coming 
to the district to live and send their children.39  From the late sixties through the eighties, black 
presence slowly increased within the district’s borders until, in 1991, Hickman Mills had the 
highest population of black students outside of the two Kansas City school districts, at thirty-
seven percent.40  During these thirty years, the district struggled to convince its patrons to pass 
bonds and raise school levies, maintain facilities in the face of the decline of the baby boom, and 
convince whites to remain within school boundaries.41  By the end of the twentieth century, 
whites had largely left the communities and the schools within Hickman Mills.  As previously 
stated, the school district is currently fourteen-percent white, a drastic change from having only 
two non-white students in 1968.42  
                                                 
38 Jami Parkison, The Journey to Our Future: The History of Hickman Mills C-1 School District, 1902-2002 (Kansas 
City, MO: Hickman Mills C-1 School District, 2002), 28-29, 63. 
39 Ibid., 83-89, 93.  The first black family to move to the district was the Gatewoods, who came in 1968.  
40 Ibid., 95. 
41 Ibid., 106-11. 
42 Ibid., 92. 
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Hickman Mills’ rise and decline as a quality school district within metropolitan Kansas 
City coincides with the racial change that communities within the district experienced.  White 
resistance to racial desegregation seems to have contributed heavily to the area’s transformation 
from a semi-rural, quaint district with average test scores and relatively high graduation rates 
with   general parental satisfaction, to a school system struggling to address various 
socioeconomic difficulties and relatively low achievement.  The arc of Hickman Mills’s 
existence reflects to an extent that of its larger and more discussed counterpart to the north, the 
Kansas City Missouri School District, in that white flight from the urban center ultimately 
harmed the economy of the city and the reputation of the schools, just as what occurred in 
Hickman Mills.   
Current scholarship indicates that school funding, being tied to property taxes, is severely 
harmed when communities become “urbanized.”  In his study on housing in Kansas City, 
Missouri, Gotham asserts that white resistance to black expansion in metropolitan Kansas City 
led to housing devaluation and neighborhood blight, which affected the school district’s funding, 
translating to an inability to meet specific educational needs.43  In her analysis of Compton, the 
infamous suburb of Los Angeles, Emily Strauss’s argument that residents in the community 
ultimately harmed themselves by refusing to raise the school levy in the face of declining 
property values further explains how schools are often doubly adversely affected by 
neighborhood decline.44  While school leadership in Hickman Mills tirelessly and repeatedly 
strove to pass school bonds and raise the school mill levy, ultimately, the district could not 
convince residents to pay enough taxes in order to appropriately fund the schools.  Thus, race 
was not a factor itself in changing the status of the schools of Hickman Mills, but a reluctance to 
                                                 
43 Gotham, Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development, 7-8. 
44 Strauss, “American School Crisis,” 4-5. 
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co-habit with black people led to a white-flight from the suburb, which negatively impacted the 
economy of the neighborhoods of Hickman Mills C-1.  Thus racism and insufficient school 
levies lay at the heart of the current plight of Hickman Mills. 
Methodology 
 In order to understand more clearly what occurred within Hickman Mills in the latter half 
of the twentieth century, I employ various methodologies in researching the large shift in the 
school district:  documentary analysis from archival research, qualitative analysis in the form of 
oral history interviews, and quantitative analysis focused upon census records from the tracts 
located within the Hickman Mills district boundaries.  I collected and compiled census data from 
the U.S. Census of the Population for the decades 1950 through 2000, primarily to create a 
snapshot of white and black populations in the different census tracts within Hickman Mills.  I 
also collected articles from the Kansas City Star and the Kansas City Times, primarily those that 
dealt with the annexation of Hickman Mills, but also writings on South Kansas City, as the 
neighborhoods comprising Hickman Mills would become known.  The two newspapers also 
proved valuable in understanding the conflict between city commissions, housing authorities, 
and residential neighborhoods from the 1960s through the 1990s.  Surprisingly, I was not able to 
find relevant information about Hickman Mills from issues between 1950 and 2000 of The Call, 
Kansas City’s African-American owned and targeted newspaper.  This is likely because 
Hickman Mills did not become part of Kansas City until 1961 and did not have any black 
residents until 1968.  Additionally, between 1968 and most of the 1980s, the black population in 
Hickman Mills remained very small, with it significantly increasing only in the 1990s, and 
mostly towards the end of the decade. 
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However, a major source of documentary history came from a small, weekly newspaper 
called the Jackson County Advocate, run mostly by a single family in Grandview, focuses almost 
exclusively on issues and events pertinent to Hickman Mills and its southern neighbor, the city of 
Grandview, Missouri.45  The paper proved to be an essential source in understanding levy and 
bond battles, school operations and leadership, and neighborhood opposition to unwanted outside 
forces such as industrialization and desegregation.   Additional documents came from a 
collection of papers compiled by the legal team involved in Kansas City, Missouri’s suit against 
its surrounding suburbs, including Hickman Mills in the early 1980s, which can be found at 
UMKC.  Yearbooks from the two high schools in the district provided further views into student 
life, but more importantly demonstrated racial change, particularly in the late 1990s, as the 
majority of the school portraits shifted from white faces to black ones. 
 I also conducted interviews with former students, teachers, administrators and parents 
from Hickman Mills, which provided important information about major events, including the 
1957 tornado and the 1961 annexation.  Interviews with current and former residents also gave 
glimpses into attitudes among white community members as they watched their neighborhoods 
change in ways they did not always appreciate.  Talking with black residents of Hickman Mills 
revealed prejudice and difficulty in the development of the neighborhoods and the school district, 
and also gave a counterpoint to white views toward the “urbanization” of the land.  I interviewed 
twelve “Ruskinites,” seven white and five black.  Five of the residents lived in the area since 
their own childhoods and seven moved into the region as adults.  Nine of the interviewees lived 
in the district for more than twenty years, with five being raised completely in the school district.  
                                                 
45 The Jackson County Advocate’s operations have grown over time and now the newspaper has multiple employees 
who work in a very small four-room office. 
 
 
 15 
Of the twelve persons interviewed, eight remain in the same neighborhoods: four black and four 
white.  The other four moved to neighboring Raytown, Lee’s Summit, or Independence. 
Theory of Suburbanization and Urbanization 
Hickman Mills’s transition from a rural to suburban community, followed by its apparent 
transformation into an urban space problematizes public assumptions about what is “suburban” 
and what is “urban.”  Additionally, the development of the school district at the heart of the 
community in South Kansas City reveals blurred lines between “urban” versus “suburban” 
growth.  For example, widened streets, highways, lighting, as well as sewer and gas lines are 
effects of urbanization, yet are vital to the existence and growth of suburban neighborhoods.  The 
Hickman Mills community largely embraced urbanization when it benefited residents, but fought 
against aspects of urban growth when it conflicted with their sense of normalcy in the suburb.  
Specifically, Hickmanites opposed landfills, low-income housing, and school desegregation, 
because residents expressed that those elements would harm the community’s economy and 
independence from Kansas City.46  A discussion of the scholarship on urbanization and the role 
of suburbs, combined with an analysis of public perception of suburban and urban communities 
and schools demonstrates Robert Sampson’s argument that neighborhoods “are not inherent but 
are socially reproduced.”47  To a large degree, the separation between suburbs and cities is 
illusionary, yet by common agreement, remain powerful and binding. 
Objective measures of city size and demography support the idea that suburbs are a social 
construction.  For instance, while the U.S. Census differentiates between “rural” and “urban,” it 
does not employ the term “suburban.”  The census’s categorization includes “urbanized areas,” 
communities of 50,000 or more people; “urban clusters,” with at least 2,500 but less than 50,000 
                                                 
46 Ironically, Hickman Mills was already officially part of the city when it voiced greatest opposition.   
47 Robert J. Sampson, Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect (Chicago: University 
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residents; finally “rural,” being any “population, housing, and territory not included within an 
urban area.”48  Suburbs do not gain a special categorization when counting numbers of people 
and where they live.  Instead, suburbs as a space gained their definition through social status, 
which was usually defined by means of a combination of factors such as education level, average 
income, and race.49 
Studies on education have largely supported a dichotomy between urban and suburban 
schools, beginning with James Conant’s problematic yet influential comparison of suburban and 
urban schools in 1946, Slums and Suburbs.50  The language of the title alone alludes to Conant’s 
assertion that urban schools, like the communities in which they were situated, deteriorated to the 
point of being harmful.51  Conant suggested improvements to be made to urban high schools in 
order to slow the movement of white families to the suburbs, which he argued had schools that 
were more “college-oriented.”52  Slums and Suburbs made clear distinctions between urban and 
suburban schools, well before urban schools and communities experienced decline.  In some 
ways, Conant proved to be prescient, as urban schools did largely experience a decline while 
suburban schools rose in prominence, all in the last fifty to sixty years.  In fact, much of 
educational scholarship today that addresses urban schooling focuses on the rise and fall of 
school districts in city centers, while suburban educational scholarship is new and still 
developing.   
Research on both urban and suburban schools often emphasize the role race plays in the 
schools and communities, which have been traditionally part of the defining characteristics 
                                                 
48 U.S. Census, Urban and Rural Classification.  http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/urban-rural.html 
49 Leo F. Schnore, Class and Race in Cities and Suburbs (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1972), 44-48. 
50 James Bryant Conant, Slums and Suburbs: A Commentary on Schools in Metropolitan Areas (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1946). 
51 Ibid., 18. 
52 Ibid., 78. 
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between “urban” and “suburban.”  Because the racial divide between urban and suburban 
communities and schools has been changing, scholars are beginning to call for a shift in how we 
address race and schools.  Erica Frankenberg commented on the reality of racial change in 
suburban areas with a plea for “a new way of thinking about suburbs and suburban school 
districts.”53  Some scholars have delved into the story of black suburbanization, such as Andrew 
Wiese, Mary-Patillo McCoy, and Bruce D. Haynes, which complicate the prevailing myth of the 
white suburb.  Regardless, the perception of suburban neighborhoods and schools as spaces for 
white middle-class families continues.54  However, racial and economic changes in suburban 
communities like Hickman Mills supports Frankenberg’s assertion that suburbs are not 
monolithic and require a new conceptualization.   
Urban historians and sociologists have explained that technically, there is no such thing 
as suburbanization, as all sprawl is urban in nature.55  Suburban development is an extension of 
urban growth, a particular kind that has favored relatively large tracts of residential housing for 
middle-class white families.56  Phillip Hauser admitted that the definition of urban is “a complex 
matter,” depending on “political, historical, or cultural considerations” and not only 
demography.57  The fact that residents of Hickman Mills did not consider themselves urbanites 
                                                 
53 Erica Frankenberg, “Understanding Suburban School District Transformation: A Typology of Suburban 
Districts,” in The Resegregation of Suburban Schools: A Hidden Crisis in American Education, eds. Erica 
Frankenberg and Gary Orfield (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press, 2012), 27. 
54 Center on Urban & Metropolitan Policy, Suburbs and the Census: Patterns of Growth and Decline, by William H. 
Lucy and David L. Phillips (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2001), 2-3.  Becky Nicolaides, “How 
Hell Moved from the City to the Suburbs,” in The New Suburban History, eds. Kevin M. Kruse and Thomas J. 
Sugrue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 80-84. 
55 Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 183.  Joel 
Garreau, Edge City: Life on the New Frontier (New York: Random House, 1991), 398-399.  Philip M. Hauser and 
Leo F. Schnore, The Study of Urbanization (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), 8-14.  The National 
Commission on Urban Problems, The Challenge of America’s Metropolitan Population Outlook, 1960-1985, by 
Patricia Leavey Hodge and Philip M. Hauser (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), 1-4.  Lewis 
Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and its Prospects (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, 1961), 486.  
56 Schnore, Class and Race, 2-3. 
57 Hauser and Schnore, Study of Urbanization, 9. 
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until African Americans moved into the neighborhoods in larger numbers demonstrates that race 
became the defining characteristic of the community in South Kansas City.  When it was white, 
Hickman Mills was a suburb.  When it became majority black, Hickman Mills was urban.  This 
study addresses the transformation the district and its surrounding neighborhoods underwent, but 
by doing so it calls into question racist and classist definitions of living space in American 
society. 
 The history of Hickman Mills also demonstrates the importance of identity, in this case 
identity with the school district over the municipality.  Even though the neighborhoods 
comprising Hickman Mills were incorporated by Kansas City, Missouri in 1961 and thus 
technically fit the definition of an urban community, residents identified themselves with the 
school district instead of the city.  The school boundaries became the borders for Hickman Mills 
as a suburban community in the minds of the local residents, as school identity became the 
symbol of a separation between the southern Kansas City neighborhoods and the city itself.  
Views on race reinforced the separation between Hickman Mills and the rest of Kansas City, in 
that Hickmanites identified with a predominantly white school, while Kansas City Missouri 
School District served a growing number of black students.  Hickmanites continued to self-
identify as suburbanites, until a strong African-American presence emerged in several 
neighborhoods in the district during the 1990s.  The perception of the community then shifted to 
being an urban locale too similar to Kansas City, so discontents sought other places to live.  
 The story of Hickman Mills is an important addition to the overall study of urban sprawl 
and suburbanization, because it adds to a burgeoning scholarship that complicates the myth of 
the suburb as a relatively quiet and tranquil space.  Residents of Hickman Mills fought over 
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school funding, school board control, and even common identity, only strongly uniting when 
faced with the outside threat of continued urbanization from neighboring Kansas City.   
Hickman Mills was a suburban community largely in name only, yet that identity was powerful 
in the lives of its residents.  Few in Hickman Mills wanted to identify themselves as urban 
residents and would most likely would have opposed the annexation of their neighborhoods in 
1961 if they had any legal recourse.  Opposition came instead to joining Kansas City, Missouri 
school district in 1964, then to a metropolitan school district plan in 1968 and 1969.  When 
residents of Hickman Mills could fight against city control, they did, even though Hickmanites 
were also Kansas Citians.  Hickman Mills was a suburb, but was in actuality a collection of 
neighborhoods that identified themselves with the school district.  At the same time, municipal 
boundaries made Hickman Mills a part of Kansas City, even if the residents largely attempted to 
keep the city at arm’s length. 
Purpose of the Study 
 The dissertation examines the history of Hickman Mills as it transformed from a village 
to a school district within a sprawling city.  I describe how the primary concern among school 
leaders shifted from a preoccupation with being able to build enough schools in order to 
accommodate the rapid population growth occurring from the 1950s through part of the 1970s, to 
worries over actions from Kansas City and Missouri that would lead to community and school 
desegregation, to profound concerns on how to operate an underfunded school district.  Another 
important element of the story of Hickman Mills centers on accreditation, essentially approval 
from the state and a national organization called the North Central Association of Schools and 
Colleges.  School leaders were largely obsessed over accreditation, as at first in the 1950s and 
1960s they sought to gain it.  In the 1970s and 1980s they strove to keep it, and in the 1990s they 
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were prepared to lose it.58  In a sense, this is a history of the rise and decline of a school district 
and the community it serves.  However, it is also a story of change, some of it prompted by the 
actions of those living in Hickman Mills, and some of it out of residents’ control.  
Throughout the first three chapters of this study, I explain battles the community and the 
school leadership fought over taxation.  Tensions between the school board and a portion of the 
community resulted from repeated attempts to raise the school levy while a small but significant 
number of residents opposed any increase in their property taxes.  This funding issue was 
important for the district, as more money allowed them to be able to expand more readily in 
order to accommodate the continually growing student body, another important theme in the first 
three chapters.  Thus the main crux of the first half of this study explains how for the most part, 
residents of Hickman Mills were focused on within the community and the school district.  The 
second half of the dissertation, chapters four and five, analyzes a shift in Hickman Mills as 
residents fought against “outside influences” that were perceived to be attempts to change or 
even destroy the community.   
This story of Hickman Mills is also an analysis of power held by different groups of 
people within the school district’s borders.  Power and local control was largely held by white 
suburbanites during the growth and expansion of the school district and the community it served 
up until 1961, when annexation by Kansas City Missouri established that the residents of 
Hickman Mills did not have as much control as they imagined.  After 1961, the general actions 
taken by leaders of the Hickman Mills School District, along with neighborhood associations and 
community groups, demonstrated an attempt by locals to exert any power or control they could, 
usually to oppose measures taken or even suggested by outside state or even city authorities.  
                                                 
58  The district lost complete accreditation with the state of Missouri in 2012, having since carried the status of a 
provisionally accredited district. 
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This is the point that race and class become a prominent issue in Hickman Mills, as the center of 
the controversies experienced by South Kansas Citians was their reluctance to live near or attend 
school with poor or black people. 
 Chapter one (1845-1957) presents Hickman Mills’s back story: how it came to be, where 
it exists and the nature of its relationship to Kansas City through the 1950s.  The first chapter 
also deals with the beginnings of suburban growth in the region, specifically the entrance of 
highways and large housing developments.  I explain how a rural community became a suburban 
one and how that changed the way schools operated.   
In chapter two (1957-1960), I focus on the last few years of the 1950s, with two large 
events that altered the trajectory of the district: a tornado and a political storm with the school 
board.  Both events were traumatic for the community and yet, the aftermath of the natural 
disaster and the school fight led to an accredited school district with improved physical facilities, 
the kind of schools of which suburban Kansas Citians could be proud.   
Chapter three (1959-1970) addresses a growing concern in the 1960s among residents in 
Hickman Mills that growth may have been too rapid.  I analyze the effects of annexation by 
Kansas City, something residents were powerless to stop.  However, when school leaders 
attempted a merge with Kansas City Missouri School District as a means to better afford to 
educate the residents’ children, community members clearly and strongly demonstrated their 
ability to oppose the measure.  Hickman Mills’s residents may not have been able to block their 
own annexation to Kansas City, but they unmistakably verified that they could and would oppose 
completely joining with Kansas City via its school district.   
Chapter four (1964-1990) addresses how many white residents of Hickman Mills 
opposed desegregation efforts in housing or schooling from the 1960s through the 1980s.   
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Struggles against other elements of urbanization (such as mobile homes, low-income housing, 
and landfills) are also addressed in this chapter, as they help reveal the central tension between 
Hickman Mills and Kansas City.  Residents of Hickman Mills resented efforts made by Kansas 
City officials to “devalue” their neighborhoods, whether through housing or dumps.  I emphasize 
the rancor Ruskinites expressed against “forced integration,” another perception on the part of 
whites in South Kansas City that their peaceful community was going to be ruined for the sake of 
social experimentation.  
In chapter five (1990-2000), I focus on the importance of perception in Hickman Mills, as 
locals as well as the Kansas City metropolitan area at large began to associate Hickman Mills 
with crime, violence, and poverty.  Eventually, the school district would educate a larger 
population of poor students, and crime and violence did rise significantly in the area during the 
2000s, but the reputation and vision of Hickman Mills as an urban school district serving urban 
neighborhoods was created in the 1990s, even though school officials tried to fight it.  Hickman 
Mills transformed into part of urban Kansas City, Missouri. 
Finally, I analyze the beginnings of white flight in prominent neighborhoods as residents 
sought to escape what they saw as the extremely negative effects of low-income housing, section 
eight housing, and the fears that neighborhoods will become “run-down.”  When black presence 
in Hickman Mills became large enough to constitute a “threat,” whites left, or they stayed but 
became less involved in their community and their schools.  Essentially, while the citizens of 
Hickman Mills felt empowered before the annexation to Kansas City, after 1961 long-time 
residents felt that they were losing more battles to the city to the north.  Eventually, with a 
“tipping point” in low-income housing and black presence in the suburb that occurred in the 
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2000s, many whites demonstrated their loss of power and control by either by moving away or 
shutting in their houses and retreating from community involvement.   
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Chapter 1: Growing Pains and the Search for Identity 
 
 The Creation of the Hickman Mills School District and its Rapid Growth During the 
Postwar Boom, 1845-1957 
 
 The Hickman Mills community today is proud of its pioneer heritage, of existing in a 
space where Americans pushed westward during the mid-1800s.  One can see that with 
sculptures and signs celebrating westward trails and historical markers that dot the landscape in 
south Kansas City.  And yet, the area of Hickman Mills is largely residentially or commercially 
developed, with some neighborhoods appearing to be more suburban while others more urban.  
For much of Hickman Mills’s early growth, school and community leaders were not focused on 
creating a suburb, instead they sought to build a strong, self-sustaining community with an 
independent school district.  This chapter explores the beginnings of the community and the 
school district it created, with an emphasis on how school leaders tried to meet the educational 
demands of a suddenly rising population in the 1950s.   
Understanding the difficulties Hickman Mills experienced during its transition from a 
rural to suburban community compared to the later “urbanization” of Hickman Mills complicates 
the popular narrative of a “rising and falling” school district.  For example, the growth and 
development of Hickman Mills and its schools that occurred in the first half of the twentieth 
century was fraught with misgivings on the part of its residents.  Additionally, school battles 
were bitterly fought long before the district was seen as going into decline.  Post-war 
suburbanization of the region led locals to begin to question their identity in the 1950s.  School 
and community leaders began posing questions asking if Hickman Mills ought to become 
village, a suburb, or part of Kansas City.  For the people living in the small yet rapidly growing 
area to the south of Kansas City, Hickman Mills’s expansion was neither easy nor simple. 
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Growth of a Small Village with Country Schools 
The communities constituting the Hickman Mills C-1 School District and what is now 
commonly referred to as southern Kansas City first existed as a sparsely populated area of rich 
farmland inhabited by settlers who were pushing west in the early nineteenth century.1  As part 
of Washington Township within Jackson County, Missouri, this region, while less famous than 
Independence to the northeast, served as a way station for groups traveling on the Santa Fe, 
California, or Oregon Trails.2  In 1845, one group of settlers attempted to establish a town to be 
called Union Point, but its efforts resulted only in the construction of a schoolhouse and a 
blacksmith’s shop, not a thriving community large enough to support the newly minted “town.”3  
Though the town existed essentially in name only, through the efforts of some enterprising 
settlers, the farmland began to attract more people and a burgeoning village came into being.4  
Commercial opportunities in selling goods to travelers brought the attention of a Midwestern 
entrepreneur named Edwin Hickman, who, in 1854, moved from nearby Independence, another 
stopping point for those bound west, to the area that would become southern Kansas City.  He 
built a mill, donated neighboring land for a church, and began to establish the village that would 
be named after him and his mill.5  
Success was short-lived for Hickman, as five years after beginning his venture, banking 
and speculation failures caused his mill to go out of business, forcing him to sell.  Even so, the 
                                                          
1 Jami Parkison, The Journey to Our Future: The History of Hickman Mills C-1 School District, 1902-2002 (Kansas 
City, MO: Hickman Mills C-1 School District, 2002), 5. The designation C-1 refers to the district’s status as the first 
consolidated school district in Missouri. 
2 Ibid., 7.  “Township” was a designation given to the area during the nineteenth century, denoting a subsection of 
the county. 
3 Ibid, 27-28.  Union Point was officially a town, as per the plat with the State of Missouri in 1855.  However, the 
population never grew sufficiently to support the town as originally planned. 
4 The US Census typically defines a town as having one hundred to thousands of residents, while a village is 
described as being smaller than a town, normally less organized, and existing on unincorporated land.  For much of 
Hickman Mills’ early history, it existed as a village. 
5 Ibid., 8-9. 
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name for the growing community became associated with its originator: Hickman’s Mill.6  Other 
commercial and transportation boons helped the fledgling village continue to grow.   By 1900, a 
hundred families or so lived within the borders of Hickman’s Mill and residents requested a post 
office and mail station.  The construction of a railway station near what is now the intersection of 
Grandview and Red Bridge Road subsequently brought traffic from farmers and ranchers who 
formerly brought their livestock to central Kansas City for slaughter, but began to deliver their 
cattle to southern Kansas City instead.7  At the same time as the railroad significantly contributed 
to the growth of southern Kansas City in the early twentieth century, it also facilitated the growth 
of industry in Hickman’s Mill, first in the form of a powder plant and then a rabbit farm.8  Along 
with more farms, a post office, a blacksmith, stores, and factories came families, and from 1900 
to 1950 the village (often called “town,” but was not officially designated as such) of Hickman’s 
Mill grew, albeit slowly.  According to legend, a clerical error within the post office 
inadvertently changed the name of the village from Hickman’s Mill to Hickman Mills, making 
the new, albeit inaccurate, moniker official and eventually becoming the common title among 
residents.9   
The steady influx of families to Hickman Mills brought children to the community and 
residents demonstrated a clear concern for the education of their offspring by building schools.    
Four original schoolhouses were constructed and operated during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century before district consolidation in 1901.  Technically, a school existed within Hickman 
Mills before the village itself did, as the founders of the failed Union Point built a small one-
                                                          
6 Parkison, Journey to Our Future, 8-9; Union Historical Company, The History of Jackson County, Missouri, 
Containing A History of The County, Its Cities, Towns, Etc.  (Kansas City, MO: Birdsall, Williams & Co., 1881), 
361. 
7  Parkison, Journey to Our Future, 28.    
8 Parkison, Journey to Our Future, 30; Stephen S. Slaughter, oral history interview, April 19, 1984, transcript, p. 
103, Truman Library, Independence, MO. 
9 Parkison, Journey to Our Future, 9. 
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room schoolhouse in 1855, naming it Union Point.10  The Union Point school remained after the 
town’s founders left and became one of the four elementary schools in the newly formed 
Hickman Mills School District in 1901.  The building was replaced with a larger brick school, 
but retained its name and operated until 1980.11  The other three original schools, Holmes Park, 
Rockford, and Hickman that were built before district consolidation were later renovated and 
expanded, eventually operating as small elementary schools until the late 1970s and early 
1980s.12  In Hickman Mills’ beginnings, these four schools served as educational centers for the 
community because originally, there was no school district for the Hickman Mills 
neighborhoods.  Missouri did not begin to consolidate schools under common leadership until 
1901, hence none of the four schools was centrally located in the town.13 
School Consolidation  
As in other cities and rural towns throughout the country, several early leaders of the 
Hickman Mills community sought to create an official school district, including a high school, in 
order to provide more educational opportunities and training for their children.  Three prominent 
figures in Hickman Mills’s early history, Orlando Slaughter, T.T. Moore, and William Johnson, 
worked together to create the first consolidated school district in the state of Missouri, which 
remains a source of pride for Hickman Mills residents today.14  These three men petitioned the 
Missouri General Assembly to support a bill that would allow two or more common school 
districts to consolidate, residents vote for school directors, as well as raise bonds for educational 
                                                          
10 Ibid., 25. 
11 Ibid., 31-32. 
12 Ibid., 33-34. 
13 See figure 1 in appendix I. 
14 In each of the interviews I conducted with former and current residents of Hickman Mills, those I interviewed 
made sure to point out that Hickman Mills was the first consolidated district in Missouri.  Additionally, meetings 
with centralized staff members at Hickman Mills’s district offices resulted in the same conversation.  Residents of 
the Hickman Mills district are incredibly proud of being first, and quick to point it out.   
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expenses.15  The state legislature passed the consolidation measure in March of 1901, which was 
to go into effect in October of that year.  Slaughter, Moore, and Johnson had six months to 
convince the four individual common school boards of Hickman Mills, Rockford, Holmes Park, 
and Union Point, including the communities that comprised them to combine and create a larger 
school district.16  While the schools in the Hickman Mills area could legally consolidate in 
October 1901, residents did not vote on consolidation until April 1902, at which point Holmes 
Park, Union Point, Rockford, and Hickman Mills common schools officially joined together as 
one district and voters approved a bond issue of $3,250 in order to build a high school.17  
Support for consolidation was fairly strong, especially with the promise that the school board 
would be comprised of members from each of the four former common school districts.  The 
high school was finished quickly, with the bond passing in April, construction starting in the 
summer, and Ruskin High officially opening in October 1902.18  From this point forward until 
after World War II, the Hickman Mills community and its accompanying school district slowly 
grew.  In essence, Hickman Mills as a school district encountered more growth than the 
community itself.  As was the case in much of the country in the beginning of the twentieth 
century, more children started attending grade and high school, but Hickman Mills as a village 
did not dramatically change.   
                                                          
15 Parkison, Journey to Our Future, 41. 
16 The existence of a consolidated school district was one step in facilitating Hickman Mills’s growth and prosperity.  
Slaughter, Moore, and Johnson later formed a chamber of commerce and successfully petitioned for an official 
branch that was specifically associated with the school district, having the same boundaries.  South Kansas City 
Chamber of Commerce, “History: From Chamber of Commerce of Consolidated School District #1 to South Kansas 
City Chamber of Commerce, 1931-2007” (unpublished document, 2012). 
17 Parkison, Journey to Our Future, 43.  3250 dollars in 1902 would equate to over 88,000 dollars in 2012.  While 
this was a large sum of money to raise in a very small community, it was relatively small amount to fund 
construction of a high school. 
18 Ibid., 44.  Ruskin was named after the essayist and art critic John Ruskin.  No one could agree on a name, so the 
school board turned to William Johnson, who selected the name of his favorite author, Ruskin.  Because many 
school districts held the same name as the high school, for quite a long time many referred to Hickman Mills School 
District as “Ruskin,” which was never the name of the school district. 
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Even considering the community support in passing the bond and the consolidation of the 
four elementary schools, the early period of the district’s establishment and growth set a pattern 
that would come to define and shape the district’s history.  From its inception as a district, 
Hickman Mills experienced difficulties and opposition even while attempting to expand.  Within 
ten years of the district’s consolidation, a vocal minority of residents formed an anti-tax league 
and pushed for a vote on dissolving the school district in order to decrease county levies and 
bonds.19  Supporters of Hickman Mills’s schools held the vote in 1914, with forty-four persons 
voting for dismantling the district and 139 for keeping it.20  This measure reveals how small the 
populace was at this time and it to marks the beginning of a long history of contention in 
Hickman Mills over the role of the district, the nature of the community, as well as taxation 
policy.  This tension over the function of the local school remains as one of the most enduring 
problems Hickman Mills has and continues to face.   
From the formation of the school district in 1902 to its transformation in the face of the 
population explosion of the 1950s, Hickman Mills consistently developed its buildings and 
updated facilities in order to keep up with population growth.21  Each of the four original 
common schools were expanded and then completely rebuilt in order to accommodate more 
students and provide better educational experiences.22  Ruskin High School experienced a 
similar evolution, as it was rebuilt in 1931 for the second time in order to accommodate the 
                                                          
19 Ibid.,54. 
20 Ibid., 54-55. 
21 During this period of burgeoning growth, Harry S. Truman, long before becoming president, served on the 
Hickman Mills school board.  Truman’s family lived in Grandview, just south of Hickman Mills, and his 
involvement with the board was very brief, only a few months in the summer of 1916 before joining the army to 
fight in World War I.  See Jon Turner, Truman’s Grandview Farm (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2011), 31; 
Mary Jane Truman (Harry S. Truman’s sister), oral history interview, January 2, 1976, transcript, p. 11, Truman 
Library, Independence, MO. 
22 For example, the four schools would eventually help introduce Kindergarten classes into the district in the late 
1950s, a crucial step for the district to gain accreditation, which will be addressed in chapter 2. 
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growth of the student body and the inclusion of families from outlying areas.23  The high school 
became the largest building in the Hickman Mills region, and thus became a type of village town 
square.  Even when Hickman Mills became part of Kansas City later in its history, the high 
school remained a civic center for the community. 
Suburban Growth South of Kansas City 
Hickman Mills changed from a sleepy rural village south of Kansas City to a working-
class suburb after the 1940s as Kansas City, like many large municipalities across the country, 
was expanding to accommodate a population explosion.  The economic geography of Kansas 
City led to Hickman Mills being an ideal place for lower middle-class whites, as explained by 
James Shortridge: 
If the Country Club District represented an idealized but largely unattainable vision of 
Kansas City for an average white resident and if the East Side was an area to ignore, 
suburban developments to the south, southeast, and north were practicable realities.  Here 
were new and affordable homes, green grass, good schools and convenient shopping 
centers.  With postwar prosperity, growth came rapidly.24  
 
The suburban neighborhoods being created in Johnson County, Kansas, to the west of Kansas 
City, were much too expensive for lower-middle-class and working-class Kansas Citians to 
afford.  Additionally, Shortridge argues that the East side of Kansas City was either considered 
“too black” or too distant from places of work in downtown Kansas City.25  Hickman Mills, as a 
village just to the south of Kansas City with available land and promises of easy access due to a 
growing highway system, offered a feasible alternative for those who wanted to escape from the 
congestion of the city.   
                                                          
23 Ibid., 58. 
24 James R. Shortridge, Kansas City and How It Grew, 1822-2011 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 
2012), 121. 
25 Ibid. 
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Longtime residents of Hickman Mills confirm this reality in expressing that affordable 
housing, employment, and proximity to Kansas City proper were chief motivations to relocating 
to Hickman Mills.  For the Baker and Husman families, moving to Hickman Mills brought them 
closer to places of work and allowed them to afford more spacious housing.  In recounting her 
entrance to the community in 1954, Carla Baker explained that the school district was not a draw 
as much as “there was property available, and we had a GI loan, the price was right, so we 
moved here.”26  Carla’s husband was a photographer who worked for the Bendix Corporation (at 
the Bannister Federal Complex), just west of Hickman Mills, so their relocation also allowed 
them easy access to her husband’s place of work.  For the Husmans, Hickman Mills was a 
convenient location between the Richards-Gebaur Air Base to the south and Kansas City to the 
north.  Lilly Husman shared, “my father worked on jet engines on the base, but the layout near 
the base was bad, so my parents got a house in Ruskin Heights.”27  Other families, like the Hills, 
relocated specifically as they wanted to leave the city because of family expansion.  The Hills 
were living in Kansas City, were expecting their first baby in 1956, and wanted to leave their 
apartment in the city for a house and some land to raise children.  While heading to a drive-in 
movie on Bannister and State Line, they saw a billboard that advertised small houses for a $99 
down payment and $99 a month mortgage.  As Gloria Hill recounted,  
we were paying no attention to the school district, it hadn’t even crossed our minds.  We 
wanted a bigger place to live at an affordable price.  It seemed a long way out at the time, 
but we got to have cows in our back yard!  It was like living in the country!”28   
 
The affordable housing, spacious land, and seemingly pristine environment of Hickman Mills, as 
well as its location close to downtown Kansas City, with its accessibility thanks to a growing 
interstate system of highways was a major draw for young families.   
                                                          
26 Carla Baker, interview with author, August 14, 2012. 
27 Lilly Husman, interview with author, August 25, 2012. 
28 Gloria Cardona, interview with author, August 30, 2012; James Hill, interview with author, August 30, 2012. 
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These favorable conditions were also the result of the work of Praver and Sons, a housing 
development company based in New York that, after seeing the success of Levittown, began 
erecting pre-fabricated homes in suburban neighborhoods.29  The houses they built in Hickman 
Mills came in four varieties: two bedrooms, three bedrooms, three bedrooms and a basement, 
and three bedrooms and a crawl space.30  They also were equipped with new electric stoves, 
which Praver and Sons included as a major selling point.31  The three-bedroom house cost 
$11,200 (around $94,000 in 2012 dollars), with a basement addition costing $1,500 ($12,685 in 
2012).32  Almost all the homes were built without a basement, a decision that many residents 
would later regret.  Business boomed for Praver, as by 1957, they had built nearly two thousand 
homes, sometimes pouring twenty-five slabs a day.33  In addition to achieving national 
recognition by winning an award from the American Institute of Architects, these homes, 
particularly in Ruskin Heights, were wildly popular locally both for their spaciousness and 
affordability.34   
Imitating more famous developers such as William Leavitt and J.C. Nichols, Praver 
ensured that each house had an open backyard and the housing developments were located 
within walking distance of a park.35  Moreover, Praver and other developers used the locations of 
their homes relative to recreation and commercial properties to drive demand for their housing, 
as well as spurring retail growth to attract residents and shoppers. The ultimate goal for Praver, 
like Leavitt and Nichols, was to also develop businesses, particularly shopping areas, in order to 
                                                          
29 Carolyn Glenn Brewer, Caught In the Path: A Tornado’s Fury, A Community’s Rebirth (Kansas City, MO: Prairie 
Figure Books, 1997), 6. 
30 Ibid. 
31 “Big Surprises With New Home in Ruskin Heights,” Grandview Advocate, vol. 1, no. 52, January 7, 1954, 3. 
32 Mike Smith, Warnings: The True Story of How Science Tamed the Weather (Austin, TX: Greenleaf Book Group 
Press, 2010), 15. 
33 Ibid. 
34 As mentioned in a Miami newspaper, Praver and Sons won awards for developments in Kansas City, New York, 
and South Dade Florida.  “Culter Ridge Praver Homes,” The Miami News, May 18, 1958, E1.  
35 Brewer, Caught In the Path, 7. 
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further entice families to buy houses.  In addition, developing commercial zones also helped 
ensure that families’ needs and desires were met and that property values would remain high.  
Industrial development did occur on the fringes of the Praver neighborhoods, with Truman 
Corners to the southwest on Grandview’s town border, as well as the eventual Bannister 
development to the north on Bannister road and what would later become state highway 71.  
These developments were important for the area, as they transformed the landscape from a rural 
prairie to suburban sprawl.  They also had a profound impact on the school district, as the growth 
of housing meant a sudden and rapid rise in student enrollments.  The concern over housing and 
student accommodation would be a dominant concern for the school district leadership for the 
next two decades. 
Other developers got involved with the growth of suburban neighborhoods in the 
southland, particularly in the Ruskin Heights region.  In 1954, the Charles F. Curry Real Estate 
Company (a Kansas City firm founded in 1924) built the Ruskin Heights Shopping Center along 
Blue Ridge Road as it meets Red Ridge Road.36  The shopping plaza had hardware, toy, clothing, 
and auto stores, along with a barbershop, salon, pharmacy, dance school, bakery, shoe-repair, 
dry-cleaner and a Ben Franklin variety store.37 The center quickly became a major local 
shopping destination even meriting a stop on the Kansas City bus line, which brought customers 
from central Kansas City.38 
Seeing almost immediate success in Ruskin Heights, Praver and Sons expanded and built 
an additional suburban community to the immediate west of their first development, announcing 
                                                          
36 “Ruskin Heights New Shopping Center!” Advertisement, Grandview Advocate, vol. 3, no. 46, November 25, 
1954, 3. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Dell Jacobs, interview with author, December 4, 2012. 
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in 1955 the opening of Ruskin Hills.39  Boasting that this area is “where exclusive suburban 
homes are built,” Praver offered three and four-bedroom ranch-style homes with attached 
garages and two bathrooms, all priced between eleven and fourteen thousand dollars, with a one 
hundred dollar down payment.40  Like Ruskin Heights, these new homes were filled with modern 
electric appliances, in addition to offering air conditioning and basements if pre-ordered.41  
Ruskin Hills homes were a little more expensive than their Ruskin Heights counterparts, but they 
were larger and offered more amenities.  Praver & Sons continued to expand in this new 
neighborhood and three years after opening Ruskin Hills, the company announced a new style of 
home, the “tri-lux” four-bedroom, two bath model, with covered parking, and a basement for 
eleven thousand dollars and no down payment for qualified veterans.42  Advertisements for the 
neighborhood homes promised that residents would “enjoy living in a quiet suburban 
community!”43  The developer’s work resulted in solid suburban growth in Hickman Mills. 
Just as Ruskin Heights homes brought commercial development, Ruskin Hills as a 
housing development spurred community growth.  Just south of the Ruskin Heights 
neighborhood, a trio of families formed the Hickman Mills Country Club in 1955, built at 
Longview and Blue Ridge Road.44   The club was advertised as “one of the most modern in any 
                                                          
39 “Praver & Sons Back Again—Ruskin Hills” Advertisement, Jackson County Advocate, 65th year, no. 37, 
November 3, 1955, 7. 
40 Ibid.  A $14,000 house in 1955 would cost $118,395 in 2012 dollars.   
41 Ibid. 
42 “Eight all new 1958 Models by…Praver &Sons” Advertisement, Jackson County Advocate, 67th year, no. 33, 
October 3, 1957, 5. 
43 Ibid. 
44 State of Missouri Certificate of Incorporation, Hickman Mills Country Club of Hickman Mills, Missouri, 
Jefferson City, MO, December 8, 1955, Papers of the Ruskin Hills Home Association.  The incorporators (also 
original board of directors) were three sets of couples—the Sharps, living north on Euclid Avenue in Kansas City; 
the Cones, living east on Suwanee Road in Johnson County; and the Hudsons, the most “local” couple, living in 
Hickman Mills on Route #1.  The country club would be renamed within two years (Holiday Country Club) and 
apparently had some operational issues, as the board was warned in 1958 and 1959 that it failed to file an annual 
report to state officials.  The state finally ordered the club closed in 1983 for continually failing to submit annual 
membership and financial reports. See James C. Kirkpatrick, Secretary of State for the State of Missouri, “Forfeiture 
of Charter or Authority to do Business,” January 1, 1983. 
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suburban community in the United States, and certainly comparable to any in the Kansas City 
area.”45  Sporting a large swimming pool, picnic grounds, tennis courts, ballroom and spacious 
dining area, the country club offered memberships for $250 to $350, the equivalent of two to 
three times the down payment on many of the homes in the area.46  Country clubs were not 
abnormal for upscale suburban communities, which Ruskin Heights (and later, Ruskin Hills) was 
turning out to be, even if they were not as exclusive as the neighborhoods being built to the west 
in Johnson County.47  Regardless, by the beginning of 1959, Hickman Mills, particularly 
residents of Ruskin Heights and Ruskin Hills, had a country club to call their own. 
The construction of both homes and businesses continued to attract families to the 
Hickman Mills area.  In 1950, there were about 2,500 people living in Hickman Mills; by 1959, 
there were 23,000.48  From another perspective, in 1950, the neighborhoods of Hickman Mills 
were too small and sparsely populated for the US Census to assign them a census tract, instead 
they were part of the overall Jackson County figures of about 877 people per square mile.  By 
1960, just ten years later, Hickman Mills contained three full census tracts and pieces of three 
others.   The Ruskin Heights neighborhood alone dominated one tract with about two thousand 
people per square mile.49  The growth was fast, which benefited contractors and businesses, but 
made the job of the school district suddenly more difficult, as new facilities, teachers, and 
supplies had to be found or created in order to accommodate the rush of children. 
Even though the growth of housing developments would directly benefit the schools of 
Hickman Mills during the 1950s building boom, schools did not factor largely into Praver’s 
                                                          
45 “You are invited to become A Charter Member of the Hickman Mills Country Club” Advertisement, Jackson 
County Advocate, 65th year, no. 38, November 10, 1955, 9. 
46 Ibid. 
47 For more on the significance, history and role of country clubs in communities, see James M. Mayo, The 
American Country Club: Its Origins and Development (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998). 
48 Parkison, Journey to Our Future, 63. 
49 U.S. Census of the Population, 1950, 1960. 
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plans.  The Hickman Mills school district benefited from suburban development in Ruskin 
Heights and other neighborhoods because it brought students who were funded by taxes on solid 
home property values, but Praver never used the schools in advertising homes in the area.  
Contrary to what is popularly thought of the relationship between suburban schools and suburban 
communities, Hickman Mills school district did not build up the community, instead, the 
suburban community expanded the schools.  Schools were not a draw for living in Hickman 
Mills in the 1950s.  This is partially due to the fact that the school district, like the community 
itself, was relatively small before suburbanization.  Housing development fundamentally 
changed the way the school district operated, which proved to be a difficult transition for school 
leaders as well as community members. 
School Expansion, School Funding 
 As development in Hickman Mills expanded in the form of suburban housing, couples 
moved south from Kansas City with their children or had children shortly after moving in.  The 
resulting increase in population became especially significant for the school district, as it meant 
that more facilities would be needed to accommodate a growing student body.  One of the first 
suburban neighborhoods created in the school district was Ruskin Heights, located in the center 
of the district, which necessitated the building of a new school.  The other four existing 
elementary schools, Union Point, Holmes Park, Rockford, and Hickman, were already 
overflowing with students and located too far away from Ruskin Heights to be feasible options.  
Thus Ruskin Heights needed its own elementary school. 
Fortunately for Hickman Mills’s school leaders, during the 1950s, federal grants were 
available for schools considered to be within “defense impact areas,” and the district’s proximity 
to Richards-Gebaur Air Base and the Bendix complex qualified them qualified for federal 
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assistance.50  The school board received an $89,000 grant to purchase land and begin 
construction on a four-room school (with a plan for expansion to eighteen rooms in the future) in 
August of 1953, with the full knowledge that the building would not be able to accommodate all 
students in the area.  In addition to constructing a new school, school officials began to request 
space in local churches and stores to use in accommodating the burgeoning student population.51  
By December of the same year, the district received another defense grant, this time for 
$162,000, which was slated for construction of a six-room structure meant for seventh and eighth 
grade students.52   
These buildings were still not enough to accommodate the influx of families into the 
district and members of the school board knew that the defense grants were not going to provide 
sufficient funds for continued construction and operation of additional schools.  For 
Superintendent Lewis Shultz (1949-1954) and the Hickman Mills school board, early attempts to 
raise capital proved frustrating as school leaders could not convince enough residents that new 
facilities or expanded buildings were needed.  Missouri state law mandated school districts 
obtain a two-thirds majority vote from the communities within district boundaries in order to 
raise school levies.53  This law made the work of passing bonds and levies particularly onerous 
for the school board in Hickman Mills. 
                                                          
50 “South City View School and Ruskin Receive Grants,” Grandview Advocate, vol. 1, no. 49, December 17, 1953, 
1; Richard Apling, "The Impact Aid Program Under Section 3 of Public Law 81-874," Congressional Research 
Service, Report EPW-88-440, June 17, 1988, 16.  The Richards-Gebaur airbase was a military installation and the 
Bendix Corporation, located at the Bannister Federal Complex alongside Honeywell and AlliedSignal, made non-
nuclear components for nuclear weapons. 
51 “Ruskin Buys New School Site; To Start Construction Soon,” The Grandview Advocate, vol. 1, no. 38, August 20, 
1953, 1; Parkison, Journey to Our Future, 64-65. 
52 “South City View School and Ruskin Receive Grants,” The Grandview Advocate, vol. 1, no. 49, December 17, 
1953, 1. 
53 Missouri General Assembly, Constitution of Missouri, article X, section 11c.  This provision in state school 
funding laws was and still is a major hurdle for the Hickman Mills school district, along with other school districts 
in Missouri, particularly when compared to districts in Kansas, which allows for a simple majority to pass levies and 
bonds. 
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The school board introduced a fifty-cent levy increase to voters on March 28, 1953, 
which was to finance a $350,000 bond.  This proposal came while Hickman Mills’s residents had 
the opportunity to declare themselves candidates for the school board election, hence the levy 
vote quickly became a campaign issue.54  The local tax opposition group supported candidate 
Harold E. Rakes, who vociferously argued that the Hickman school board both mismanaged 
money and refused to be open about its finances with the larger community.55  Exacerbating 
headaches for the board was public fallout over the planning of the fifty-cent levy increase on the 
March ballot, and another on an April ballot for eighty cents.  If both levies passed, property 
taxes would rise by $1.30 for every $1,000 of assessed value.56   
Rakes campaigned on the anti-tax platform, pointing out that the proposed tax hikes, 
when added to state, county, water, and current school and library taxes, would total $4.34 per 
$1,000 assessed property value, thirty-two cents higher than Kansas City, Missouri taxes.57  
“Being a father and now a grandfather, I believe in education,” assured Rakes, “but I still believe 
that it can be obtained without exorbitant or excessive costs.”58  Rakes was not a lone voice, as 
his group paid for a full-page ad in the local paper (previously a tactic only taken by the pro-tax 
school board), arguing against raising the levy.  The ad proclaimed: 
Let’s not stop the growth of Hickman Mills by mortgaging the community to the point  
that working people cannot afford to live here…let’s re-organize the school…then see 
what is needed…let’s keep our heads and not be stampeded into voting for a bond issue 
we may regret for years to come…VOTE AGAINST The School Bond Issue, March 28, 
1953.59 
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55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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The opponents, more publicly vocal than in the past, won—the election on March 28th resulted 
in 461 votes for the bond and 288 against, thirty-four votes shy of reaching the two-thirds 
majority vote needed to pass the bond.60  Victory was not complete for the anti-tax group, as 
Harold Rakes subsequently lost in the school board election ten days later.61  At this point, the 
board now had a high-stakes levy fight in April, with another $350,000 bond issue of an eighty-
cent levy increase up for a vote on April 18.   
Superintendent Shultz and the board met early in April to discuss a new attempt to raise 
money for building construction.62  The meeting turned confrontational when one hundred fifty 
local citizens arrived to question the board about its construction and finance plans.  Essentially, 
the board meeting became a staging ground for a debate between Ralph Skudlarek, another 
vociferous opponent to tax increases, and Dr. George Englehart, the director of school building 
services for the Missouri department of education and a visitor to the district.63  Their 
interchange was terse and, on Englehart’s part, sarcastic and biting.  Englehart was explaining to 
the crowd that the district was going to lose eighty-nine thousand dollars in state grants if it did 
not pass the bond issue in order to help with needed construction, at which point Skudlarek 
interrupted with a question,  
Skudlarek: “What is the cost of two-story construction?” 
Englehart: “About the same as single-story construction.” 
S: “Do you feel that this ‘finger’ plan is an economical plan for this area?”64 
E: “In the long run it is as economical as any other.” 
S: “A good many architects say the ‘finger’ plan is not the best.  They are not   
                                                          
60 “$350,000 Bond Defeated,” The Grandview Advocate, vol. 1, no. 12, April 2, 1953, 1. 
61 “Rakes loses!,” The Grandview Advocate, vol. 1, no. 13, April 9, 1953, 1.   
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63 Ibid. 
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schools built in Hickman Mills did not employ the finger plan. 
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      economical, are they?” 
E: “Well, the most economical would be a cell block.”65 
 
At this point, the meeting continued with parents giving testimonials as to the cramped nature of 
the classrooms, while others requested clear financing plans for the bonds.66  Unfortunately for 
Engelhart, Shultz, and the rest of the school board, the meeting failed to resolve any doubts 
naysayers had about the bond issue.  The election the following week resulted in 451 votes for 
and 288 against the measure, again narrowly missing (by 42 votes) the two-thirds majority 
needed to raise the school levy.67   
The fact that voters rejected the school bond twice within thirty days rankled with Shultz, 
who commented, “it looks as if the people really don’t want to build the new buildings.”68  The 
superintendent then asserted that if a bond of some sort was not passed soon then the schools 
would have to start teaching students in two shifts.69  One immediate measure taken was to cease 
teaching Kindergarten, which alleviated overcrowding to a degree, but also resulted in the 
district not gaining an “AAA” rating from the state board of education.70  Shultz promptly 
requested help from the local chapter of the chamber of commerce in addressing overpopulation 
problems in the schools, particularly due to developments in Ruskin Heights, where forty school-
aged children could be found in the thirty new homes occupied at the time.71  The chamber of 
commerce took some pity on Shultz, and created an educational committee who would keep 
                                                          
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid.  
67 “Voters Reject Ruskin Bonds,” Grandview Advocate, vol. 1, no.15, April 23, 1953, 1. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Billy Wall (HMSD board member, 1957-1975), deposition summary, Arthur Benson Papers (1975), Box KC 250, 
Folder 52, 189-90, State Historical Society of Missouri Research Center, University of Missouri-Kansas City 
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members apprised of issues pertaining to the district.72   While the committee was a step towards 
greater community involvement which would eventually prove to be a very successful tool 
Schultz and the school board would use in future funding battles, for the moment, the 
superintendent was at an impasse.  Something was going to need to change in order to get the 
money the district needed in order to accommodate the sudden influx of students.  What Shultz 
and the school board did not know at the time was that their battle over a bond issue and levy 
increase would become a pattern in Hickman Mills.  From 1953 onward, the school district 
would generally encounter resistance in passing a bond if it came with a tax increase.  
Employing members of the community outside of the school district became the main tactic in 
winning the public vote. 
The Citizen’s Committee for the Hickman Mills School District 
In the last week of September 1953, Shultz and the school board met to once again 
propose a $350,000 bond, expressing interest in involving community leaders in convincing 
voters to approve the measure.  Heads of the Chamber of Commerce, Lions Club, PTAs from the 
elementary schools, Ruskin Music Mothers Club, and Ruskin Fathers Club all volunteered to 
support the bond in the October 17th election.  Shultz pointed out that even with the bond and 
federal grant money, more would have to be done to address the rising student population, 
predicting that in a few years another high school would need to be built.73  Support for the bond 
was particularly high, but again voters had to pass the measure with a two-thirds majority, as it 
required a tax increase.  This raising of the mill levy was the chief source of opposition to the 
bond, primarily from locals who believed the schools could operate more efficiently or build 
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cheaper buildings.74  Shultz’s answer to arguments of efficiency was that at the time, over a 
hundred students were attending classes in a basement, and the district had to employ an array of 
tactics in order to avoid teaching students in shifts.75  The district desperately needed new 
buildings.  Unfortunately, members of the school board and district administrators felt any 
community approval for additions or construction would only come after difficult and drawn-out 
uphill battles. 
Then, serendipitously, the board received good news just four days before the bond 
election.  The bonding agent was prepared to offer the money to the district without requiring 
immediate payments, resulting that the district could pass the bond without a levy increase for 
two years, perhaps longer.  Should the levy need to be raised, it would not pass ten cents on one 
hundred dollar assessed valuation.76  Essentially, even if the bond would eventually raise the 
levy, the district could ask for a mere ten-cent hike.  This was a minor miracle for Shultz, as 
opponents to the measure had less to argue against.  Voters overwhelmingly supported the bond 
at the election, with 851 votes for and 162 against.77  The promise of not raising taxes was kept, 
as the board received more good news months later when it learned that the upside of 
suburbanization in Hickman Mills was a significant increase in property values, particularly in 
Ruskin Heights, which brought in enough capital without needing to raise the mill levy—thus 
solidifying the levy at $2.80.78  At the same time, the district continued to receive grant monies 
because of its proximity to Richards-Gebaur and Bendix.79  The funding situation seemed 
positive for the district in 1953 and early 1954 and leaders were cautiously optimistic that the 
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schools in the school district could grow quickly enough to match the housing developments in 
the area. 
Hickman Mills’s school leaders wasted no time in constructing new buildings to 
accommodate the rapid rise of students; by April 1954, C.A. Burke Elementary (111th and 
Longview Road) opened.80  Superintendent Shultz also announced his upcoming retirement in 
June 1954 to take effect in July, with Assistant Superintendent Joseph Nesbit as Interim 
Superintendent until a permanent replacement could be found.81  Nesbit served as superintendent 
until February 1, 1957 (and would again briefly lead the district fifteen years later), continuing 
the battle over school funding and necessary expansion.  Nesbit learned from watching his 
predecessor engage with portions of the community over funding, and repeated Shultz’s 
successful technique in involving influential community groups to express support for school 
bonds and levies.  A school funding board was created in the fall of 1954, with many of the same 
organizations involved as in 1953, but endowed with an expanded and more official purpose.  
Nesbit explained, saying: 
The purpose of the board will be to assist the school board in its work on such problems 
as bond issues, school construction, and picking and securing school sites.  Passage of 
school bond issues for construction in the Ruskin district for the past several years has 
been a difficult task, and one which has divided the community into numerous factions, 
all pulling different directions.  Citizens committee advocates are hoping that the group 
can serve as a unifying force in such matters by supplying enough precise information to 
satisfy the most demanding elements in the district.82 
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In addition to the same community leaders who teamed with the district in 1953, this committee 
also had representatives from seven local churches, the South Jackson County Junior Chamber of 
Commerce, the Jackson County Safety Council, a local sorority, and the Ruskin Homemakers 
Club.83  More than a simple cheerleading group, the school funding board reviewed school 
budgets and projected construction costs, as well as bond sales, in offering advice to the school 
board on how to best raise funds to construct new buildings and provide for upkeep of older 
ones.84   
The Citizen’s Committee started immediately in the fall of 1954, as it researched, helped 
write, and publicly supported a bond issue the school board was to present to the public for vote 
in January.  Faced with an “immediate critical problem of school housing in the district,” the 
school district was looking to pass a $600,000 bond on top of an additional $270,000 in federal 
aid.  The money would be used to add a wing to the already planned new Ruskin High School, 
with enough space for ten more classrooms, a laboratory, and a cafeteria.  The bond would also 
pay for construction of a new elementary school.  The good news for taxpayers was that the bond 
would require no tax increases, but the Citizen’s Committee wanted to make clear that taxes 
were going to need to increase in order to adequately address student growth.  Delmer Berg, the 
chairman of the committee, shared: 
Construction of these new units will take care of the new pupils coming in the next year, 
but next year we in the Ruskin district will probably have to vote more bonds to take care 
of the children coming in the following year.  The district is growing at a terrific rate, and 
the school situation is a critical one.85 
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By this point in the 1954-55 school year, there were 1,800 students in the district, a far cry from 
the 200 students the district had when first consolidated fifty years previously.86  Nesbit expected 
an additional thousand students for the following year.87  Chairman Berg clarified how 
community growth was going to greatly affect building operations: 
We on the committee have been making a close study of the district’s school housing 
needs...and we have on file letters from builders indicating the construction of more than 
3,600 new homes to be built and occupied by June of 1956.  That means a huge influx of 
new children to the district.  And we as residents of the district can’t just sit idly by and 
not make adequate preparations for meeting the problem.88 
 
From this point forward, the Citizen’s Committee became an essential player in district efforts to 
pass bonds and/or raise school levies.  Additionally, by the summer of 1958, this citizen’s group 
expanded by adding representatives from forty community organizations, and became ensconced 
as part of the district’s school management team, which dealt with additional issues the district 
faced such as teacher welfare, adult education, and transportation.89 
Bonds and Taxes 
 For both the leaders of the school district and the new and old families living within the 
borders of Hickman Mills, the first few years of the 1950s were semi-tumultuous, as officials 
determined where students were going to be taught and how the district was going to pay for 
their education.  As previously discussed, despite occasional setbacks and disappointments, the 
district was largely successful in getting bond issues passed to build new facilities without 
having to raise taxes.  However, the warnings that previous administrators gave in stating that the 
bonds passed were largely stopgap measures came true very quickly.  Still, the district had grown 
in the number and size of buildings in its fifty years as a consolidated district.  By the beginning 
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of the 1955 school year, the district was finishing its third rebuilding of the high school, this time 
as a separate and larger building (“Ruskin #2”) literally next to the “original” building (rebuilt in 
1931), which was converted to a junior high.90  Apart from the expanded four original 
elementary schools (Union Point, Holmes Park, Hickman and Rockford), students were attending 
C.A. Burke, and the board had plans for two more elementary schools to be built in 1955 and 
open in 1956.91 
It is during the period from 1955 through early 1957 that battles over funding became 
more entrenched and further heated.  School leaders became increasingly concerned that they 
were not going to be able to continue building more schools by floating additional bonds without 
raising the mill levy.  However, quite serendipitously for the district, unexpected outside forces 
made it possible to pass bonds without raising taxes, which in turn made voters much more 
agreeable to increasing school funding.  1955 began with a major push by the district to pass a 
$600,000 bond, again without raising taxes, in order to continue to build onto the high school 
and to begin construction for two more elementary schools.92  This time, the finances for the 
bond were a bit of a gamble, in that leaders assumed that the assessed valuation of property 
within the district would rise enough within three years to fully fund the bond and avoid a need 
to raise the mill levy.93  Another complication the district faced was that it was nearing its 
bonded indebtedness limit, set by Missouri at ten percent of assessed valuation.94  In other 
words, Hickman Mills was approaching its borrowing limit and would not be able to go much 
further into debt without having the community first grow in size.95  Yet the school district 
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needed to grow, at least in physical buildings, as the five elementary schools, one junior high, 
and the high school were not sufficient to hold all the students.  At this time the Ruskin High 
campus, a building originally intended for two hundred students, instead housed over five 
hundred.  The newest school, Burke Elementary, was already exceeding capacity as well.96  
Together, the five elementary schools had one thousand students, far beyond building capacity.97  
The proposed bond was not going to get the district ahead, but merely help it to catch up. 
 Good news came for the school board, as the bond passed in January, with an 
overwhelming 734 voters in favor of spending the money and twenty-seven against.98  The 
superintendent was elated and Thomas Hudson, the school board president, expressed that “the 
board is very, very pleased” with Nesbit exclaiming, “it just goes to show that things have 
changed a lot around here in a short time!”99  The relationship between the school board and the 
community had probably not changed to a great degree in such a short period of time as Schultz 
proclaimed; rather, having a bond issue without a tax hike was likely more palatable to residents 
than a mill levy increase.  The board and the district won, which gave school leaders a feeling of 
success.  However, the continual problem the district and the community faced was that although 
the school district was to receive additional funding, it was still not sufficient to fully converge 
with the growing population.  The district simply could not get ahead financially to stay abreast 
of student numbers and building demands.  Additionally, district leadership was counting on 
rising property values and federal funds (defense money) to help the district float through its 
debt.  This was a potentially dangerous dependency, but continually reinforced as an opportunity 
for another unexpected source of revenue came in 1955 from the state of Missouri in the form of 
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a cigarette tax and an even larger financial boon, the School Foundation Program.  These two 
sources of revenue proposed by Missouri legislature would help alleviate the district’s dire 
financial situation. 
 In 1955, the Missouri Legislature submitted for statewide vote the passing of a two- cent 
tax on packs of cigarettes, amounting to a ten-percent tax, with the intention that this money 
would be spent on funding schools in the state.100  Additionally, voters statewide would be 
choosing whether to expand state school funding by creating the School Foundation Program, a 
proposed new entity to organize state monies for school districts.  Together, both referendum 1 
for the cigarette tax and referendum 2 for foundation funding would provide more money for the 
schools, although no one seemed exactly sure how much money would actually be raised.101  
Both measures succeeded in the October election, with the cigarette tax receiving a strong 76.7% 
passing vote and the school funding obtaining 70.7% of the vote.  This meant that beginning in 
January 1956, revenue raised by cigarette tax sales would provide more money for the district.  
Additionally, the state was potentially going to increase financial support for its schools, even 
though the funding formula had not yet been solidified.  Essentially, in order to assure that 
school funding came through the school foundation program, the cigarette tax had to pass.102  
District leaders were pleased, and by the beginning of the 1955/56 school year, the school levy 
was set at $3.10 per $100 assessed valuation.103 Even more agreeable for Hickman Mills’s 
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leaders, after taking into account the district budget and the cost of bond payments, the district 
had a positive balance of $530,000.104    
The Hickman Mills school board capitalized on the state funding by pushing for more 
bonds, with the promise of keeping property taxes flat.  A January bond issue in 1956 asked for 
$520,000 in order to build a twenty-classroom elementary building at 103rd and Grandview 
Road, near the northeast corner of the district.105  This bond was under consideration at the same 
time that the latest elementary school, Harry S. Truman, was opening on James Reed Road just 
south of Bannister Road.106  Superintendent Nesbit was able to declare that “additional funds 
made available through the state’s new Foundation program will make possible the retirement of 
these bonds without levying more taxes on the property owners of the district.”107  Like earlier, 
the Hickman Mills Citizens Committee demonstrated support for the bond, which resulted in 
overwhelming success.  The measure passed 648 votes to 80, and construction on what would 
become Westridge Elementary began, with the intention that the school would open in the fall of 
the same year.108  The district now had a modern high school, a large junior high nearby in the 
former high school building, and seven elementary schools throughout its boundaries. 
 Even with the eventual good news and the serendipitous additional sources of income, the 
school district was still dealing with heavy growth, which meant that school leaders were going 
to continue to search for more funding.  The dilemma of how to maintain school operation with 
increased student growth continued in early 1957, when the school board announced a new bond 
issue proposal to be voted on at the end of the month.  The board asked for $530,000 this time, 
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again claiming that continued and rapid growth required more facilities.  Board president Marvin 
Langford justified the need for the bond, saying, “Ruskin is the fastest growing district in the 
state of Missouri, according to the department of education.”109  Like previous successful bond 
elections, the board was quick and vocal in declaring that the bond would not require a tax 
increase, in this case because property values had been rising steadily and projections indicated 
they would continue to rise.110  School leaders persisted in pressing their case by placing a full-
page ad in the paper that detailed enrollment numbers, making the public aware of how quickly 
the district had grown.  In 1951, the district had 640 students.  By January of 1957, it had 3,500, 
with a projected enrollment of 4,000 in the fall of 1957.111  To support the assertion that taxes 
will not need to be raised in order to pay for the bond, the board explained that in 1954, the 
assessed valuation on property in the district was $10,782,860, but in 1957, it had risen to 
$21,066,000.112   
The bond would allow the board to build another elementary school (20 classrooms), add 
eight rooms to Westridge Elementary, and buy land for future buildings.113  These additions, like 
the previous ones, were desperately needed, as schools were overflowing with students.  The 
typical elementary classroom within the district in 1957 had thirty-six students for each teacher, 
with some classes having as many as forty-five students.114  When the election began on January 
26th, the hopes and arguments of the school board and school supporters were vindicated, as 695 
people voted for the bond and only 19 voted against.115  Considering that Hickman Mills as a 
community had not yet finished expanding as growth continued, the school board was aware that 
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it was going to have to continue building in the future, with projects that would require more 
bonds and probably more levies.  But for now at least, district leadership had won.   
Flirting with Incorporation and Annexation 
 As a community, Hickman Mills experienced identity struggles concurrently with its 
battles over school growth and increased taxation.  Even as early as May 1953, while the school 
board sought to convince residents of the need to build more schools, members of the district 
began to question whether remaining an independent “town” was preferable to becoming part of 
Kansas City.  The Hickman Mills Chamber of Commerce met and began to discuss the 
advantages of remaining a village, becoming a fourth-class city, or joining Kansas City to the 
north.116  A prominent lawyer in the town presented the benefits of annexation to Kansas City, in 
that the community would have increased services, especially water, sewage, fire, and police, 
and the annexation would most likely result in increased property values for residents.117   
At the same time, Kansas City leadership took notice of the small but fast-growing 
neighborhoods in the southland, and began to take measures to annex the area, or at least to keep 
them from incorporating or being annexed by another city, such as Grandview.  Kansas City 
leaders noticed the difficult relationship St. Louis was having with its surrounding suburban 
towns on the other side of the state, and feared becoming locked in by communities that 
incorporate.118  In November of 1954, Mayor William Kemp and the Kansas City council created 
two ordinances with the purpose to begin the process of annexing Hickman Mills’s 
neighborhoods, particularly Ruskin Heights, which was figuratively exploding with tax-paying 
working-class and middle-class families.  Designed as “holding measures,” the ordinances stated 
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that Hickman Mills could not incorporate or be annexed by any other city.119  When residents 
were asked at the time about the measure, responses were tepid with “everyone taking the 
announcement…with a spirit of resignation.”120  The city touted the measure to Hickman Mills 
as an offer of increased services and lower taxes, but locals expressed real doubt about the 
chances of saving any money.121  However, nothing further developed beyond this holding 
measure, at least for the next few years. 
Two years later Hickman Mills’s residents would be addressed by Kansas City’s leaders, 
this time from L.P. Cookingham, the famous city manager of Kansas City.122  Cookingham 
presented to the Hickman Mills Chamber of Commerce the benefits of incorporation, such as a 
better and more abundant water supply, city police, fire departments, and garbage collection, as 
well as improved sewer systems.123   However, this time, instead of Hickman Mills looking into 
the possibility of joining Kansas City, the city itself was about to introduce a measure to annex 
Hickman Mills, which would then go to ballot for Kansas City residents.124  This measure never 
materialized in 1956, but it did begin discussion both in Kansas City and in Hickman Mills about 
the relationship the village would have with Kansas City in the future.  Residents of Hickman 
Mills were also beginning to feel the pressure of annexation from another direction, as only a 
few weeks after Cookingham’s visit to the area, the mayor and city council from Grandview filed 
a bid with Jackson County to annex Hickman Mills.125  Residents opposed this measure more 
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strongly than they did Kansas City’s offer, but Grandview’s move demonstrated that Hickman 
Mills’s position was somewhat precarious.  If they did not incorporate or declare themselves a 
town or city in their own right, the rapidly growing neighborhoods were not going to remain 
independent for long. 
Increasing Growth and Urbanization of the Southland 
Metropolitan growth in the 1950s throughout Kansas City and particularly in the southern 
metropolitan area contributed to a heightened feeling of encroachment sensed by Hickman 
Mills’s residents.  Even with clear advantages in the form of greater and faster access to Kansas 
City, as well as increased commerce and economic development, locals were not convinced at 
joining the city.  Residents were concerned in particular that annexation would encourage a 
larger transformation that the small rural community cum suburb would experience.  Regardless, 
the community began to grow and develop more, this time with roads and highways.   In 1956, 
Kansas City, Jackson County, and the Missouri highway department worked together toward 
expanding a north-south highway through the center of Kansas City, Missouri and extending 
south through Grandview.  An existing route would be widened, giving limited access to 
Hickman Mills and Grandview, as well as a new designation: Highway 71.126  The limited access 
road would run south inside the western boundary of the school district and four access points, or 
entrance and exit ramps, would be in Hickman Mills at Bannister Road, Red Bridge Road, 115th 
street, and Blue Ridge Road.127  The highway meant increased traffic to and from the southland, 
but it also created greater access to goods and services in Kansas City for the southern suburb.  
Shopping plazas along Bannister Road and further south at Truman’s Corners would further 
develop, bringing financial capital to the area and by extension, the school district.   
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Zoning changes followed the road expansion.  During the same summer that Missouri 
announced construction for highway 71, the Jackson County Planning Committee held a public 
hearing to propose and take feedback on rezoning tracts in Hickman Mills.  These changes 
proved to be momentous for the community both in the short and long term.  Three zoning 
alterations directly affected Hickman Mills, with two (Bannister Road and Holmes Street; Red 
Bridge and Grandview) rezoning from residential and farm areas to local business, and one 
(111th and 112th terrace) from residential to light industry.128  The potential (and eventual) 
introduction of business and industry was an exciting prospect for residents of Hickman Mills, in 
that it offered economic vitality and further growth.  For the school district, this meant that 
further monies could be collected from businesses, which would alleviate the tax burden 
Hickman Mills’s residential property owners were paying.  This meant that perhaps school bonds 
and levies could be passed with less difficulty than previous years.129  At the same time, this shift 
in land use, even though it affected just a small part of the district, signaled to residents that the 
quiet area in which they lived was going to become a little more like Kansas City to the north.  
  In many ways, Hickman Mills has a somewhat strange origin for a community, not only 
because it is a misspelling of the original name of an informal village.  By 1957, the area the 
school district covered was not an incorporated town or village, and had not joined any other 
municipality.  The only unifying organization for the neighborhoods and communities was the 
school district, and the people who lived in Ruskin Heights, Ruskin Hills, on the border with 
Grandview, next to Longview Lake or Blue River Road, all considered themselves residents of 
Hickman Mills (or Ruskinites, after the high school).  From early on in Hickman Mills’s growth, 
the schools became the unifying factor for people living in the region.  What was once a sleepy 
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quasi-village with a blacksmithy and a mill became a first-ring suburb of Kansas City, which was 
cemented when road construction gave greater access to the larger metropolitan area.  But 
suburbanization was not as peaceful or idyllic as Praver & Sons had homebuyers believe.  The 
period of growth was fraught with strife over taxation and school debt, as district leaders had to 
fight difficult battles in order to build enough schools to accommodate the steady influx of 
families and children.  
 Additionally, because of state school funding laws, bond issues generally had to be 
passed with a two-thirds majority, which meant school supporters had to raise much more 
support than tax opponents.  Every bond election the school board lost still carried a majority 
vote, usually only needing thirty or forty (usually five to ten percent) additional votes, which 
must have been extraordinarily frustrating for school leaders.  And yet, between 1953 and 1957, 
the district managed to build three elementary schools and a high school, converting the previous 
building to a junior high.  However, most of the growth was done with very little raising of 
property taxes, and Hickman Mills consistently kept its mill levy lower than the neighboring 
school districts.  Dependence upon federal funds, specifically defense dollars, and an increase in 
property values that came with suburban development certainly solved some pressing issues for 
the schools, but would later lead to disaster.  For people like Lewis Schultz, Joseph Nesbit, 
Thomas Hudson and Delmer Berg, the long-term ramifications of keeping property taxes very 
low took a backseat to the immediate problem of literally having too many students to teach. 
While Hickman Mills’s monetary and political situation seemed to be much improved by 
1957, a major event changed the way the community and the school interacted with each other, 
at least for a time.  On May 20, 1957, a tornado hit in southern Kansas City, destroying the high 
school, junior high, and part of C.A. Burke, along with a wide swath of homes and businesses 
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from the Ruskin Shopping Center to Ruskin Heights. Forty-eight people died, and over five 
hundred were injured.130  After the devastation, the community came together to repair and 
reconstruct homes, schools, and businesses with the idealistic intention of rebuilding the 
community better than it was.  Unfortunately, the ties between the school and the community 
were only temporarily strengthened, as political squabbles and scandals involving the new 
superintendent resulted, at best, in an uneasy relationship between those who lived in the school 
district and those who worked for it.  Kansas City further complicated matters for the school 
district in its successful move in 1961 to annex Hickman Mills, which ushered in a new and 
somewhat problematic relationship between the community, the school, and then the city.  This 
had enormous ramifications in the following decades.   
 
 
                                                          
130 Thomas P. Grazulis, Significant Tornadoes 1680-1991: A Chronology and Analysis of Events (London, UK: 
Environmental Films, 1993), 897-98; Brewer, Caught In the Path, 4-7; Parkison, Journey to Our Future, 69-73. 
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Chapter 2: Storm and Stress 
 
Hickman Mills in the Wake of the 1957 Tornado and a School Board  
Scandal, 1957-1960 
 While the Hickman Mills school district struggled to accommodate a large influx of 
school-aged children during a period of rapid population growth, economic development, and a 
housing boom, a string of successful bond issues and school expansions bode well for the future 
of the district and placed it in good stead financially by 1957. However, the sweeping destruction 
left by a tornado in May 1957 interrupted the district’s momentum.  This chapter addresses the 
physical destruction and rebuilding that occurred within the district, demonstrating how 
effectively the community could come together and repair its schools, with the assistance of 
large amounts of state and federal funding.  The chapter also addresses a political storm that 
occurred at the end of the 1950s, as a fight broke out between the superintendent and three 
members of the school board.   
The tornado was the storm from the chapter heading, but in some ways a more 
challenging event occurred within eighteen months, as an ugly and embarrassingly public battle 
between the school superintendent and part of the school board arose.  This fight was the stress, 
which significantly taxed any trust the community had in the school district. However, the 
tornado and the contention between district leaders each resulted in a greater coming together for 
the community—one in a physical sense and the other in a philosophical and psychological 
manner.  The tornado was a tragedy in that people died, many were injured, and homes and 
businesses were destroyed.  My assertion that the community ultimately became stronger after 
the tornado does not mean the disaster served a positive role in the development of the school 
district.  But the aftermath of the tornado translated to larger and newer facilities as well as 
greater financial stability for Hickman Mills School District.  Likewise, corruption and school 
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board intrigue were not healthy or helpful for the Hickman Mills schools, but the repercussions 
of the school board dispute eventually led to a triple-A rating for the state and accreditation by 
the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools.  In a period of three years, the people of 
Hickman Mills addressed a tragedy as well as a self-inflicted wound, and ultimately came out 
better for it with improved facilities and more focused direction.   
Tornado  
A strong storm arose west of Hickman Mills in Spring Hill, Kansas on May 20, 1957, 
then subsequently moved eastward, showing signs of a funnel forming among black clouds.1  
The storm traveled east towards Grandview, then north along the Kansas City Southern Railroad 
line, which led directly into the Hickman Mills School District.2  At 7:35 p.m., a category F5 
tornado touched the ground first in Martin City (west of Grandview), then traveled northeast 
through a corner of Grandview, directly towards and ultimately through the neighborhood of 
Ruskin Heights.3  The storm was over by 8 p.m., but managed to destroy the high school and the 
junior high, as well as large areas of the surrounding neighborhoods.4  Immediate reports 
revealed that thirty-one people died that evening and over two hundred were injured. 5  By the 
                                                          
1 Jami Parkison, The Journey to Our Future: The History of Hickman Mills C-1 School District, 1902-2002 (Kansas 
City, MO: Hickman Mills C-1 School District, 2002), 69. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid.; Carolyn Glenn Brewer, Caught In the Path: A Tornado’s Fury, A Community’s Rebirth (Kansas City, MO: 
Prairie Figure Books, 1997), 106-07.  Carolyn Brewer’s Caught In the Path is essentially a collection of interviews 
with a large number of the residents of Hickman Mills who experienced the tornado in 1957.  As many of the adults 
from that time are no longer living, Brewer’s volume is an excellent resource for first-hand accounts of the event.  
This section of the chapter, which examines peoples’ experiences during and after the tornado, employs quotes from 
the interviews with adults that Brewer recorded, in addition to drawing on interviews that I conducted with those 
who were children at the time of the tornado. 
4 Parkison, Journey to Our Future, 69; “Area Reels Under Tornado Impact,” Jackson County Advocate, 67th year, 
no. 14, May 23, 1957, 1. 
5 “Tornado Kills 31, Injures 200,” Kansas City Times, May 21, 1957, 1. 
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time everyone in the community was accounted for, numbers were revised to show that forty-
eight people died and over five hundred were injured.6 
 Considering the damage to the high school and junior high, in one sense the community 
was very lucky.  If the tornado had happened during the day, many more children probably 
would have died.  Even though the tornado hit in the evening, it came at the end of the school 
year and preparations were being made at the high school for upcoming graduation, hence some 
school staff did not escape unscathed.  The then high school principal and future superintendent 
Blaine Steck was at Ruskin High and recounted his surprise at the tornado, as it destroyed the 
building the night before the school’s graduation ceremony: 
I didn’t really know there was a tornado coming until it hit the school building.  It was 
the night between baccalaureate and graduation…I had no indication whatsoever of the 
weather being bad, but somehow I knew what it was when I heard the noise.7 
 
Steck continued with his description, re-telling what happened when the tornado hit the building: 
 
I had started up the glass hallway from the gym to meet the nurse in her office.  I heard a 
rumbling sound like a freight train, but of course we do have a train track just west of the 
school, so it didn’t attract my attention that much.  We have those sounds all the time.  It 
got louder and louder and things began to hit the roof.  Then I figured it was something 
serious so I headed back to the music room.  By this time the glass hallway windows 
were breaking and crashing.  I got inside the double doors of the music room and boy, 
I’m telling you, I can still hear stuff hitting that roof and the sound of all those windows 
breaking.  I just ducked down right there in the corner.  There was a wastebasket there, so 
I tried to get that over my head, which I did to some extent.  I’ll have to say, I did a little 
praying that the roof wouldn’t cave in on me.8 
 
Luckily for Steck, it did not.  But he did find himself trapped as he explained the immediate 
aftermath of the tornado on the high school: 
I had debris all over me.  Especially tar from the school roof that just went everywhere.  I 
stepped out into the hallway from the band room.  To get out of there I really had to push 
that door hard because of the debris piled up against it.  I opened that door and I’d say the 
                                                          
6 Thomas P. Grazulis, Significant Tornadoes 1680-1991: A Chronology and Analysis of Events (London, UK: 
Environmental Films, 1993), 897-98; Brewer, Caught In the Path, 4-7; Parkison, Journey to Our Future, 69-73. 
7 Blaine Steck, interview by Brewer, transcribed in Brewer, Caught in the Path, 21. 
8 Steck, quoted by Ibid., 43. 
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hallway was filed up with everything.  Not just building materials, but everything—tires, 
pieces of furniture.  My first thought was of Mrs. Guyall [school nurse]. So I tried to go 
up to the entrance of the school to see if she was O.K.  I waded through material, about 
seventy-five to one hundred feet.  Of course when I got up there I couldn’t see anything.  
The roof was gone, and most of the walls, and I knew there wasn’t any use trying to find 
anyone because it was dark and the halls were piled high.  They found her later that night 
buried by the entrance.  The janitor was a few yards away from her, also dead.9 
 
Only three people were in the building when the tornado came, Steck was the lone survivor.   
The destruction was equally vivid for those outside of the high school.  As a young boy, 
longtime Hickman Mills resident Robert Spearman, whose family lived near the high school at 
the time, also saw the tornado and its destruction up close and survived:  
We were all home, my mother had just gotten home, and we all got into our car—
including our neighbors.  So two families, ten people, crammed in our Pontiac, I think my 
dad thought we could drive away, but we were stuck in it, no way to drive.  So we got out 
of the car and I watched the high school roll by.10 
 
The high school was a recently constructed building, having opened in 1955 with additions 
completed in 1956.   The junior high, adjacent to the high school, was previously used as the 
high school.11  In one night, the entirety of the district’s facilities for secondary education were 
completely destroyed. 
The high school and the junior high were not the only buildings to be directly affected by 
the tornado, as it also ripped apart a sizable section of Burke Elementary, another relatively new 
building which initially opened in 1954.12  Building Principal Joseph Nesbit, also a future 
superintendent, was in that building during the tornado and shared his experience, saying: 
 I guess I was just sort of dazed and overwhelmed by the damage it had done to the  
school.  After awhile, I went back home and tried to get some rest, but I had to clean up 
first…I went to bed but I couldn’t go to sleep, so after awhile I got up, dressed and went 
back up to the school.  I could hear water running, so I shut the water to the building off 
                                                          
9 Steck, quoted by Ibid., 67. 
10 Robert Spearman, interview with author, August 25, 2012. 
11 Parkison, Journey to Our Future, 65-66. 
12 Ibid., 60; Brewer, Caught in the Path, 57. 
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and turned the gas off.  I don’t know how long I stayed around there, but I know I went 
back to the house around three a.m.13   
 
When Nesbit headed home, he found that the National Guard had arrived (as ordered by 
Missouri Governor James T. Blair, Jr.) to maintain order and limit looting: 
Very few people, as I recall, were out when I went home the second time.  There was an 
eerie stillness to the whole scene.  The National Guard had moved in, and I remember a 
guardsman on the corner of 113th and Bennington stopped me.  But I convinced him that 
I was not a sightseer and that I lived down there and I was on my way home.  I was just 
dumbfounded and dazed by the scope of destruction, and that was just in Hickman 
Mills.14 
 
Later, Nesbit learned from the district insurance company that Burke elementary was thirty-five 
percent destroyed: 
The upper wing, closest to the railroad tracks, was practically gone.  It blew the walls 
down and blew part of the roof off the all-purpose room.  The center wing was still 
standing but had damage to the roof and broken windows.  The lower wing, or the west 
side, had mostly debris blown in and broken windows.15   
 
Finding something positive to notice, Nesbit added, “fortunately, all the enrollment cards were in 
a safe in my office and they were all right.”16  In the aftermath of the tornado, the neighborhoods 
needed cleaning up and schools, businesses, and homes required rebuilding.  Considering the 
devastation, then new superintendent Carl Wagner (hired three months before the tornado hit) 
immediately took action.  Classes were cancelled for both high school and junior high students 
and high school graduation was postponed.17  After deliberating with the elementary principals, 
Wagner decided to end the school year early, most likely because there was only one week of 
school left in the semester.18  
                                                          
13 Joseph Nesbit, interview by Brewer, transcribed in Brewer, Caught in the Path, 57. 
14 Nesbit, quoted by Ibid. 
15 Nesbit, quoted by Ibid., 123. 
16 Nesbit, quoted by Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 107.  Brewer explains that the students decided to not sing their planned graduation song “Winds Across the 
Sky.” 
18 Brewer, Caught in the Path, 123; “Area Reels Under Tornado Impact,” Jackson County Advocate, 67th year, no. 
14, May 23, 1957, p 1. 
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Reconstruction and Urbanization 
 To the credit of Missouri governor James T. Blair, Jr. and Kansas City Mayor H. Roe 
Bartle, residents of Hickman Mills quickly received assistance.  The governor declared martial 
law and sent out part of the National Guard, while the mayor sent police and firefighters into the 
Hickman Mills neighborhoods to limit damage and search for survivors.19  Mayor Maurice 
Henrie of neighboring Grandview also sent help from the city’s police and fire departments.  
Additionally, the 110th Engineers Army Reserve from Richards-Gebaur also arrived to assist.20  
Eventually, the Red Cross, Salvation Army, Jackson County Health Department, along with 
multiple local stores and businesses became involved in search-and-rescue efforts, then property 
recovery.21  Nesbit remembered preparations during the summer after the tornado and before the 
new school year: 
The Red Cross moved right in and started serving meals from the Burke kitchen.  The 
kitchen part of the school wasn’t hurt much, but we did have a problem with the roof over 
the all-purpose room where the meals were served.  It didn’t bother them or slow them 
down.  I ate many meals there that summer.  Several of us principals worked at least five 
days a week salvaging school materials.  We moved a lot of furniture around, and to 
different buildings, trying to get ready for the next school year.  None of us got a vacation 
that summer, but no one complained.  Just before school started, we all went down to the 
Lake of the Ozarks together for a long weekend.22 
 
Of course, the schools were not the only part of Hickman Mills that needed repair and 
reconstruction.  After the tornado, the community underwent a massive effort to rebuild the 
neighborhoods destroyed by the storm.  On Saturday, May 25, the Ruskin Homes Association 
held a meeting in the parking lot of Ruskin shopping center to discuss insurance, disaster aid, and 
reconstruction with community members.  Estimates for repairs totaled $75 million, with $25 
                                                          
19 Brewer, Caught in the Path, 125; “Area Reels,” 1. 
20 Brewer, Caught in the Path, 125. 
21 Ibid.; “Reconstruction Is In Full Swing in the Tornado Area,” Jackson County Advocate, 67th year, no. 17, June 
13, 1957, 1. 
22 Nesbit, quoted by Brewer, Caught in the Path, 138. 
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million under federal disaster review.23  The meeting included state, federal, and local 
organizations in order to answer questions about insurance, taxes, and schools.  Additionally, 
Praver & Sons created a reconstruction company, even though homeowners were not obligated 
to have their homes rebuilt by Praver.24 
After assessing the damage, businesses were rebuilt and new homes were constructed, 
usually with much fanfare.  By October, Praver & Sons were advertising improved housing in 
Ruskin Hills, with three or four bedrooms and a new feature that was welcomed by the 
community—basements.25  Truman Corners, located near the intersection of Blue Ridge Road 
and Highway 71, was another victim of the tornado but reopened in mid-November, with forty-
five thousand shoppers celebrating the rebuilt mall.26  Ruskin Heights Shopping Center, just one 
and a half miles northeast of Truman Corners along Blue Ridge Road, was completely destroyed 
in the storm.  However, by early December the plaza re-opened with eleven of its original 
nineteen stores returning, as well as nine new vendors.27 
This recovery brought housing expansion to the southland, and as Ruskin Heights and 
Hills were continuing to expand with new homes and commercial developments, the sleepy 
village of Hickman Mills was slowly urbanizing.  As discussed in chapter one, highways were 
                                                          
23 Brewer, Caught in the Path, 141; “Ahead on Reconstruction In Ruskin School District,” Jackson County 
Advocate, 67th year, no. 23, July 25, 1957, 1, 4. 
24 Brewer, Caught in the Path, 141. 
25 “All New Ruskin Hills!” Advertisement, Jackson County Advocate, 67th year, no. 33, October 3, 1957, 5.  In both 
formal and informal conversations during my research, residents of Hickman Mills spoke about both the devastation 
of the tornado and how it redefined priorities in housing in Hickman Mills, as basements became a necessity, not a 
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August 14, 2012; Colleen Hamilton, interview with author, August 14, 2012; Robert Spearman, interview with 
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beginning to enter the Hickman Mills area, resulting in increased traffic.  With increased traffic 
and housing developments, residents in some of the neighborhoods like Ruskin Heights and 
Ruskin Hills began to demand street lighting.28  However, the hurdle for residents in obtaining 
lighting was that Hickman Mills existed as a separate entity than Kansas City or Grandview, but 
was an unincorporated village with no real central leadership.  Additionally, Jackson County did 
not offer street lighting for residential neighborhoods.  As a solution, people in Hickman Mills 
turned to their home associations, who had been overseeing cleaning, park maintenance, and 
sewage for the neighborhoods after construction, with association dues paying for the services.29  
The Ruskin Homes Association conducted a study in early 1958, determining that it could use 
association dues to pay for electricity for 176 streetlights in the neighborhood, purchased from 
Kansas City Power & Light.30  This was possible because at the same time, Ruskin Heights, 
Ruskin Village, and Ruskin Hills neighborhoods were all transitioning their sewage operations 
from their own neighborhood associations to Jackson County, with an offer by Praver & Sons to 
cover the cost of further construction.  Neighborhood dues could then go toward electricity and 
not sewage, as the costs of water and drainage would come from county taxes.31  This was an 
early marker of the trend towards increasing urbanization for Hickman Mills.  As will be 
discussed in chapter 3, one of the advantages residents experienced by being annexed by Kansas 
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City in 1961 was the large municipality offered improved services such as water, electricity, fire, 
and police at a lower cost than Jackson County could provide. 
School Rebuilding 
 Just as the neighborhoods in Hickman Mills were modernizing, the school district made 
efforts in the 1960s to expand facilities.  While the devastation in 1957 remained forefront in the 
minds of the residents of Hickman Mills, in some ways, Hickman Mills as a school district came 
out of the tornado better for having been hit by it.  The district’s insurance policy covered the 
cost of repair and much of the rebuilding that occurred resulted in larger, more “state of the art” 
facilities that were largely financed by a combination of insurance and disaster relief funds.  
District leadership had been working towards expanding schools for almost a decade and it took 
advantage of the recovery period to develop as much as possible.  Principal Steck pointed out the 
“silver linings” that came for the district after the tornado: 
The high school was built back with a grant from the government.  The old brick junior 
high building was torn down and the new high school extended up into that area.  The 
building was built back so a third floor could be added.  It was most unfortunate that the 
building was destroyed, but the community and district were better off.  They got so 
much more back.32   
 
Steck continued, extolling the virtues of the school district staff who worked very hard in the 
summer of 1957 to be ready to open the schools in the fall and positing that the tornado gave a 
reason for the community to come together in order to help each other.33  Burke principal Joseph 
Nesbit echoed Steck’s sentiments and asserted that not only did immediate community members 
help rebuild, but the efforts of politicians like Stuart Symington helped the school “get the 
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wheels moving and cut through red tape” with the federal government in order to obtain disaster 
relief funds that essentially funded reconstruction efforts.34 
The insurance money together with federal and state disaster relief was important for the 
school board in rebuilding, but it was the creative use of funds in reconstruction that allowed 
Hickman Mills to build better and larger facilities than it had before the tornado.  Local 
television affiliate KCMO news director Joe Kramer lived in Ruskin Heights and shared how 
school leaders used disaster relief funds to rebuild the high school: 
We had a young school superintendent, Dr. Carl Wagner.  Thanks to Senator Symington 
and other lawmakers we were getting a lot of disaster-relief funding, much of it was 
going to the schools.  Ruskin High School was a fairly new school at the time, but pretty 
badly wrecked.  Dr. Wagner asked whatever federal authorities he would have asked, 
whether it was necessary to reconstruct Ruskin as it was, or could the money be spent to 
produce a more efficient facility.  They said, “Hey, it’s your money.  Spend it the way 
you feel it should be spent, as long as it meets the purpose that it formally served.”  He 
had it redesigned for more efficiency, more usable space for educational purposes.  He 
used the federal aid proceeds from that disaster to very beneficial effect.35 
 
The federal funding came with some caveats, one being that monies provided be used only to 
rebuilt and not expand.36  So builders, in conjunction with the school board, came up with a plan 
to be able to build a larger school with the 1.9 million dollars received from a combination of a 
federal grant and school insurance money; they constructed the second floor and set up plans for 
a future third floor initially, with an eleven foot high “crawl space” underneath, which was later 
turned into the main floor.37  This bit of trickery allowed for the district to use funds for a two-
story building in order to really construct a three-story one. 
                                                          
34Ibid., 152-153.  Stuart Symington was a senator from Missouri who was instrumental in obtaining disaster relief 
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35 Ibid., 158-159. 
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 Even with federal and state help, repairing the schools and preparing the district to begin 
the 1957-58 school year was not an easy task.  Fortunately, construction on the new high school 
was swift and by July, school leaders felt confident that they would have the building finished 
enough to accommodate the anticipated seven-hundred high school students coming in the fall.38  
The district was also finishing construction of a new elementary school, William H. Johnson on 
Marsh Avenue (between Ruskin Heights and Ruskin Hills neighborhoods), when the tornado hit.  
The damage done to the building, similar to that suffered by Burke Elementary, was covered by 
the district’s insurance policy, hence repairs were made quickly and both schools received 
students in September of 1957.39  While the tornado was not a welcome event for the Hickman 
Mills community, school leaders like Wagner were able to take advantage of recovery efforts 
and funding to provide better schools than had existed in the first place.  While the tornado was 
traumatic for the community on the whole and tragic for those who were affected by injury and 
loss of life, the aftermath of the unfortunate event improved the Hickman Mills school district. 
District Growth…Again 
 Insurance money and federal disaster aid only covered reconstruction and it was not long 
until, once again, school leaders began asking the community anew for more money in order to 
expand educational facilities.  As described in chapter one, Hickman Mills was struggling to 
accommodate the large influx of students that resulted from population growth inside the 
district’s borders.  And yet, as in the past, Hickman Mills received serendipitous monetary 
support even while it struggled to adjust to the increase in student numbers.  This time, district 
leaders were given a gift of land to build a school. JM and Mary Baptiste, successful chemists 
and business owners, lived on a large estate called “Sleepy Hollow” near 103rd Street and 
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Highway 71.40  Before JM’s death in 1944, the two had decided to donate their land for 
educational or public use.41  In July 1957, only two months after the tornado, Mary, who took 
over as president of the company and manager of the estate after her husband passed away, 
offered fifteen acres of her land (valued at $45,000) to the school district with the expressed 
desire to construct a school building.42  School board member Marvin Langford quickly accepted 
the gifted land and declared that a junior high would be built, which would replace the junior 
high destroyed in the tornado.43 
 However fortuitous, unforeseen gifts did not completely alleviate Hickman Mills’s 
overcrowding situation.  As in the previous years, the school board needed to buy more land and 
to build more schools so it began to take steps to do so, actions which were met with opposition 
from anti-tax citizen groups.  By the end of 1957, Langford suggested the district acquire an 
additional fifteen acres to build another elementary school, with the intention of purchasing the 
land from the developer Praver & Sons.  This endeavor would cost the district about $45,000.44  
In a plea to the community to approve the purchase, board members Langford and Robert Barden 
wrote an open letter in the Jackson County Advocate, describing the reasons the district needed 
the land: 
1. The Citizen’s Committee recommends two schools be built in any area with 650 
homes in construction. 
2. We need 81 more rooms by 1959 in order to accommodate 1st through 8th graders. 
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3. At Johnson Elementary we have 300 students, which is too many.  Burke has 311, 
also too many students. 
4. The overflow from Johnson and Burke is enough for a new school.45 
 
The paper gave some space to the opposition in the same article, by listing the two chief reasons 
to not support the land purchase: “the land costs too much and other, more affordable spaces are 
available for purchase and development in the district.”46  In the face of some opposition, the 
land was approved for purchase and the district began making preparations for the construction 
of another elementary school in Ruskin Heights to relieve pressure from Johnson (which was just 
opened in 1957) and Burke.  The building would not be finished until 1959 and would be named 
Symington elementary, after US Senator Stuart Symington, who had been instrumental in 
obtaining federal disaster funds for the school district after the 1957 tornado.47   
By the beginning of the 1958-59 school year, there were eight elementary schools in the 
district.  The original one-room schools, Union Point, Holmes Park, Rockford, and Hickman, had 
undergone small expansions and were operating as first-grade centers.  Larger elementary 
schools like Burke (1954), Truman (1956), Westridge (1956), and Johnson (1957) were handling 
the bulk of the Hickman Mills students, with Symington soon to be added to the ranks in 1959.48  
Most of these newer schools were built near the Ruskin Heights and Ruskin Hills neighborhoods.  
Ruskin High, the new high school replacing that destroyed in the tornado, was completed 
quickly, with Baptiste Junior High anticipated to open by the following school year. The school 
system’s facilities, like the physical elements of the community surrounding it, had effectively 
recovered from the devastation of the tornado. 
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Raising Money 
 While the tornado was not a distant memory for the Hickman Mills community, life was 
returning to normal in the southland, which meant that the district was still dealing with 
overcrowding and how to build more schools without making residents feel overtaxed.  The 
superintendent and the school board in Hickman Mills again began their monumental efforts to 
pass bond issues and fund the construction of more schools to accommodate the steadily 
increasing growth in the district’s neighborhoods.  As before, school leaders deployed their 
Citizen’s Committee, put full-page ads in the newspaper, and largely promised voters that they 
would not see significant increases on their property taxes.  The first major goal for the school 
board was to build Symington Elementary, as the district had already purchased the land for the 
school.  The board asked the public to vote late in January 1958 on a $500,000 bond to construct 
the school, which would also provide within-district kindergarten for the first time.49  The board 
promised that no taxes would increase, as the funding for the bond would come from a new 
influx of money, primarily tax dollars from the renovated Truman Corners shopping plaza.50  
The strategy worked, and Hickman Mills School District handily won the two-thirds majority 
vote needed to pass the bond issue, with 1124 voting for it and 218 against.51  Hickman Mills 
was now the most financially secure it had ever been, largely thanks to relief funds that allowed 
for school construction and reconstruction without assuming further debt.  Additionally, public 
sympathy for the schools in the wake of the tornado meant that bond issues, for a time at least, 
were not as difficult to pass.52  Unfortunately, the pro-schooling public sentiment was not going 
                                                          
49 “Half Million Bond Election to Ruskin District Voters,” Jackson County Advocate, 67th year, no. 49, January 16, 
1958, 1, 8. 
50 Ibid.; “The Future of Our Children…Must Come First!” Full-Page Advertisement, Jackson County Advocate, 67th 
year, no. 50, January 23, 1958, 6. 
51 “Ruskin Board Happy Over Bond Election,” Jackson County Advocate, 67th year, no. 51, January 30, 1958, 1. 
52 Spearman, Baker, Hamilton, and Wade, interviews with author. 
 
 
 71 
to last long, as a district-wide controversy came to light within two weeks of the successful 
January bond issue.   
School Board Squabbles 
 After success in constructing more school buildings and expanding the educational 
facilities within the district, there was opportunity for self-congratulation and even celebration 
among Hickman Mills’s school leaders.  However, on February 3, 1959, during an executive 
session (closed to the public) of the school board, Superintendent Carl Wagner announced his 
resignation, having served in the office for two years.53  Wagner was not subtle in describing 
why he was asking for an early termination of his contract, stating that evening to the board: 
I knew that there was this problem on the board within thirty days after I arrived in 
Hickman Mills…constant badgering at board meetings and by interference with 
administration in matters of personnel and in placement problems…no able administrator 
would stay under the circumstances.54 
 
Wagner’s abrupt resignation brought to light frequent disagreements between himself and three 
members of the school board, in particular with Marvin Langford, whom Wagner accused of 
overstepping his role in “the hiring of an incompetent teacher” against the superintendent’s own 
wishes.55  The teacher was most likely a chemistry teacher at the high school, as Wagner did not 
want to renew his contract, but the board, at Langford’s insistence, did so.56  Eventually, this 
accusation of misuse of authority became more serious as Wagner’s story became public and the 
Jackson County Advocate began investigating discord among the school board.57   
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Combined pressure from the local newspaper and citizen’s groups led the school board to 
be more frank in addressing the nature of its troubles.  As members of the board began sharing 
their notes from past meetings, it became apparent that there was a steady build-up of tensions 
between Wagner and Langford, which culminated in an argument about the planning, 
construction, and staffing of Symington Elementary school.  The initial fight between the two 
men occurred while the district was looking to purchase land for the construction of a new 
elementary school.  The board had found land on the eastern edges of the district, so Wagner 
negotiated with the developer.  The Superintendent wanted the school site to be bounded on all 
four sides by roads, but the developer was not willing to build that many streets and cancelled 
contract negotiations.  Langford accused Wagner of purposefully sabotaging construction so that 
the district would purchase land in Ruskin Heights, which supposedly benefited Wagner, as he 
lived in the neighborhood.58  Later inquiry found that there was no personal gain for Wagner in 
having the school located in a Ruskin neighborhood and also he had no ties to Praver & Sons, the 
developers for Ruskin.  Additionally, the board discovered after the fact that it saved 
significantly on transportation costs by having the school located in Ruskin Heights.59   
When the school was built, Wagner and Langford then disagreed about who should run it.  
On November 4, 1958, Superintendent Wagner presented to the board his recommendations for 
new hires, focusing on Symington Elementary, which was to open in the fall of 1959.  Langford, 
with the immediate support of board members Robert Barden and Wallace Pinkepank, overruled 
Wagner’s suggestion of hiring Virginia Brown as principal of the new Symington Elementary, 
instead wishing to appoint Bruce Tucker who had been serving as principal at the four smaller 
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elementary schools.60  Wagner was resistant, but eventually agreed to place Tucker as principal 
on a one-year trial basis, with Brown taking over as principal of Union Point, Rockford, 
Hickman, and Holmes Park.61  Brown subsequently wrote a letter to the board exclaiming her 
dismay and embarrassment at the board’s actions, particularly about the discussion of her 
potential position at board meetings with neither her knowledge nor her presence.62  Wagner 
later complained that the “trial period” never went into effect and that the board, led by 
Langford, essentially hired a school principal against the superintendent’s wishes.63 
While disagreements existed before this event, animosity between the superintendent and 
the school board (chiefly three members of the school board) increased significantly, with each 
side was engaging in name-calling and accusations of impropriety, sometimes to the point of 
absurdity.  For example, Langford, who taught Sociology at Southeast High in the Kansas City 
Missouri School District, accused Wagner of pressuring KCMSD Superintendent James Hazlett 
to fire him.64  Wagner and some of the board members also brought up Langford’s previous role 
as educator and principal in the Hickman Mills district, claiming that he was trying to assume 
more leadership and power than what was appropriate for a board member.65  On a more 
personal level, Wagner and his supporters also accused Langford of nepotism, as his wife 
worked as a librarian at the high school.66 
Unease between Wagner and three of the school board members escalated in the first part 
of 1959 when “Langford & Co.” (the nickname given to Langford, Barden, and Pinkepank by 
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their detractors) expressed their formal opposition to the superintendent and were unwilling to 
renew his contract, with the vote to renew a tie at 3-3.67  In cases such as this, the Jackson 
County superintendent would normally then mediate and make an ultimate decision, but he 
refused to do so until after the April school board elections for Hickman Mills, in case a change 
in the school board would result in a change in the contract vote.68  Wagner decided he had 
enough; rather than waiting, he found a position in Oklahoma and asked for an early termination 
of his contract.69 
 But Wagner did not just resign and leave.  Within a short period of time the 
superintendent was making suggestions to the public as to how a school board should operate, 
saying, “...the board should be strictly a policy making body.  If any board member ignores this, 
the citizens should insist that he remove himself from office.”70  Wagner continued, stating, “if a 
board member has consistently given erroneous reports to the board, he should remove himself 
from the board.”71  While refraining from using his name, it was clear that Wagner was referring 
specifically to Langford in his public accusations.  The members of the board themselves divided 
into two camps: those supporting Langford (Langford, Barden, Pinkepank) and those supporting 
Wagner (Glen Gerred, Bill T. Wall, Barney Stewart).  Other board members also began issuing 
public statements.  Gerred made an immediate and scathing pronouncement to the newspaper 
after Wagner’s resignation: 
As long as the board of education usurps the powers of the superintendent they destroy 
his effectiveness…three members of the board were determined to undermine his 
[Wagner’s] position as superintendent by making administrative decisions on 
personnel…As long as this condition on the Board exists, we will not be able to get and 
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retain a competent superintendent.  The three members…must keep their hands off 
administration and make policy as everyone knows is the duty of a board.72 
 
Not to be outdone, Stewart added a shorter, yet fierier statement, placing blame for Hickman 
Mills’s non-accreditation status with the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools 
directly towards Langford & Co.: 
Well, Mr. Langford and Mr. Barden have finally succeeded in their efforts to get rid of 
another superintendent of schools.  The job of finding a replacement will not be easy.  No 
competent administrator will consider coming into a system that is not accredited because 
school teachers on the Board of Education insist on telling them how to do their job.73  
 
The last Wagner supporter, Bill Wall, gave a similar statement as the other two men, adding his 
congratulations to Wagner for finding “a more responsible position.”74  Robert Barden, the board 
president, remained more cautious in his wording, referring to the fact that the board voted 
unanimously to accept Wagner’s resignation and adding, “I don’t agree that the school board 
practices nepotism, which is actually voting to hire relatives to work for the district.”75  Neither 
Pinkepank nor Langford made immediate statements to the public. 
Almost simultaneously with the board statements, members of the community began to 
speak out against certain board members.  F. Russell Millin, a former board member, went on 
record to declare that Barden and Langford would always remain an obstacle to having a strong 
superintendent.76  Local evangelist, Reverend Paul Lambert, suggested that since the 
superintendent had resigned, the entire board should also step down so a special election could 
be held by the county superintendent to create a new board.77  While claiming that this would 
prove to the citizens of the district that the board wanted “to act in good faith,” it was also self-
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serving in the sense that Lambert was running for school board in the April election, and if the 
entire board resigned, he would be much more likely to win a seat in the election.78   
Adding to the tensions within the school board was Hickman Mills’s status as an 
accredited institution.  It was classified as an “AA” school by the Missouri State Department of 
Education, missing its triple A rating mostly because of student to teacher ratios, which the 
district was trying to improve by building or expanding so frequently.79  However, it was not 
accredited at all by the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools (usually called North 
Central Association), by virtue of justifications similar to those of the state department of 
education, but also because board practices were not in line with North Central policies.80  This 
became one of the main points creating animosity between board members, as Langford & Co. 
strongly disagreed with the other three board members over the extent of authority a board 
should exert in areas of staffing.81  Langford felt that the North Central Association was being 
too restrictive in its description of what a school board member is allowed to do and argued that 
he had a right to exert more authority over the daily operation of the district’s schools.82 
Reverend Lambert’s call for the board to resign resonated with a segment of the citizens 
of Hickman Mills and a petition began to circulate, demanding that the entire board step down.83  
Within two weeks it had gained 2,578 signatures and the board began to have a serious 
conversation about what it should do to deal with the debacle.84  President Barden publicly stated 
that he saw no legal imperative to his stepping down, but Barney Stewart succumbed to pressure 
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and handed in his resignation, only to rescind it two days later, arguing that his leaving would 
give an upper hand to Langford, Barden, and Pinkepank.85 “The way I see it, it is my duty and 
the duty of the whole board to resign,” stated Stewart, “but it would do no more than give 
immediate control of the board to Marvin Langford, three to two, if I handed in my 
resignation.”86  Both Stewart and Glen Gerred were finishing their terms in April and were not 
seeking re-election; instead they expressed support for two specific candidates, Don Newkirk 
and Reverend Lambert, who had declared their allegiance to Superintendent Wagner.87 
Relations between board members had become acrimonious enough that people in the 
community began to call for investigations into the board itself.  Six prominent pastors from the 
local Presbyterian, Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, and Community Christian churches wrote an 
open letter to the Hickman Mills Citizens Committee asking for an official investigation into the 
school board.88  The letter pointed out that the arguments between the board and administration 
“caused unfavorable publicity for our school district” and were “not in the best interests of our 
school district and our children.”89  As part of their recommendation to investigate the school 
board, the clergymen requested that the Citizens Committee specifically look into the “ethics and 
conduct of the School Board and the Administration,” and that they involve “the State 
Department of Education and the Missouri State Teachers Association.”90  For an organization 
whose original purpose was to help school leaders convince the community to pass bond issues, 
the Citizens Committee was thrust into a position of considerable power. 
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Six lawyers, including former board member, F. Russell Millin, issued a separate call to 
action, one that ultimately resulted in more change for the board.  Deploring the lack of 
accreditation for the district by the North Central Association and the infighting on the board, the 
lawyers appealed to the National Education Association and asked for an official investigation 
into the board, the school administrative staff, and school policies.91  Within two weeks of the 
initial public accusations made by Wagner and the outcry that followed, Langford, Barden, and 
Pinkepank made official statements in the local paper.92  Langford explained to residents the 
difference between state accreditation and accreditation by the North Central Association, stating 
that while being recognized by the NCA was a good goal, it was most important to be recognized 
by the state, which Hickman Mills was. 93  Langford assured that the district wanted to have an 
AAA rating, but needed more kindergarten classes to do so, rather than changes to board 
policies.94  Langford then went on the attack, pointing out that Wagner had worked in nine 
different districts over the last sixteen years, insinuating that he was not capable of remaining a 
superintendent in any district.95   
As for nepotism, Langford again defended himself by pointing out that his wife had 
worked in the district since 1943, while he became a board member in 1951.  Additionally, 
Langford state that he consistently abstained from voting whenever her contract renewal was 
submitted to the board for review.96  He then ended his statement with, “it is more important to 
know what is right rather than who is right.”97  Both Barden and Pinkepank took similar stances 
in their own statements, mostly attempting to address rumors of nepotism in the district and 
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factionalism on the board.98  Pinkepank specifically attacked accusations of factionalism, 
claiming that there were very few 3-3 votes and that he was not part of a bloc.99  All three men 
claimed they would support an investigation done by the NEA, which was echoed in statements 
issued by the board members who supported Wagner.100  All six of the board members made 
public declarations that were taken on the same day of a special board meeting, during which the 
members unanimously voted to invite a delegation from the NEA to interview the board, staff 
members, former superintendents, and principals, as part of an official investigation.101 
Hickman Mills Under Scrutiny 
 The individuals who would eventually conduct the investigation of Hickman Mills 
belonged to a special committee created by the National Commission for the Defense of 
Democracy Through Education, an organization formed in 1941 under the NEA, whose chief 
purpose was to “investigate controversies involving teachers and schools.”102  Oscar E. 
Thompson, professor of education at Iowa State Teachers College, headed the committee with 
six other members—a county superintendent of schools, a school superintendent, two school 
board members, and two teachers.  Two of the members of the investigative body were Kansans 
and the rest were from throughout the Midwest.103  After the Hickman Mills school board 
approved the request for an investigation, the measure was then passed to the district teachers, 
who voted in March 1959, ninety-two in favor and seventy-four against.104  Staff members came 
to Kansas City and conducted preliminary interviews on April 5th and 6th, with the committee 
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itself arriving in May to do in-depth interviews with board members, superintendents, principals, 
teachers, and residents.105  The committee also sent questionnaires to ninety-three community 
members.106 
 When the interviews and surveys were finished, the committee left and then came back in 
February 1960 to present its findings to the district.  The public meeting was held at Ruskin High 
in order to have enough for all the interested parties to attend.  Even so, the room was packed.107  
The committee began the meeting by declaring that the perception of the primary issue facing 
Hickman Mills was just a conflict of personalities was “an oversimplification of a situation 
which proved to be complex in nature and influenced by many factors.”108  It found that there 
were essentially two factions of board members, that one member in particular—the most senior 
member (an indirect naming of Marvin Langford)—was leading one faction and had too much 
influence.  Ultimately, the entire board was at fault because it had not written a solid and explicit 
set of policies for members to follow.109  As for the action towards Wagner, the committee 
determined that the superintendent had failed in creating a positive relationship with the board, 
the community, and the staff.  According to the NEA commission, Wagner was autocratic and 
antagonistic and was not a simple victim of the board.110 
 The committee’s finding did not exonerate the board or Langford for Wagner’s treatment, 
as the committee chided the board for being antagonistic and unprofessional in demeanor, 
especially at board meetings.  Additionally, the NEA investigators discovered that members of 
the board conducted secret meetings and “repeated vicious rumors” about the previous school 
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leader, Superintendent Schultz (1952-1956), and in essence, forced him to resign.111  The 
investigation found that the members of the board were unprofessional, unethical, and “became 
sidetracked from the goal of all school boards, that of providing as good a school system as 
possible for the school district.”112  These were strong words considering the expansion the 
board helped foster for Hickman Mills’s schools.113 
 The committee ended its report with recommendations for the board, superintendent, 
teachers, and community members, with most advice dedicated to how boards of education 
should operate.  Its suggestions focused on how the board needed to re-create itself as a policy-
making unit and urged the group to create a handbook of school policies for board members to 
abide by.114  The committee report also urged school board members to make a formal apology 
to Lewis Schultz for making a decision that was “unduly influenced by rumor and unfounded 
charges” and that they should institute a policy to ensure a similar action would never happen 
again.115  Finally, the board was instructed to “expect and accept the resignation or retirement 
forthwith of the senior member of the Board of Education.”116  The committee found his actions 
towards superintendents unethical and concluded that he had taken advantage of the board’s lack 
of written policies.117  Marvin Langford was out. 
Aftermath 
 Some changes were already underway at the board level before the NEA special 
commission made its report.  In April 1959, the district had a board election, which resulted in 
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the greatest voter turnout in the history of the district, most likely due to the public controversy 
related to the school board’s actions against the superintendent.  Don Newkirk and Art McElroy 
won seats, replacing Glen Gerred and Barney Stewart.  This did not immediately change the 
status quo of the board, as Langford was still heading his faction, but he did not gain any 
supporters in the election of Newkirk or McElroy, which meant the board remained split.118  
Additionally, the community passed a tax levy increase for school funding, raising the district tax 
to $3.75 on one hundred dollars of assessed valuation of property, which became the highest levy 
in Jackson County.119  This money meant teacher salaries would rise and the district could afford 
to hire more teachers and specialist instructors.120  On the leadership side, in May 1959 
following the April election, the school board began writing out set policies for board members 
to follow, many months before being instructed to do so by the NEA commission.  It also hired a 
new superintendent, Tom Foraker, who would prove to be Hickman Mills’s longest serving 
district leader, from 1959 to 1976.121 
 The board continued to refine its written policies and changed its relationship with the 
superintendent, as counseled by the NEA report.  This, coupled with some crucial factors, 
resulted in Hickman Mills receiving “AAA” status by the state of Missouri and gaining 
accreditation by the North Central Association in 1960.122  It is worth noting the changes the 
district made in order to gain accreditation.  First, the board demonstrated that it followed the 
written policies it had finally created and had fostered a more professional atmosphere in board 
meetings.  Second, the opening of Symington Elementary in the fall of 1959 meant that pressure 
on the four smaller elementary schools in the district was greatly relieved and superintendent 
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Foraker decided to have the small schools offer Kindergarten and first grade only.  In the fall of 
1959, for the first time in the district, Kindergarten was offered for all students.  Third, the levy 
increase in April 1959 translated to higher pay for teachers, which helped attract qualified 
persons to a district that was needing to fill their schools with personnel as quickly as it needed 
to construct more buildings.  The levy increase allowed the district to hire more specialized and 
non-specialized staff, which also made Kindergarten possible.  As stated earlier in this chapter, 
the two great obstacles for Hickman Mills to receive AAA status (the highest) in Missouri and 
accreditation with the North Central Association were the availability of Kindergarten and 
professionalism of the school board.  By the end of 1960, Hickman Mills changed leadership and 
added enough qualified staff and buildings to declare that the small but growing school district to 
the south of Kansas City was a quality institution for parents and children. 
The Sun Will Come Out… 
 Hickman Mills experienced two tragedies, one out of its control and one of its own 
making.  Yet, the aftermath of the tornado and the school board drama led to a stronger 
community with newer housing, shopping, and schools.  By 1960, Hickman Mills was a viable 
suburban community for those wishing to escape the congestion and perceived crime in Kansas 
City.  As the southern lands were easily accessible via Highway 71, residents had shopping 
plazas, affordably spacious homes, and accredited schools housed in new facilities.  Hence, the 
population growth in Hickman Mills continued to climb through the 1960s, as more families 
relocated and enrolled their children in school.  This meant that the school district would once 
again address overpopulation and more buildings would need to be built, much like the 1950s.  
However, because the community itself was growing to such a great degree, citizens began to 
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want better services than what the county could provide, particularly water, sewer, electricity, 
and fire and police protection.   
At the same time, since this was a community with a growing population and increasing 
business activity, the potential for a strong tax base was appealing to Kansas City leaders.  City 
commissioners were additionally nervous about having city boundaries “boxed in” similar to 
what happened to St. Louis.123  When considered together, these factors help explain why 
Hickman Mills became a desirable area for Kansas City, Missouri to annex, and at the same 
time, helps indicate why citizens in the area south of the city saw some advantages in joining 
with the municipality.  In chapter three, I will address the annexation of Hickman Mills, 
including attempts by Kansas City and Grandview to annex the school district.  Suburban growth 
and the eventual joining with the larger urban center in the north led to significant changes 
within the borders of the Hickman Mills school district, some of which were welcome, while 
others brought unforeseen consequences that prompted longtime residents of Hickman Mills to 
regret not retaining their independence from Kansas City, Missouri.  
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Chapter 3: Mixed Feelings 
 
Urbanization, Modernization, and the Fight to Stay Independent and  
Self-Sufficient, 1959-1970 
 
 By 1960, the unincorporated village of Hickman Mills had transformed into a suburb of 
Kansas City.  Even though areas by Longview Lake to the east and the western edge by Blue 
River Road were more rural and sparse, housing developments in the center and northern areas 
of the school district were growing and expanding at a very rapid pace.  For all intents and 
purposes, Hickman Mills had become a collection of suburban neighborhoods as the 1950s 
became the 1960s.  Technically, the village was part of an urban community as it was annexed 
by Kansas City in 1961, and thus ceased to be a village and instead became part of the city, with 
the moniker “South Kansas City.”  Even so, the appearance of the area remained “classically” 
suburban, primarily due to the housing developments built by Praver & Sons, as well as the fact 
that the population of Hickman Mills was almost entirely composed of white blue collar/lower 
middle-class families.  The school district reflected the area’s suburban character in its struggles 
to grow quickly enough to accommodate the increasing number of children living within the 
school boundaries.  
This chapter addresses how Hickman Mills’s identity shifted from its foundation as a 
separate community to becoming part of a metropolitan center.  Essentially, Hickman Mills 
ceased to exist as a geographical designation except within the borders of the school district, 
which the community determined would stay separate from Kansas City.  Even though Hickman 
Mills lost its independence as a village or individual community, it retained its identity as 
Hickman Mills because the school district remained autonomous.  Exploring efforts to annex the 
school district to Kansas City reveals the central issue in Hickman Mills’s history—the 
community wished to remain independent but was not always willing to pay the economic costs 
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needed to be self-sufficient.  The change from being a small but growing suburb south of Kansas 
City to being a part of the larger municipality, the community’s refusal to join the Kansas City 
Missouri School District, and serious funding issues and tax battles laid the foundation for the 
eventual decline of Hickman Mills as a school district. 
No Longer a Village:  Hickman Mills Becomes Part of Kansas City, Missouri 
On March 1, 1959, the residents of Kansas City, Missouri voted on a resolution to expand 
the city southward, annexing unincorporated lands that included the neighborhoods comprising 
the Hickman Mills School District.1  This move was but one manifestation of Kansas City’s 
expansion efforts, as it was in some danger of being locked in by other municipalities and not 
being able to grow.  Kansas City’s geographic location limited its expansion, as it was bounded 
on the west side by the state border with Kansas, bordered by growing suburban cities like 
Grandview to the south, Raytown and Lee’s Summit to the southeast, and Gladstone and North 
Kansas City to the north.2  The longtime city manager for Kansas City, Missouri, L.P. 
Cookingham (in office 1940-1959), made plans to enlarge Kansas City, chiefly to the north and 
the south in his conception for expansion.  While the manager had been forced out of his position 
by the time the residents of Kansas City voted to annex Hickman Mills, the acquisition was a 
result of Cookingham’s work.3  After a citywide vote, Hickman Mills was to become South 
Kansas City on January 1, 1961.4 
                                                            
1 “Feelings Mixed on Nearing Annexation,” Kansas City Star, February 1, 1960, 1A. 
2 James R. Shortridge, Kansas City and How It Grew, 1822-2011 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 
103, map 48. 
3 Ibid.; Stanley T. Gabis, “Leadership in a Large Manager City: The Case of Kansas City,” in City Bosses and 
Political Machines, ed. Lee Seifert Greene, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 
353 (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1964), 58. 
4 “Feelings Mixed,” 1A. 
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Decreased costs and increased services made the plan to join Kansas City more palatable 
among residents of Hickman Mills, even if they did not have a say in the matter.5  The only 
organized group to officially and vocally protest the annexation was the local chapter of the 
Chamber of Commerce, whose members had vested interests in seeing the community become a 
small city of its own.6  Kansas City officials kept reminding residents of Hickman Mills the 
benefits they would receive, particularly in decreased taxes.7  R.D. Rogers, the acting city 
manager for Kansas City (after Cookingham’s removal), asserted that residents would see their 
water and electricity bills as well as their fire insurance decrease by two-thirds.8  At the time, 
Hickman Mills residents were paying special water and fire levies to Jackson County, which 
would disappear when the community joined Kansas City.9  Property taxes would also be a third 
of Jackson County rates, although residents would still have to pay state and school taxes.10  As 
annexation came closer, residents learned that police and fire services were going to be greatly 
improved for the community of Hickman Mills, as the city would take over those services either 
at noon on the thirty-first of December, or at midnight on January 1st, 1961.11  
 While incorporation/annexation into Kansas City would result in expanded services, 
residents expressed doubt about becoming Kansas Citians.  Many preferred to keep their 
community small and worried about immediate changes like larger roads and increased traffic.  
                                                            
5 Carla Baker, interview with author, August 14, 2012; Gloria Cardona, interview with author, August 30, 2012; 
Colleen Hamilton, interview with author, August 14, 2012; James Hill, interview with author, August 30, 2012; 
Lilly Husman, interview with author, August 25, 2012.  
6 “Against City Move,” Kansas City Star, February 17, 1960, 3; South Kansas City Chamber of Commerce, 
“History: From Chamber of Commerce of Consolidated School District #1 to South Kansas City Chamber of 
Commerce, 1931-2007” (unpublished document, 2012), 2.  For most of its existence (1931 to present day), the 
Chamber of Commerce in Hickman Mills claimed association with the school district.  Only in the 1970s did the 
group rename itself the “South Kansas City Chamber of Commerce.” 
7 “Annexation Area Costs May Be Less,” Kansas City Times, October 19, 1960, 4. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 “City Ready to Take Over Fire Runs in Annexed Area,” Jackson County Advocate, 70th year, no. 47, December 
29, 1960, 1, 5. 
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The region especially needed more traffic lights, mostly along Bannister, Longview, and Blue 
Ridge Roads, which were the major thoroughfares in the community and where most businesses 
were located.12    However, even with the increased congestion and the shift from a quieter 
community to a more bustling center of commerce, there was very little visible protest against 
the annexation on the part of “Ruskinites.”  Some longtime residents interviewed suggested that 
people at the time were resigned to their fate—the move was out of their control and thus it 
needed to be endured.13  There is a certain irony that so much of the growth of Hickman Mills 
came from people who chose to leave Kansas City, Missouri in the first place and move out to 
the country, only to have the result of the migration be a transformation of the original space.  In 
a sense, the city was claiming these people back.  While residents were not completely opposed 
to the measure (though they would be a few years later when the school board suggested merging 
school districts), some expressed a sense of loss in becoming part of the city.  One resident of 
Ruskin Heights wrote a letter in the local paper lamenting a loss in civic pride and local identity 
that resulted from becoming part of the big city, saying, “we have street lights, several parks with 
playground equipment…but we all scream taxes, taxes, taxes.  We aren’t the small, civic 
community we used to be.”14  Her comments capture the sense of defeat in the community, that 
residents had lost their civic identity in the annexation and were looking for a way to stay 
connected as a small community.  All residents had left was their school district identity, which 
they clung to.  
 
 
                                                            
12 “New Traffic Control Lights Planned for HM Area,” Jackson County Advocate, 72nd year, no. 36, October 11, 
1962, 1. 
13 Baker, Cardona, Hamilton, Hill, and Husman, interviews with author.  As Baker was a child at the time of 
annexation, she was remembering her parent’s views on Kansas City. 
14 “Ruskin Review,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 73, no. 4, February 28, 1963, 4. 
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School as Community Identity, School Growth  
 Before annexation, Hickman Mills existed as an unincorporated village and had no 
centralized governing body, but did have a Chamber of Commerce and a school district named 
for the village.  After annexation, the name “Hickman Mills” only accurately applied to the 
school district, yet people in the neighborhoods of then South Kansas City primarily identified 
themselves as residents of Hickman Mills.15  Hence, the school district had become the only 
unifying entity for the area that was now a newly minted part of Kansas City.  Shortly after 
municipal annexation, residents of Hickman Mills experienced a minor threat that would have 
meant losing a piece of the district to neighboring Grandview, and a major threat made by the 
Hickman Mills school board itself to join the Kansas City Missouri School District (KCMSD) 
and dissolve the Hickman Mills district.  As evidenced by the community’s visceral reaction to 
these perceived threats, the thought of losing an independent school district was much more 
unappealing to residents than losing their identity as a village.  More likely, the loss of the school 
district would signal the end of Hickman Mills as a separate space apart from Kansas City and 
residents would no longer live in a suburb.  The history of the proposed merger with Kansas 
City’s school district shows that while the community opposed the measure, it was Hickman 
Mills’s own school board who proposed it, for financial reasons.  The suggestion made by the 
school leadership came about because the school district continued to struggle accommodating 
the annual increase in students and attempted to raise needed funds, but the community was 
reticent to pay more taxes.   
 In 1961, the school board continued actions that it had been engaged in for over a decade, 
namely seeking to pass bonds to fund school expansion and the construction of new facilities.  
The members of the board met at the end of December 1960 to discuss a new bond issue of 
                                                            
15 It was also common to refer to oneself as a Ruskin resident, as per the local high school. 
 
 90 
$555,000 in order to build a twelve-room elementary school (Warford Elementary), to add six 
more rooms to the high school, and to purchase land for another elementary school in the 
future.16  The high school expansion was becoming necessary as enrollment had increased to 
over a thousand students, with nearly fifteen-hundred expected students for the following school 
year.  Additionally, the board sought to raise the school levy by ten cents to $3.75, in order to 
continue to fund the schools and keep a low interest rate on debt.17  The board was optimistic this 
would pass in January, but members were nervous about municipal anti-annexation sentiment 
among Hickmanites; that somehow residents would confuse the two issues.18  In fact, the board 
decided to cancel the levy increase and focus instead on the bond issue, supposing that 
requesting for both would be too much for the community to support.   
Superintendent Tom Foraker expressed the importance of the bond issue, arguing that 
growth in the school district “means that we have to build a new school the size of Baptiste 
junior high building every year!”19  The district had grown at this point to having over seven 
thousand students and school leaders (along with housing developers) assumed the student body 
would continue to increase within the district.20  Good news came for district leadership, as the 
bond passed in January with just over a thousand votes for the issue and 352 against.21  Foraker 
and the board were pleased that the bond passed the necessary two-thirds majority vote by a clear 
margin, but noted that this was the closest bond election since 1956, before the tornado.  The 
leadership attributed the anti-bond votes as linked to anxiety over annexation with Kansas City, 
                                                            
16 “Ruskin Board Approves Program for Bond Issue,” Jackson County Advocate, 70th year, no. 46, December 22, 
1960, 1. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 “Ruskin Ready for Bond Vote at Five Schools This Saturday,” Jackson County Advocate, 70th year, no. 50, 
January 19, 1961, 1, 7. 
20 Ibid. 
21 “HM Voters Grant $555,000 School Bond Issue,” Jackson County Advocate, 70th year, no. 51, January 26, 1961, 
1, 8.  Based on the estimated number of adults living in the neighborhoods comprising Hickman Mills according to 
the 1960 census (16,261), turnout was about eight percent. 
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thinking that some residents were confusing the school district bond with a municipality 
measure.22  School construction began and the district leadership was engaged in a now normal 
routine of building, planning, and determining how to finance the next needed facility.  Residents 
in Hickman Mills were then surprised, just weeks after the bond vote, when the school board was 
threatened with a loss of part of the district to a neighboring city.   
 In February 1961, the city of Grandview proposed annexing the neighborhoods around 
the Truman Corners shopping plaza to their own school district.  This was a blatant effort to gain 
tax revenue from the center, which was understandable considering the plaza and the 
neighborhood touched upon and even crossed into Grandview’s borders. Not wanting to lose the 
funding that came with that portion of the district, the Hickman Mills school board opposed the 
measure.  Because Jackson County law required both school districts to hold a public vote when 
disputing boundaries, Hickman Mills held its at the beginning of April, this time combining it 
with a delayed levy increase vote.23  The gamble of having citizens vote for a possible boundary 
change and a levy increase on the same ballot was bold, but the measure worked in favor of 
Hickman Mills.  While Grandview residents voted to annex the neighborhoods into their own 
school district, a majority Ruskinites opposed it, and at the same time approved the levy increase 
by a comfortable margin—almost two thousand for the measure, with six hundred against.  Over 
2500 voters opposed the boundary change, with only forty-nine voting for it.24  With a stalemate 
over Truman Corners, the Jackson County school board met to arbitrate.  After deliberation, the 
Jackson County authorities decided to remain the boundaries intact.  Hickman Mills got to keep 
Truman Corners and the funding that came with it and at the same time gained a levy increase on 
                                                            
22 Ibid. 
23 “Ruskin Voters Oppose South Boundary Change,” Jackson County Advocate, 71st year, no. 9, April 6, 1961, 1-2. 
24 Ibid.  This vote elicited a fifteen-percent turnout. 
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property taxes in the neighborhoods, which were growing in value due to rapid 
suburbanization.25   
 With the border dispute settled, the superintendent and the school board returned to their 
primary activity, addressing district growth.  As before, Foraker and the school district leadership 
continued to push for building expansion to address the growing numbers of new students.  By 
the fall of 1962, Hickman Mills was enrolling a little over 8,500 students in the schools, with 
three hundred more high school students than the previous year.26  Once again, the school board 
knew it had to raise more funds for further construction in order to accommodate the increase in 
students.  At the end of 1962, the board set a new bond issue for election in January 1963 for 
$450,000, to be used to build a new elementary school (Dobbs) and another junior high (Ervin).27  
As in the past, the board turned to community groups to help support the bond and the Chamber 
of Commerce came forward endorsing the school plan.28  The vote again overwhelmingly 
favored the bond, with only 163 persons opposing and 1,739 in favor.29  Foraker was pleased, but 
he and the school board realized that each bond issue was essentially a stopgap measure that was 
temporarily ameliorating a problem that needed a larger and more permanent solution.  Hickman 
Mills needed to raise taxes and not just pass bonds if it was to educate the new students in light 
of continued residential development and population growth in the area. 
Hickman Mills Hits a Wall 
 Even with the expansions and repeated bond issues, the district was still in the unenviable 
position of being incapable to provide enough facilities for the continued growth of students 
                                                            
25 “County Board Says No to School Line Change,” Jackson County Advocate, 71st year, no. 13, May 4, 1961, 1. 
26 “HM Enrollment Is up 873 at Opening,” Jackson County Advocate, 71st year, no. 31, September 6, 1962, 1. 
27 “Saturday 26th vote $450,000 Bond to Build New,” Jackson County Advocate, 72nd year, no. 47, December 27, 
1962, 1. 
28 “School Bonds Endorsed by Hickman Chamber of Commerce,” Jackson County Advocate, 72nd year, no. 51, 
January 24, 1962, 1. 
29 “HM Voters Give Big Bond Majority,” Jackson County Advocate, 72nd year, no. 52, January 31, 1963, 1. 
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living in and moving into the neighborhoods of Hickman Mills.  This had essentially been the 
standard for growth and expansion in Hickman Mills, a pattern detailed in chapters 1 and 2.   
However, after ten years of consistent growth and expansion with very little in the way of raising 
the local levy in order to adequately fund school construction and operations, the school board 
and the superintendent saw they were facing a crisis. In 1963, they decided to take strong action 
to address it.  Board president Bill Wall presented a speech in a closed meeting to a group of 150 
business and community leaders in February of 1963, outlining his concern with the rapid 
increase in the number of school-aged children: 
About five years ago, or the year following the tornado, it became apparent that this 
district would have to build the equivalent of thirty teaching stations, or classrooms, per 
year to keep up with the pupil growth pattern…We have had a ten percent growth per 
year in student population over the past five years.  Seven percent of this increase is from 
a higher or increasing birth rate in the district.  Three percent of this increase has been 
from children who have moved into the district…I wish I could say that the situation will 
get better but it is going to get much worse.”30 
 
Wall explained to the group what the district was planning for construction and expansion to 
meet the growth, as well as concerns over the potential loss of accreditation from the state of 
Missouri and from the North Central Association should class sizes become too large.31  Adding 
to Wall’s concerns, the district was not able to simply increase its bond indebtedness in order to 
finance school construction.  As outlined by state law, each school district was allowed to issue 
bonds up to nineteen percent of their assessed valuation (property value) and, each year since 
1953, Hickman Mills had always voted for bonds up to its legal limit.32  As Wall succinctly 
stated, “it simply is not enough to do the job.”33 
                                                            
30 “Warn of Coming School Crisis,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 73, no. 4, February 28, 1963, 1, 4. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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 The school board president then offered three options to the community leaders: continue 
with bonds and have the schools eventually operate on a half-day schedule, with students 
attending in shifts; join the Kansas City, Missouri district; or vote for a dollar levy lasting for 
four years, on top of the regular levy of $3.75.34  Wall was vying for the last option, as he 
asserted that sending students to shorter school days would deprive them of a quality education 
and joining the Kansas City school district might lower tax rates, but would bring about 
uncertainty and lack of local control.35  Passing a long-term, but temporary levy would raise 
sufficient funds to construct and operate more buildings.  Wall provided his audience with 
specific finances:  
By collecting this dollar special levy…it is estimated that we would have available some 
$3,707,000.   It is estimated that our building needs for the next four years total 
$3,791,665.36 
 
The funds would not completely cover district expenses, but the special bond would raise enough 
money to make expansion work.  Wall ended his presentation with an excerpt from the locally 
venerated poet John Ruskin, for whom the high school was named, urging the community to 
think of the future and “that men will say as they look upon the labor and wrought substance of 
them, ‘see! This our fathers did for us.’”37   
The Great Levy Campaign of 1963 
The 150 community members at the gathering agreed to form a committee on school 
finance and began having meetings in the Ruskin High cafeteria in order to discuss the future of 
the district.  Within two weeks, the committee came to a decision to support the effort to raise a 
                                                            
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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four-year levy.38  The measure would be put on the general school board election set for April 2, 
1963.39  The committee then immediately voted to change themselves from a finance committee 
to a public relations one, ostensibly so it could participate in the levy campaign.40  This was a 
demanding undertaking, exceeding previous bond and levy elections with a goal of bringing 3.7 
million dollars into the district over four years.  Committee members began a letter-writing 
campaign, placed full-page ads in the newspaper, held public meetings, and convinced the editor 
of the Jackson County Advocate to officially and vocally support the measure.41  The committee 
promised the citizens of Hickman Mills that the levy would be re-evaluated if state or federal 
funding increased over the next years.42  Presenting an official statement from the school board, 
Bill Wall attempted to assure voters that “the board has exhausted every possible resource in its 
exploration,” that for the best education of the children of the district, “there is no other choice 
but to submit this proposition to the voters.”43   
Opposition to this very large levy was formidable, even if it was not as publicly vocal as 
the efforts put forward by the school board and the public relations committee.44  When the April 
2nd election came, the levy increase was overwhelmingly defeated and three board members, 
including president Wall, lost their seats.  Each was replaced by men who promised to not raise 
levies unless completely necessary.45  Over five thousand people voted in the election, a record 
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39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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1, 4; “The Moving Finger,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 73, no. 6, March 14, 1963, 3; “VOTE YES! FOR OUR 
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for the district, with the vote totaling three to one against the special levy.46  However, the basic 
$3.75 levy was renewed, so support for the schools was not completely revoked.47  But the 
message from residents of the district was clear for the school board and for Superintendent 
Foraker: address the problem of overcrowding, but do it without raising taxes. 
Dealing with Defeat 
 Foraker and the school board had been thoroughly defeated and now had to find other 
measures to cope with large increases in student enrollment and fewer spaces to put them.  The 
main problem facing district leadership was that in order to maintain the AAA rating with 
Missouri, as well as accreditation with the North Central Association, class sizes had to remain 
relatively low; the district could not simply crowd students into the school buildings.  Not 
without losing accreditation with the North Central Association.48   
The board’s next strategy to address school growth and funding was to return to the previous 
pattern of passing bonds and smaller levies piecemeal.   In January 1964, the board started with a 
$450,000 bond with a promise of no immediate raise in taxes.49  However, the bond failed to 
pass.  The community goodwill and overwhelming support given to the school district after the 
tornado in 1957 had been spent and district leadership now found itself in a very uncomfortable 
position.  Previous board president Wall’s warning from the year before still held true in 1964; 
the district either had to find a way to raise more money, divide its student body in half and teach 
them in shifts, or look to annex themselves to Kansas City to the north.  While teaching in shifts 
would occur in the district a decade later, the board was reticent to take drastic measures, so it 
                                                            
46 Even with a record turnout of five thousand voters, this amounted to thirty percent of the eligible electorate 
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47 “Defeat $1 HM Levy,” 1. 
48 “Public Committees to Study School Classroom Shortage,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 73, no. 14, May 9, 
1963, 1. 
49 “Everyone Has a Share” Jackson County Advocate, Full-page Advertisement, vol. 73, no. 4, January 16, 1964, B1. 
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began to look at its third option, joining the Kansas City School District.  This made sense at the 
time, as the KCMSD was accredited, had more facilities and a larger operating budget, and had a 
good, albeit short-lived, reputation.  The “downfall” of KCMSD, which has made the district so 
infamous today, was going to come later, precipitating Hickman Mills’s own “decline.”  
However, the strong opposition that would come from the suggestion to join KCMSD signaled 
that suburban residents did not want to lose their final piece of identity separate from the city, 
namely their suburban school district. 
Flirtation with the Kansas City Missouri School District 
 New board president A.A. McElroy and Superintendent Tom Foraker quietly petitioned 
the state board of education for permission to look into and vote upon annexation with the 
Kansas City Missouri School District in January 1964; by February, they received word from the 
state body that they allowed were to proceed.50  McElroy wrote the issue onto the agenda for the 
February 5th meeting which attracted enough attention from the community that two groups, the 
Ruskin Committee for Annexation (CfA) and the Patrons for Education Progress (PEP) each sent 
a representative to present statements to the board about annexation.51  There was some intrigue, 
as McElroy did not want to let them speak, justifying his refusal by stating that they were not on 
the agenda and that he was not interested in listening to “any political speeches.”52  Some of the 
other board members disagreed and motioned to allow the presentations.  A vote was taken and 
only two board members, McElroy and Don Newkirk (both among the longest serving members 
of the board at the time), voted against allowing the representatives to give a speech.53  
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 After deliberating on when to hold the annexation election and a possible upcoming levy 
vote, the board then dedicated time in its schedule for public presentations.  Murray Melliker, 
from the Committee for Annexation, read a statement requesting for a vote as soon as possible 
and in as many polling places as feasible to allow for maximum voter turnout, as well as a litany 
of suggested regulations to ensure that voters have “their basic right to a secret ballot and a fair 
election.”54  Considering that the school board created this committee, some members present 
assumed they were going to hear a supportive statement from the CfA.  Instead they got a veneer 
of support for annexation and heavy criticism for voting issues.  The statement surprised some 
board members and several commented that they felt insulted at even a hint of perceived 
unfairness in elections.55 
 The statement prepared by Milton Duncan, president of Patrons for Education Progress  
(PEP), was much more succinct and accusatory.  Duncan shared that he headed a committee that 
met the night before to plan its opposition to annexation: 
We repeated our conviction that this district can support its own educational system and 
maintain local control without taking the irretrievable step of annexation.56 
 
This was the start of a six-week campaign between two equally vocal and passionate groups—
one for annexation and one against.  With the election occurring on March 14th, there was not 
much time for either side to make their case to the public, so the battle that ensued was relatively 
brief but loud.  The fight over an effort to join Kansas City schools, which ultimately failed, had 
greater prominence and significance for the community than the discussion about joining the 
actual city itself.  However, unlike the annexation of 1961, this time residents of Hickman Mills 
had the power to decide their own fate. 
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 For the first time, the Jackson County Advocate was replete with full-page ads for and 
against the annexation proposal, an unusual circumstance as normally the paper only ran ads 
placed by the school board or the public awareness committee.  Additionally, while letters to the 
editor were historically sparse in the local paper, during this period, each issue (weekly) had two 
or three letters, all addressing the annexation question.  The majority of the writers employed the 
language of local control—a desire to retain decision making powers over the schools and a fear 
that those powers would be lost in joining the larger entity of the city school district to the north.  
If the annexation measure had succeeded, KCMSD would have become a district with an island 
extension, as Hickman Mills’s district border was separated from Kansas City by a piece of the 
Center and Raytown school districts.57  Residents of Hickman Mills also expressed a fear of the 
unknown, arguing that becoming part of the larger city school district would mean being subject 
to rules that work for Kansas City, but not necessarily for Hickman Mills.  The letters in the 
paper never explained what that statement meant, but it seems to relate to a sense of loss of 
control.58  Writers complained of dirty tactics and smear campaigns waged by both the CfA and 
the PEP, some claiming slanderous flyers were inserted into the local paper shortly after it was 
delivered and others stating that leaders in each group received threatening phone calls at 
home.59  For a short period of time, tensions mounted over whether to completely merge with 
Kansas City school district or not. 
 PEP employed ads in the newspaper and sent flyers as well as mailers to people’s homes 
declaring the dangers of becoming part of Kansas City’s school system.  Typical arguments 
included concerns that the district would ignore the suburban area and that the smaller population 
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59 Ibid. 
 
 100 
of the south would not be sufficient to allow residents to make a difference in citywide elections, 
or that the Hickman Mills School District is special and should continue being its own entity.60  
However, some residents also expressed concerns toward joining a school district that served a 
large minority population.  One position repeated by the PEP was that the merger would mean 
children would be bussed into the city and would attend schools far away from home, which 
bears resemblance to a common reason given by white, suburban parents for fighting 
desegregation.61  Another argument used stronger language, stating that Kansas City had “31,000 
culturally deprived children that require a special program.”62  The language was code for “poor, 
non-white students,” originating from a popular educational text at the time by Frank Riessman, 
The Culturally Deprived Child.63  This was another argument that would be used to reject 
desegregation efforts throughout the Kansas City metro area and among other metropolitan 
centers throughout the country.  Suburbanites were concerned that their children’s education 
would suffer from exposure to “culturally deprived” children.  PEP focused on the argument in 
one of its flyers, positing that the cost of educating “culturally deprived children” was high and 
that “our relatively homogenous district does not have this costly problem.  The grass in not 
always greener on the other side of the fence.”64 
 For its part, the CfA placed ads and flyers attempting to squash rumors that children 
would be put on buses and sent to the city to go to school.   The committee’s argument was much 
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less impassioned than PEP’s, but very straightforward.  The CfA explained the reality that 
educating the growing number of children within the district was becoming increasingly 
expensive; that the community itself did not have the resources to finance the burden, but Kansas 
City did.65  The group presented data showing that in 1964, the local tax base gave the school 
district about five thousand dollars per student, down seven hundred dollars from 1960.66  
Kansas City, Missouri, however, was paying almost eleven thousand dollars per student.  The 
inclusion of Hickman Mills would lower the average, to about ten thousand dollars, but doubling 
what the district could provide on its own.67 
 The two groups continued to publicly argue with each, with the CfA accusing the PEP of 
fear mongering and the PEP questioning the CfA’s calculations.68  The CfA argued that the 
district leadership endorsed joining Kansas City and the PEP rejoined that the teachers 
overwhelmingly rejected it.69  The League of Women Voters sponsored an official debate on 
March 3rd in the high school cafeteria, with about three hundred fifty persons attending.70  Two 
members of each organization stood in front of the crowd and engaged each other with direction 
from a moderator, including timed statements and rebuttals.  The arguments posed by both sides 
largely repeated what had been shared in print—questions over funding, local control, and 
busing.71  However, at the end of the prepared statements and back and forth arguments, the 
debate was opened to written questions supplied by the audience.   
One question posed to a member of the Committee for Annexation stands out because it 
directly addressed integration: “Isn’t it the policy of Kansas City to have a Negro teacher in each 
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school?”72  The immediate answer given is indicative of the sentiments and outlook among 
Hickman Mills’s suburbanites at the time, as the representative from the CfA (again the 
supporters of joining with Kansas City): 
Kansas City is in the business of education, not segregation.  Their policy is a policy of 
neighborhood schools.  Not one student is transported out of his school, unless he 
requests it for reasons of curriculum.73 
 
In a manner, the answer dodged the question, but essentially the CfA member was making the 
point that children would attend their local schools and thus would be unaffected by the makeup 
of the schools to the north.  When the question was posed to a representative from PEP, she 
answered that Superintendent Hazlett in Kansas City has an official policy of “total 
integration.”74   
The issue of race continued after the debate as well, as the CfA released a list of 
counterarguments to each chief complaint about annexation raised by PEP.  Near the top of the 
list, the CfA included the statement “The Negroes Are Coming,” explaining that PEP had been 
conducting “a blatant appeal to bigotry and prejudice” in insinuating that students from Kansas 
City would be attending schools in Hickman Mills, or vice-versa.75  The CfA countered, showing 
that of the eighty-two elementary schools in Kansas City, only five have pupils from other areas 
due to overcrowding.76  The statement called the “PEP’s thinly-veiled threat of forced 
integration” both ridiculous and contemptuous, while also assuring readers that integration was 
not going to occur because of the annexation.77   
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 On March 14th when district residents attended their polling stations to cast their votes, 
tensions continued to be high, to the point that Foraker requested and was granted two police 
officers at each polling place to quell any fears of violence.78  The schools that served as voting 
centers that day were crowded and noisy, and when the votes were counted, the Patrons for 
Educational Progress won.  Annexation was strongly denied, with 5,569 votes against the 
measure and 2,956 in favor.  Over eight thousand people took part in the election, far surpassing 
the previous record of five thousand.79   
Aftermath 
 With the rejection of annexation, the board had to return to pursuing stopgap measures by 
passing bonds and attempting smaller levies.  This automatic return to previous patterns raises 
the question as to whether Foraker, Wall, McElroy, or other board members actually wanted to 
annex to Kansas City.  After all, Foraker would most likely have lost his job and not all the board 
members would have retained seats on the Kansas City board.  They either decided to pursue 
annexation because they truly saw no other means to accommodate the needs of the children in 
the district, or perhaps they hoped that the threat of annexation would alert the community to the 
dire financial situation the district was in, convincing them to raise a higher levy.80  Either way, 
in not being passed, the annexation question proved to be a complete failure for Hickman Mills’s 
schools.  District leadership still had to address the financial and construction problems it 
encountered.  In addition, the demise of the annexation bid did not succeed in awakening any 
greater sense of responsibility toward the school district amongst the voters, as they voted 
against annexation, but also voted against a seventy-five cent temporary tax levy in the same 
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election.81  Support for the school district was waning and the rest of the 1960s were largely 
dominated by bond and levy votes that could not reach the two-thirds majority needed, a great 
source of frustration for Foraker and the school board. 
 Within a few weeks of the annexation vote, Superintendent Foraker began to make 
speeches to the public again about overcrowding in the schools, this time arguing that it was 
happening throughout the district and at all grade levels.82  A special seventy-five cent levy 
increase election was suggested for the end of April in order to build a third junior high, another 
high school, and find land for yet another elementary building.83  The levy failed, so the school 
board immediately set a new date, May 12, 1964, for the same levy, hoping the extra time would 
provide more opportunities to convince the public of the needed work in the district.84  High 
school principal Blaine Steck told the newspaper that the North Central Association had put the 
school on advisement because twenty-five of the high school teachers taught one hundred 
seventy students in a day.85  If the district could not lower the student-teacher ratio, it ran the risk 
of losing accreditation.86  Foraker added to the bad news, sharing that by the fall of 1965, the 
district would probably have to use the kindergarten classrooms to house half of the first-graders, 
which would also jeopardize accreditation.87 
 With the election in May, the school board found a somewhat surprising ally—the 
Patrons for Educational Progress.  President Duncan and the board of directors of PEP published 
an open letter, placed an ad in the newspaper, and sent flyers to homes asking voters to support 
the special levy, particularly if those same voters chose to keep Hickman Mills school district 
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independent of Kansas City.88  Duncan explained to reluctant voters, “the four-year 75 cent 
special building fund levy is not intended to produce a luxury-class education; it is necessary to 
keep the district abreast of its growth problems.”89  Both PEP and the school board warned the 
public that not raising more money would lead to split-session schooling, fewer kindergarten 
classes, transportation issues, and, most likely, a loss of accreditation.90  Everybody involved in 
the effort knew that the most difficult aspect of the levy election would be obtaining a two-thirds 
majority, considering the same special levy had failed twice previously, once during the 
annexation vote and again in April. 
 May 12th proved to be disappointing, as while a majority of community members (sixty-
one percent) voted for the special levy, the results did not reach the necessary two-thirds.91  
Although the board was gratified that a clear majority of the populace favored some increase in 
school funding, not meeting the required amount of votes meant that while it could try to pass a 
levy again, cuts were going to have to be made.  Board president A.A. McElroy announced at the 
end of May that kindergarten parents would now have to pay six dollars a month to send their 
children to school.  The previous fee was ten dollars a year.92  McElroy was blunt in his 
reasoning: 
We made no bones about it that if the special building levy didn’t pass we’d have to take 
economy measures.  I feel the kindergarten should start to pay for itself this year.93 
 
The increased fee did not stop people from enrolling their children in kindergarten; in fact, 
enrollment across the district for the fall of 1964 reached over ten thousand, a staggering number 
when considering how small the district began.94   
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 Between April 1964 and May 1965, the school district attempted five times to pass a 
special levy, usually between seventy-five cents and a dollar.  Finally, in May of 1965, a special 
one-year levy of ninety-six cents was passed by the two-thirds majority, which enabled the 
district to spend an additional $450,000 in building a new elementary school and expanding on 
Warford and Dobbs elementary.95   
Costly Expansions 
In the face of financial difficulties and the inability to pass permanent tax hikes that 
would bring in sufficient funding for full district construction, the school leadership did what it 
could to continue to educate the students who kept coming.  Part of the elementary boom from 
the late fifties was now causing problems for the two junior high buildings and the high school, 
and expansions were going to be necessary, even if funding was uneven.  During 1966 and 1967, 
the school district began work to build one more junior high (Smith-Hale) and another high 
school (Hickman Mills High School), fighting for levies and bonds to fund the construction.96  
As also occurred in the 1950s, the school board was surprised in 1967 to receive notice that it 
was going to get additional federal funds for being a school district in a defense-impacted zone.97  
With some families working at the Bendix plant to the west and others as part of the Richards-
Gebaur air base to the south, Hickman Mills was granted $597,305 dollars as a one-time grant to 
offset the cost of educating children of defense workers.  Foraker was thrilled, as it helped 
alleviate construction woes caused by lack of sufficient funds to build the new junior high.98   
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As exciting as the new money was, reality struck when parents enrolled their children for 
school in the fall of 1967 and the district realized it still had too many children for the space 
available.  Enrollment increased to 13,512 students, with Foraker exclaiming that there were as 
many children in the school district as citizens in the neighboring town of Grandview.99  The 
following year, enrollment increased, but not by as much as the years past, with 14,170 coming 
to school.100  Foraker expressed the hope that this meant the district was beginning to “level off, 
possibly enough to give us a breathing spell in the future!”101  The new junior high, Smith-Hale, 
opened in the fall of 1968, which did provide some relief.  Construction on the new high school 
building was going slowly, as it was less than halfway complete by the fall of 1968.  The board 
was not sure how much money to request in a bond election to finish the building.102  More 
specifically, it was not confident that it could get the amount needed to complete the 
construction.103 
A failed combined bond and levy election in early 1969 left the district reeling, as the 
levy temporarily decreased from $3.75 to $1.25, a situation that if not remedied, would have 
meant that the schools would only receive enough money to operate for two months.104  The 
school board set the exact same levy for re-election in April, which also lost, this time by a one 
percent margin.105  At this point, in early 1969, the board decided to return to its previously 
failed attempt to significantly raise the school levy after the annexation vote in 1964.  The board 
sought to return to the $3.75 levy that had been in place for years to fund current school 
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construction and maintenance, setting the date for May 13.106  The school board hoped that a 
large, well-organized campaign might result in enough votes to pass the giant levy.107  Somehow, 
this time it worked and the vote on the thirteenth was roughly two to one for the levy.108  Foraker 
was not incredibly celebratory in his remarks that evening, as he expressed that the school 
district was late in getting the funds it needed, construction for the high school in particular was 
proving problematic, ninety teachers had resigned, and property taxes were not going to be 
enough to continue to finance the schools.109 
As unoptimistic as Foraker’s sentiments were in light of a huge win for the district, his 
warnings proved to be correct.  School construction, even with the levy increase, had been 
financed in such a piece-meal fashion that uneven payments left the construction crew so 
frustrated that it went on strike in May.110  The high school did not open until 1973 and, even 
then, it remained unfinished for another year.111  Additionally, Foraker and the school board’s 
warning that the district would have to use split-school sessions to accommodate a surge of 
students came true in 1970.  
A New Decade, Things Only Get Harder 
1970 was a very difficult year for Hickman Mills’s leadership, marking one of the last 
major battles between an organized anti-tax league and the school district’s superintendent and 
board of education.  This was an exhausting year for the district leadership as well as for the 
residents of Hickman Mills, with eight levy elections, a teacher strike, a lawsuit, and split 
sessions at the high school, which all took place in the calendar year.  By the end of 1970, the 
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district finally passed a levy to continue funding the schools, but, in the process, the anti-tax 
movement in South Kansas City became strongly entrenched and school leadership’s power (or 
perhaps courage) to pass levies was greatly diminished. 
Although maintaining school construction was still a concern for the district, a new 
financial problem manifested, this time related to school operation.  The district was not going to 
afford continued transportation, maintenance for the buildings, and teacher salaries with the 
$3.75 levy in place.  The staffing element became a problem at this point for the district, as 
Hickman Mills was not going to be able to pay its teachers a competitive wage in comparison 
with surrounding school districts.112  On March 11, representatives from the Community 
Teachers Association (CTA, teachers’ union) presented to the board a statement outlining that 
the teachers would be going on strike for one day, Monday, March 16, due to insufficient pay.113  
Officially designated as a day in which all teachers in the district held a “withdrawal of 
services,” the CTA gave a list of demands to the board, including improved pay and benefits for 
district teachers.  The primary request was to raise the base pay from $6,200 to $6,900.114   
While the teachers’ grievances were real and the union was in truth seeking to improve 
their pay and benefits, the timing of the strike may indicate ulterior motives at play, as the one-
day strike also came a week after the year’s first failed attempt at raising the school levy.  Some 
speculated at the time that the teachers were trying to make a statement about the funding of the 
district.  One former teacher, who was new at that time, commented, “we thought we could wake 
up the parents a little bit, get them to understand the situation we were all in.  The school needed 
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better funding!”115  The teachers picketed in front of the schools, carrying signs that said “We 
Care More.”116  The one-day strike accomplished nothing, as there was no raise and levy 
elections continued to fail for most of the year. 
The Seven-Month Tax War 
Levy elections in 1970 were set for March 11, May 12, May 28, June 18, July 7, August 
11, September 1, and September 18, when a levy finally passed.  Like the annexation battle, the 
struggle to pass a school levy to fund operations was largely fought between two groups: a 
committee created by the school board to encourage passing of the levies called “Put Children 
First” (PCF) and a group headed by a retired realtor called the “Committee of Concerned 
Citizens for Better Education” (CCBE) that opposed levy increases.  A basic outline of the levies 
and the vote tallies for them as follows is helpful in understanding what happened during the 
1970 fight over taxation and school funding. 
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Table 1: School Levy Elections, March 11-September 18, 1970117 
 
Date of 
Vote 
Levy Amount Vote For Vote 
Against 
Percentage 
Voting 
“Yes” 
Pass/Fail 
(need 2/3 
majority) 
Percentage 
of 
Residents 
Voting 
March 11 
 
$6.05 
+.75 cent 
4,604 
4,618 
2,403 
2,387 
65.7% 
65.9% 
Fail 
Fail 
 
26.67% 
May 12 $6.05 
+.75 HS 
2,968 
3.045 
2,198 
2,123 
57.45% 
58.9% 
Fail 
Fail 
 
19.66% 
May 28 $6.05 
+.75 HS 
4,482 
4,490 
2,435 
2,427 
64.79% 
64.91% 
Fail 
Fail 
 
26.33% 
June 18 $6.05 
+.75 HS 
4,987 
4,875 
2,542 
2,684 
66.23% 
64.49% 
Fail 
Fail 
 
28.65% 
July 7 $6.05 
+.75 HS 
6,329 
6,229 
4,282 
4,380 
59.64% 
58.71% 
Fail 
Fail 
 
40.38% 
August 11 $5.86 
+.75 HS 
6,951 
6,637 
4,066 
4,373 
63% 
60.2% 
Fail 
Fail 
 
41.93% 
September 1 $5.86 8,762 5,044 63.46% Fail 52.55% 
September 
18 
$5.58 8,032 2,087 79.37% Pass 38.51% 
 
What must have been incredibly frustrating for Foraker and the school board, let alone 
the parents and community members who supported the levy, is that every vote tally 
demonstrated that the majority of voters were in favor of increasing school funding.  However, 
because state law required a two-thirds majority to increase property taxes, the school either had 
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to rouse enough supporters to vote or compromise enough to convince recalcitrant citizens to 
agree to some taxation. The June 18 vote was particularly vexing for the district, as the total was 
roughly a half percentage point shy of passing the levy, equivalent to gaining twenty-eight more 
votes.  The September 18 vote count is instructive in that it shows a steep decline in the number 
of persons who voted against the levy.  The school board made a compromise with the CCBE in 
September in order to assure its support for the levy, a decision which angered a segment of the 
school funding supporters, as the board had agreed to a lower levy rate to secure the deal.  
Unfortunately, the board’s attempts to placate the CCBE probably translated to people from both 
sides of the issue refraining from voting in the September 18th election.118 
 What made the levy increase so important for Hickman Mills was that there was also a 
statewide vote on increasing income taxes, with part of the revenue directed towards funding 
Missouri schools.  The tax hike was defeated in April, which meant that the state was going to 
supply less money to the schools than had been anticipated.119  By May, Foraker warned the 
public that the district was in real trouble because it had not yet ordered supplies for the schools 
for the fall, neither had leadership given teachers contracts because the district was not sure what 
its budget was actually going to be.120  Adding to the state funding issue, Foraker was facing the 
possibility of a teacher shortage.  Some teachers were beginning to leave the district and work in 
neighboring schools in Grandview, Raytown, Center, or Kansas City, because those districts’ 
operating budgets were set with levies already passed and contracts ready to be signed.121  By 
June, Foraker was increasingly blunt with his pronouncements, sharing that the school had eighty 
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teaching vacancies, with no candidates for hire.122  As in the past, the school turned to public 
supporters to help get the levy passed. 
Many in Hickman Mills volunteered support, including the editorial board of the Jackson 
County Advocate, who ran continual editorials, cartoons, articles, and letters to the editor that 
overwhelmingly argued in favor of the levy.123  Members of the public, particularly clergy, 
began to write letters to the paper and sent messages to homes urging the patrons of the district to 
support the local schools.124  One preacher from St. Luke’s United Methodist Church placed the 
words “you put children last, shame” on the lettered marquis in front of the church building for 
passersby and churchgoers to see.125 
For its part, the CCBE was working hard in trying to convince the public that the school 
district was mismanaging money and needed to find better ways to build and maintain schools 
without overly taxing the hardworking people of Hickman Mills.126  One officer in the CCBE, 
Howard Finke, who would later unsuccessfully run for a Kansas City district 6 seat (representing 
Hickman Mills), wrote a letter to the paper in June declaring that the school board and 
superintendent Foraker have a “credibility gap” with the public.  It originated from officials’ 
claims that the schools were not going to be able to stay open for much longer without passing a 
levy, yet the schools continued to operate for three months.127  He continued by proscribing how 
the district can save money through wise investments, contending that the teachers’ union was to 
blame for the teacher shortage in the district, and postulating that Foraker was comfortable 
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raising the levy because he does not live within district boundaries and would not have to pay the 
tax.128  Finke ended his letter arguing: 
There are other answers to our school problems.  I happen to believe the answer doesn’t 
always lie in voting in higher levies.  Higher levies are only a stop-gap measure and do 
not get at the underlying problems…I think our leaders would do well to open their 
minds and do a little creative thinking about the problems and search for other solutions 
instead of a continual submission of a levy proposal that has been defeated three times.129 
 
Another anti-tax member of CCBE wrote to the paper explaining that having repeated elections 
for a tax levy when it had been defeated in the past was anti-democratic.130 Claiming that the 
district was employing a policy of repeating the levy until it finally passes, the tax opponent 
finished with: 
It appears to me that if they would have just told us this thing was going to be and that it 
didn’t matter whether we want it or not that the result would be the same.  That’s how 
Russia would do it.131 
 
While tax supporters were using moralistic and practically religious rhetoric to convince voters 
to support children and the schools they attend, the tax opponents wanted voters to think about 
personal rights and freedom from over-reaching institutions.  But debates also became personal.  
The head of CCBE, G.P. Wooldridge, held a press conference in June to declare that Foraker 
should be removed from office for misusing school funds.  Foraker then filed suit against 
Wooldridge charging him with defamation and slander.132   
 Even with the animosity between the groups, by July, with the fifth defeat of the levy and 
fall approaching, the school board knew it had to work harder on compromising with the CCBE 
and began to set up meetings between itself, the CCBE, and the board’s own pro-levy committee, 
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the PCF.133  But the rhetoric and the public arguments still continued, with school board 
members and Foraker making statements that without proper funding, the schools would simply 
not open in the fall.  Members of the CCBE countered that Missouri law would not allow the 
schools to be closed, which prompted a Missouri state department of education official to make a 
statement clarifying that Missouri had “no law which can force a school district to open and 
operate when it has not passed an operating levy.”134  With this, the threat escalated from dual 
sessions for the high school to not operating the schools at all. 
 The CCBE offered a compromise at this point in August, promising to support a $5.30 
levy to operate the schools.135  However, it continued fighting against the levies as presented by 
the district, even going so far as to claim that the tax increase would provide unethical raises to 
the superintendent and the principals.136  But when the CCBE and the board met together, the 
anti-taxers begged the district not to close the schools.  Midge Greene, the secretary for the 
CCBE made a passionate statement: 
Do not throw our children out on the streets because of your stubbornness and pride…We 
still maintain that a $5.30 levy is sufficient to operate this district…by doing these things 
you will not only be serving this community but will also restore to your positions the 
integrity you deserve.137 
 
Brinksmanship continued through August and into September, as the district argued that it could 
not operate without a budget, which necessitated an operating levy, and the CCBE kept insisting 
that there had to be a way to run the schools without taxing more than $5.30.138  
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Negotiation  
 When the levy failed for the seventh time on September first, the district leadership 
finally admitted defeat, rescinded its threat of not opening the schools, and called for a meeting 
with the leaders of the CCBE.139  The conference was primarily between the school board and 
the CCBE, represented chiefly by Howard Finke, but representatives from the teachers’ union 
and from the Hickman Mills Chamber of Commerce also took part.140  Board president McElroy 
offered to lower the proposed levy to $5.58, with a promise that the schools would open.  F. Neal 
Raupp of the CCBE countered with $5.30 and Foraker’s resignation, with full support from the 
CCBE.  McElroy refused both.141  Board member Bill Wall, the previous board president who 
lost his seat in the 1963 annexation fight and had since regained it, asked Finke if there was any 
way the CCBE would accept $5.50, to which Finke replied that the group would only support 
$5.30.142  The chairwoman of the teacher’s union then shared that the teachers would only 
support a levy that let them keep their $6,300 base salary promised by the board.143 
 McElroy pointed out that a $5.30 levy would mean budget and staff cuts and that if the 
levy election failed before school started, the district would have to refund Missouri any state aid 
money it would receive until the community could pass a levy.  This would have dire 
consequences for school funding, as the district would have to try to pass even higher levies to 
repay the state loan.144  The meeting had started at 9 pm and at this point in the conversation it 
was 10:30 pm.  Everyone took a break and then met together as a delegation for negotiation, with 
two representatives per group chosen from the CCBE, the PCF, and the teacher’s union, along 
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with Mary Smith from the Chamber of Commerce, Dr. Phillip Needles representing area 
ministers, and two students representing the high school.145  Of the twelve members of the 
delegation, only two opposed the levy—the two members of the CCBE.  After two hours of 
negotiation, the delegation convinced the CCBE to agree to a $5.58 levy, with the condition that 
the levy be set for two years and that the district issue a promise in writing that it would open the 
schools even if the vote failed.146  The representative for the teachers agreed to take a short-term 
contract in order to simplify budgeting; the PCF said it would back the levy if the CCBE showed 
public support as well; and Smith declared that the Chamber of Commerce would champion 
whatever compromise came out of the meeting.147 
 After this discussion, one of the representatives from the teacher’s union stood up and 
loudly stated, “I have no confidence in Finke—he’s going to turn this around on us when tonight 
is done!”148  Shouting broke out, chiefly between members of the CCBE, the PCF, and the 
teachers, so McElroy called for another break, which he used to talk to the members of the 
CCBE to try to dissuade them of requiring a two-year commitment.149  When the break was over, 
the CCBE agreed to a one-year freeze on the levy of $5.58, the board voted on the measure.  It 
passed, with one abstention from member Paul Kamitsuka, who stated that he “cannot support 
any compromise and I cannot trust Finke.”150  The meeting was adjourned at one in the morning. 
 With the agreement in place, the PCF and the CCBE started sending mailings and placing 
advertisements in the paper, only this time jointly.  The CCBE included statements, with no 
apparent awareness of the irony of the situation, “Concerned Citizens for Better Education asks 
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you to VOTE YES this time!”151  The levy passed, with a turnout of ten thousand voters, a little 
lower than the previous vote, but still representative of over a third of the adult members of the 
community.152  However, even though the board honored its promise to open the schools, it did 
decide to divide the high school student body and teach in two shifts.  Juniors and Seniors were 
to attend Ruskin High from 6 am until 12:15 pm, then the Sophomores would arrive at 12:30 pm 
and leave at 6:45 pm.153  Extra-curricular activities would still be offered, but the high school 
would continue the split sessions for two school years.154  Colleen Hamilton, who had a child in 
the high school at the time, remembers the difficulty of the split sessions: 
They had been trying to pass bond issues, and my son had to attend school half-days—he 
was the afternoon session.  That was a very unhappy time.  We didn’t like it, he didn’t 
like it.  Nobody liked it, the teachers were unhappy…that was not good.155 
 
Speaking of her own child’s experience and her observations of the community at the time, 
Hamilton expressed that, “I think the split sessions really hurt how the kids saw the school.  I 
could see a definite resentment towards the school.  It was not a fun place to be for two years.”156  
At the time, Mary Smith from the Chamber of Commerce wrote a letter to Hickman Mills 
congratulating the successful compromise, acknowledging that the fight was difficult and that it 
exposed a rift in the community, but her tone was more positive in asserting that Hickman Mills 
“may grow stronger for having done it [levy fight].”157 
 Ultimately, Hamilton was more correct in her assessment of the relationship between the 
school and the community in the fallout of 1970.  The CCBE quickly returned to demanding 
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audits of the school district and accusing leaders of mismanagement of funds.  Levy fights 
continued, but 1970 marked the end of any attempts to pass a large levy to fully fund school 
construction, maintenance, and staffing.  The last elementary school was finished in 1973, 
shortly after the second high school was finally done.  The school district at last faced more 
manageable enrollments, but a slow decline in students precipitated an eventual halving of the 
student body district-wide.  
Long-Term Effects 
 The tax battles and school operation problems that plagued the history of the Hickman 
Mills School District established a pattern of reliance on a persistently low levy, a condition that 
would hinder the district’s financial situation to this day.  The municipal annexation to Kansas 
City but maintenance of a separate school district, in combination with tax and funding problems 
greatly affected Hickman Mills’s trajectory through the end of the twentieth century.  However, 
longtime residents of Hickman Mills expressed that joining Kansas City as a municipality was a 
benefit to the area.  Lilly Husman, who had been a resident of Hickman Mills since 1954, 
explained that:  
Ultimately, the annexation to Kansas City was a good thing, even if we weren’t exactly 
sure at the time.  Our sheriff was quite overstretched, and getting better and more police 
and fire protection was a blessing.  Now not joining the school district, that was good too.  
We got to have our autonomy, and pride in our history.158 
 
This was a common sentiment among those interviewed who moved to or grew up in Hickman 
Mills before 1963.  Interviewees expressed that growth was inevitable and the community was 
not able to handle protection, electricity, and water very well by itself.159  However, each of 
those interviewed also related that the community was wise to not join the Kansas City school 
district, citing similar reasons as those expressed by Husman, namely preservation of local 
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control and community identity.  This raises some questions: what does it mean when a 
community is willing to join a municipality but not a school district?  Why was the community 
so resistant to merging the schools?  What fears or concerns propelled the community’s struggle 
to remain independent? 
For Hickman Mills, the irony of joining Kansas City but not the schools was that, 
ultimately, the dominant condition of the two school districts has become very similar.  Hickman 
Mills does not exist as an independent community, it is part of southern Kansas City.  However, 
Hickman Mills C-1 School District is distinct from the Kansas City Missouri School District.  
Yet, in the minds of longtime residents and the wider metropolitan area, this is mostly a de jure 
distinction, as the districts face similar challenges.160  Both districts have been struggling with 
either losing or being granted provisional accreditation and serving primarily poor, minority 
students.    
The rest of this study will demonstrate that 1961, 1964, and 1970 were linchpin years for 
Hickman Mills, as they marked the beginning of the period in which the region transformed from 
a small community of largely lower middle-class/blue-collar whites to an extension of the 
Kansas City “urban” space, with a majority non-white middle-class/blue-collar populace.  This 
transformation was incredibly slow between 1970 and 1990, but greatly increased in the last 
decade of the twentieth century.  The common pattern of “white flight,” which helped Hickman 
Mills grow in the 1950s and 60s, happened within the district itself, but in the 1990s.  Both 
chapters four and five will address this change in Hickman Mills, with chapter four looking at 
the district’s fight against desegregation efforts, fair housing, and industrialization in light of 
gradual increase of black families moving into local neighborhoods during the 1970s and 1980s.  
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Chapter five will explain the perception of decline in Hickman Mills during the 1990s, when the 
community and the school became known as another dangerous part of Kansas City. 
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Chapter 4: Not In My Backyard 
 
Race, Integration, and Opposition to Demographic Change, 1964-1990 
 Hickman Mills’ leadership had largely been occupied with local battles over taxation, 
school construction, and overcrowding through the 1950s and much of the 1960s.  Previous to 
1964, residents in the all-white geographic area of the Hickman Mills school district were 
essentially oblivious to the 1954 and 1955 Brown v. Board decision.  People in Hickman Mills 
only began to publicly address integration when confronted with the perceived threat of joining 
the Kansas City Missouri School District in 1964.  Integration entered the public discussion 
again in 1969 when a statewide plan was proposed to reorganize school districts that would 
consolidate Hickman Mills, along with other southern suburban schools, together with Kansas 
City, Missouri.  After this suggestion by part of the Missouri legislature, Hickman Mills became 
much more aware and protective of its status as a suburban enclave for white, lower middle-class 
and blue collar families.   
Feeling threatened by being associated with Kansas City (although already officially part 
of the municipality), residents began to take measures to ensure that their neighborhoods and 
schools remained “safe” for their children.  They adopted a “not in my backyard” approach in 
late 1960s through the 1970s, a period in which residents of Hickman Mills actively fought 
against Kansas City by opposing anything residents thought endangered their own status quo.  
The Hickman Mills community resisted several measures at once, with the same groups fighting 
against low-income housing and integrated schooling, or landfills and base closures.  Their 
reaction to the Spainhower commission of 1968 and 1969 and desegregation efforts in Kansas 
City in the 1970s also epitomizes their blanket emphasis on halting any changes to their 
community, especially those that made suburban Hickman Mills more similar to urban Kansas 
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City.  Again the irony of the history of Hickman Mills is that it grew substantially because of 
urbanization efforts made by Kansas City as well as an influx of Kansas Citians wishing to live 
an affordable suburban lifestyle.  In a broader sense, the history of Hickman Mills is one of 
significant change.  However, by the 1960s residents sought to halt any further development 
within school borders, particularly opposing racial or economic change within the 
neighborhoods. 
 This chapter will examine the community’s efforts to oppose integration.  Additionally, I 
will reveal how the residents of Hickman Mills saw desegregation of housing and schooling by 
Kansas City authorities as an intrusion into the peace and “normalcy” of the southland.  As will 
be addressed, many of the actions taken by Ruskinites involved the schools themselves, whether 
as literal meeting places for opposition groups, or “neutral ground” for opposite sides to meet 
and discuss possible compromises.  This chapter will explore how for all its concerns over 
“forced integration,” Hickman Mills as a community began to racially integrate very slowly due 
to factors outside of white residents’ control.   Specifically, black families began to move in very 
small numbers to neighborhoods like Ruskin Heights, Ruskin Hills, and Kirkside.  While not 
significant enough to constitute a threat to white hegemony, African American presence in south 
Kansas City would eventually grow.   By the 1980s and 1990s many whites became nervous 
about property values, neighborhood safety, and school quality, causing them to move to more 
remote white enclaves like Lee’s Summit, Raytown, Independence, and Liberty.1  While the 
white flight from Hickman Mills will be covered in greater depth in chapter 5, the seeds of 
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neighborhood demographic and economic change began during the events analyzed in this 
chapter. 
Urban Perception 
While residents did not complain vociferously against expanded highways and access to 
and from the city as a result of closer ties with Kansas City, they expressed discomfort with the 
more “undesirable” aspects of urbanization: multi-unit housing, landfills, and in the case of 
Kansas City’s and Hickman Mills’s relationship, the idea of large numbers of non-whites as 
residents.  Some resistance to fair housing occurred in the 1960s, but the end of the decade 
specifically cemented feelings toward residential and educational integration among those who 
lived in Hickman Mills.  Events in the 1970s and to a degree the 1980s served as a continuation 
of a bitter conflict in 1968 and 1969 in the Kansas City metropolitan area. 
Becoming part of Kansas City either coincided with or ushered in a period of great 
“urbanization,” depending upon the perspective of persons interviewed.  White respondents used 
the term “urbanization” to describe the change in Hickman Mills underwent from the 1960s on 
through the present day.  When pressed, those interviewed admitted that “urban” was code to 
suggest a demographic change in the community, namely when the area began to “turn black.”2  
African American respondents employed different language when the gradual change Hickman 
Mills underwent in shifting from a predominantly white community to a predominantly black 
one.  Specifically, black Hickmanites applied the same terms white respondents used to explain 
how Hickman Mills transformed during its period of suburbanization.3  Black families moved 
south into Hickman Mills with the same motivations as their white counterparts: affordable 
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housing, greater space, and distance from congestion and perceived crime of the city.4  The 
difference between the two groups is that black families, for the most part, moved into the area 
thirty years later than whites.  Hence, white residents of Hickman Mills expressed the change in 
the area as urbanization that resulted from the joining with Kansas City, Missouri, while black 
residents saw the two events as simultaneous and not directly linked.5  Race plays an important 
role in the perception among Hickmanites of what is urbanization and what is suburbanization. 
Changes in the Land 
 Road expansion was a tangible example of Hickman Mills becoming more a part of 
Kansas City, not just in name.  While Hickman Mills as a community underwent changes as it 
grew and merged with Kansas City, many of the effects of joining the larger metropolis did not 
begin to be felt among residents in the southland until the 1970s and 1980s, particularly with 
highway construction and expansion.  The process of being linked to major roads began several 
decades earlier when Highway 71 opened up more convenient routes to Hickman Mills and 
Grandview, which helped spur residential and commercial development in both places during the 
1950s.  The Interstate Highway 435 (I-435) making a loop around Kansas City, also brought 
about change for Hickman Mills in the late 1960s and through the 1970s.  Land was cleared in 
the northwest corner of the school district for I-435 to head south from Kansas City in the early 
1960s, with the section of the road completed to the junction with highway 71, making a “V” 
shape in the northwest portion of the district.6  At the same time, another section of interstate 
was being constructed west on the south end of Overland Park, Kansas, with the idea that 
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completion of the road would make for a “tremendous economic impact on South Jackson 
County,” opening the area for more residential and commercial growth.7  Missouri transportation 
officials were finally able to connect the two lengths of the interstate in 1970 and commuters or 
shoppers could travel through southern Kansas City faster than before.8   
State transportation officials were correct in assuming that highway development would 
bring business to Hickman Mills, although it would take ten years for the area to fully develop.  
The Bannister Mall, a very large shopping plaza that encouraged economic growth throughout 
the “Bannister district” opened in 1980 between I-435 and Hillcrest and was an economic boon 
for the area as well as for the school district.9  Multiple restaurants, boutiques, chain stores, and 
service-oriented businesses such as auto repair centers followed the mall into the Bannister 
district during the 1980s, all increasing property values and bringing increased revenue to the 
school district.10  However, not all new developments in south Kansas City were welcome 
additions for local residents, who particularly opposed non-single family housing such as 
apartment complexes, low-income housing, and mobile homes. 
Fighting Mobile Homes 
 Mobile homes tend to be unpopular regardless of where they are built, hence opposition 
by Ruskinites against a mobile home park proposed in the early 1970s was not unique.  
However, the organization of South Kansas Citians against mobile homes involved the schools, 
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with school leaders at the forefront.  Opposition rallies were held at the local schools, a pattern 
that would continue as residents later fought against low-income housing in other parts of 
Hickman Mills.  
Leading up to the fall of 1971, a developer named Tom Horner applied to Kansas City to 
build mobile home parks within Hickman Mills’s school district borders, starting with a 467-unit 
park in the southwest corner of the district, off Martha Truman Road.11  When the school board 
learned of this possible development, it and other community groups immediately began to 
protest the proposition.  Public objection became visible and organized enough that 
Superintendent Foraker began holding meetings and debates at different school buildings for the 
public to learn about the issue and to encourage them to contact the city council asking not to 
have mobile houses in the area.12  In October, Horner agreed to debate the issue with Foraker 
and another community member, Betty Clements.13  Clements presented the argument that the 
development would bring in over a thousand people in a small space, which would congest the 
roads.14  Foraker told the crowd that the schools would be hurt by the addition of mobile homes, 
as they would add a more children to the district, but not help financially because the land area is 
smaller than single-family homes, hence the property tax revenue would be less.15   
Horner tried to assuage the group, telling them that new mobile homes in 1971 were 
much better, cleaner, and nicer than in the past, but his audience found the developer 
unconvincing.  The community, along with the school district, petitioned the city council and 
with the help of their representative John Sharp (council member from district 6, Hickman Mills) 
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succeeded in having Horner’s application to the council denied.16  The avoidance of a possible 
blight was satisfying to residents in South Kansas City, but another fight was looming, this time 
with garbage. 
Keeping the Trash Out 
 As stated earlier, one of the inevitable downsides of increasing urbanization with roads, 
services, and commercial centers is increased traffic and garbage.  With Kansas City annexing 
Hickman Mills in 1961 and thus expanding southwards into undeveloped land, opportunities to 
find places for refuse storage made Hickman Mills a prime location for a landfill, which 
residents of the area greatly resented.  In 1972, the city council presented a plan to Hickman 
Mills’s residents for a landfill that would be built between the newly opened I-435 and Highway 
71.17  Three hundred people appeared to protest the decision and Hickman Mills Community 
Council (essentially a larger neighborhood association) president Betty Clements assured 
residents in September that there would be no action on the landfill.18  She proved to be right, as 
popular protest against the dump convinced the city council to announce that it was shelving the 
matter in October.19  Hickmanites would not have to worry about landfill battles again until the 
1990s.20  By the end of 1972, residents of Hickman Mills had successfully kept a landfill and a 
mobile-home lot out of their territory.  Their next challenge in preventing changes to their 
community would be holding on to an integral local institution.  
Richards-Gebaur Air Base Decline 
 By early 1973, rumors began to circulate throughout Grandview and Hickman Mills that 
the United States Air Force was going to close Richards-Gebaur Air Base and move personnel to 
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other installations in the country.21  Although Stuart Symington, now a U.S. Senator representing 
Missouri, sought to assure people in southern Kansas City and Grandview that the base was not 
going anywhere, school leaders were concerned.  Hickman Mills did not have as many students 
associated with the air base as other districts, including Grandview and Belton, but the district 
would still lose around 250 students from civil service families associated with the base, as well 
as 500 children of military personnel.22  If the base were to close, the district could handle the 
loss of the students, having constantly worried about overcrowding in the previous two decades. 
But previous defense funds that had come from the federal government, often during times of 
great financial need for the district, would be greatly diminished.23  By March, US Senator 
Thomas Eagleton informed the public that the Secretary of the Air Force was considering large 
reductions for the base, if not outright closing it.24 
 Progress on the base’s fate was kept quiet until 1974 when the Air Force announced that 
it would be closing the base and sending troops to Scott Air Force Base in Belleville, Illinois.25  
The Kansas City Chamber of Commerce got involved and presented an argument to the 
Pentagon that the closing would prove to be devastating for those non-military personnel 
associated with the base.  The group estimated that Grandview and Kansas City would lose 
around eight million dollars because of the move.26  Others sought legal means to force the Air 
Force to leave the base intact.  Robert Corbett, the president of the newly renamed Southern 
Kansas City Chamber of Commerce (formerly Hickman Mills CoC) formed a group called the 
“R-G Relief Fund,” which was raising money to pay a legal team to sue the United States Air 
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Force.  Corbett sought to obtain a temporary injunction against the closure in order to conduct an 
environmental impact study on the closing of the base.27  The suit worked to a degree and the 
military agreed to slow down the transfer by April of 1975.28  The fight continued in state and 
federal courts for the rest of the year, with some national figures like then Senator Bob Dole 
becoming involved in asking Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to reconsider the move.29  
Ultimately, the courts found that the Department of Defense had the right to move the Air Force 
troops and close the base.30   
 The base closing directly impacted Grandview more so than it did Hickman Mills, except 
that the state of Missouri, which now owned the base, planned to convert part of it along with 
some land on the north end closer to Hickman Mills, into a correctional facility.31  Residents 
both in Hickman Mills and Grandview loudly protested this move, much in the same way that 
residents of Hickman Mills opposed the building of a landfill only a few years earlier.  By 
September of 1976, Missouri Governor Bond agreed to cease any move to build a prison just 
south of Hickman Mills.32 
Regardless, the base, along with the economic boost it gave the entire county was gone.  
The air base also was a draw to the southlands and had been partially responsible for the growth 
that Hickman Mills experienced in the 1950s and 1960s, as shown in chapter 1.33  While the 
closing of the base was not a primary reason for eventual decline in Hickman Mills, it did 
contribute. 
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Fair Housing 
Residents of Hickman Mills won and lost battles against outside influences affecting their 
status quo in the 1960s and 1970s, but the most difficult, longest lasting, and ultimately least 
successful conflict Hickman Mills had with Kansas City and the state of Missouri dealt with 
race, schools, and housing.  Starting in the 1960s, with federal legislation on civil rights and the 
Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare looking into fair housing, residents and leaders 
in Hickman Mills began to consistently address race in the school district for the first time.   
In 1964, a group of clergy across the Kansas City metropolitan area called the Greater 
Kansas City Council on Religion and Race began a campaign to fight housing restrictions.  The 
program was called the “Good Neighborhood Pledge,” which encouraged homeowners to sign a 
petition decrying the practice of racial discrimination in buying and selling housing.34  As the 
organization canvassed throughout the area, including Hickman Mills, opposition groups on both 
a national and local scale geared up attempts to stop fair housing, an issue that was beginning to 
be considered by the Kansas City council.35  On the national level, the John Birch Society and 
the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) became involved in fighting fair 
housing movements across the country, while in Kansas City, more specialized groups like the 
Committee for the Preservation of Private Property and the K.C. Council for Civic 
Responsibility worked to curb a fair housing movement.36   
 In 1966, representatives from the Council on Religion and Race started acquiring 
signatures for their Good Neighbor Pledge in Hickman Mills with a goal of one thousand 
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signatures.37  The Hickman Mills chairman, Dick Porterfield, was looking for more volunteers, 
as he had collected five hundred signatures and wanted another five hundred.38  Porterfield was 
never able to collect the full 1000 signatures in Hickman Mills.39  Opposition to Porterfield was 
intense in south Kansas City, as in the rest of the metropolitan area.  Reverend Robert I. Hatch 
from the First Bible Presbyterian Church in Kansas City and a member of the John Birch Society 
formed a group called the Citizen’s Committee, which worked with the John Birch Society and 
the local Committee for the Preservation of Private Property to also collect signatures, donations, 
and supporters opposing any fair housing attempts made by Kansas City.40  Placing repeated ads 
in the Jackson County Advocate, Hatch and his supporters advised that the religious figures 
involved in the Good Neighbor Pledge were overstepping their bounds and endangering the 
public’s “freedom of choice.”41  The ad continued: 
What has been unfair about our American system of housing?  Nothing!  What’s wrong 
with choosing your own neighborhood on the basis of your racial ethnic as well as 
proximity to schools, churches, or shopping centers?42 
 
The ad also criticized the originators of the Good Neighbor Pledge, claiming that they 
themselves chose their own housing “on the basis of racial and ethnic surroundings.”43   
The fight over fair housing was widespread throughout the metropolitan area, particularly 
because the Kansas City, Missouri city council passed a fair housing ordinance in 1967 
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outlawing racial discrimination in housing.44  Opposition groups like the Citizen’s Committee 
sought to overturn the ordinance with a public vote, after having collected enough signatures to 
petition the city council.45  The city-wide referendum was to occur on April 30, 1968, but the 
city council avoided the vote by adopting the federal 1968 Civil Rights Act about two weeks 
before the referendum was to be decided, negating the local ordinance and hence the possible 
recall of it.46   
For the most part, after the adoption of the Civil Rights Act, residents of Hickman Mills 
seemed to stop focusing on fair housing for a time.  However, in the late 1970s, the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) began working with Kansas City to 
build homes in Hickman Mills, efforts which local residents fought for thirty years.  As will be 
discussed further, whites in Hickman Mills perceived fair housing ordinances and HUD efforts 
as immediate threats to their children’s welfare and fought passionately against them, as they 
believed such alterations to the community’s status quo would lead to “forced integrated” 
schooling.  During the late 1960s, the Hickman Mills community joined many other suburban 
areas to vociferously oppose a measure proposed by a member of the Missouri legislature to 
reorganize school districts, which had the potential of creating districts that crossed color lines. 
Spainhower Plan and District Reorganization 
 In 1967, Missouri Lt. Governor Thomas Eagleton asked state House of Representative 
member James Spainhower to head a commission to study and create a school reorganization 
plan.47  The commission met in October of 1967, hired a consultant and a team of researchers 
                                                          
44 Gotham, Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development, 125. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47  Donna Gardner and John L. Rury, “Suburban Opposition to District Reorganization: The 1968 Spainhower 
Commission and Metropolitan Kansas City and St. Louis,” The Urban Review: Issues and Ideas in Public Education 
(17 July 2013), doi: 10.1007/s11256-013-0255-4.  James Spainhower was a member of the Missouri House of 
Representatives from 1963 to 1970 and then later was elected state treasurer from 1973 until 1981.  He had an 
 134 
from the University of Minnesota, and began working on the problem of school organization in 
Missouri through 1968.48  While the group began presenting findings as early as March of 1968, 
it created a complete report in November, which outlined a plan to create twenty regional school 
units throughout the state, which would oversee teacher professional development, school 
construction, and school taxation.49  As per this plan, the St. Louis and Kansas City metropolitan 
areas would become single districts.50  Before exploring the reactions in Hickman Mills, it is 
important to first note that this plan was a complete failure as the Missouri legislature did not 
adopt its recommendations.  In fact, association with the report was political suicide for 
legislators as it was wildly and completely unpopular in every part of the state, but particularly in 
the suburbs.51 
 Residents of Hickman Mills first became aware of the “secret school plan,” as denoted by 
the Jackson County Advocate in November 1968, and they were not pleased.52  The school board 
met on November twenty-first to discuss strategy, announcing that it was going to hold public 
meetings to get feedback from local members.53  Superintendent Foraker made a statement for 
the newspaper expressing surprise: 
I never dreamed the reorganization plan would be so sweeping.  Dr. Mueller asked us last 
April to quell any fears about chopping up the Kansas City district and attaching parts of 
it to the suburban districts.54 
 
Foraker argued the state had larger problems to address in education, namely increasing the debt 
limit of school districts and how high local boards could set levies, two very prominent issues for 
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the Hickman Mills school board.55  In the local paper, the editor argued that the reorganization 
plan was deeply flawed and that any supporters would be seen as “reactionary” and 
“integrationist.”56  The editor also pointed out that the Spainhower plan would destroy suburban 
schools that “have become the pride of the nation” and that merging them to cities “would be a 
tragic disservice to the future of our country.”57 
However there were residents, such as Murray Mellicker, who were not threatened by the 
suggested change in district organization and also were willing to point out the latent (or 
obvious) racism in opposition to the Spainhower plan: 
The truth is that as the Midtown Freeway gets going, the movement of the Negroes into 
our present districts, which has already started, will be accelerated.  Hickman Mills, and 
later Grandview, will have hundreds of black American families within the next few 
years.  Those who wish a lily-white school district can take their choice of rural Alabama 
or South Africa.  Even wasting money to preserve obsolete district lines will not preserve 
segregation; the day of second-class citizenship for black Americans is approaching its 
end.58 
 
Mellicker represented a less antagonistic segment of Hickman Mills, but more citizens were 
opposed to the idea of merging all the schools in Jackson and Clay counties than were supportive 
of it.   
In January 1969, state representatives held a public meeting at Raytown High School to 
discuss the plan and around 1,800 people attended, including a delegation from Hickman Mills 
led by Tom Foraker.59  Foraker spoke at the meeting along with some of the state 
representatives, presenting the case that per-pupil costs would probably rise with creation of a 
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“super-size” district—he received loud cheers from the audience for opposing the plan.60  Tom 
Ryan, a democrat representing Jackson County seventh district in the state legislature, was 
particularly blunt in his warning about the Spainhower Plan: 
What this is all about is not education.  It is integration.  They want to integrate us 
forcibly, and they want our money.  You know what that means.  If you want to go to 
Paseo high school now, you have to carry a ‘shiv’ that long.”61 
 
Ryan was making his opposition to the plan clear, as did the other politicians present.  Anybody 
attending the meeting came away knowing that their representatives were clearly against the 
plan, with one of the representatives commenting that he had not met anybody who was in favor 
of it.62  With such significant and determined opposition even before the meeting and the clear 
unpopularity of the Spainhower plan, why was a public meeting held in the first place?  What 
purpose did it serve, other than rallying people around a common cause, in this case standing 
against “forced integration?”63 
 Regardless, a second meeting was held on February fifth, this time at Smith-Hale Junior 
High in Hickman Mills.  Missouri Senator Don Manford hosted the meeting and spent most of 
the time reassuring the four hundred people in attendance that he would oppose the Spainhower 
Plan, guarantees that were met with much applause and cheering.64  School board member Bill 
Wall declared that the plan was “so loose in management it is doomed to failure.”65  While the 
community present was vocally opposed to the consolidation, one person was brave enough to 
present another view.  Kenneth Burkhart, a teacher at Ruskin High asked the representatives to at 
least consider the plan and its possible merit in addressing “the educational problems of the 
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state.”66  Burkhart suggested that reorganization might improve teacher quality, as it would 
equalize teacher salaries throughout a region, and “teachers would go where they want to 
teach.”67  The audience responded to his speech with stony silence, but Manford thanked the 
teacher for his input.68 
 The next day, February sixth, the state legislature met to discuss the plan, with visitors 
from throughout Missouri attending to voice disapproval of the measure.69  A large contingent of 
three hundred people from Raytown attended the hearing in Jefferson City, along with one 
hundred and fifty from Hickman Mills.70  Foraker spoke to the assembly, expressing that the 
Spainhower commission assumed the suburbs were more affluent than other parts of the state: 
“they aren’t affluent.  The people simply are willing to work harder, sacrifice more and impose 
greater taxes on themselves to improve their school systems.”71  Other superintendents in the 
state gave similar testimony, with one claiming the plan was foolhardy in combining districts as, 
“you can’t merge five poor men and make one rich man out of them!”72  James Spainhower 
announced during the hearing he was abandoning House Bill 437, the school reorganization plan.  
Attendees rejoiced.73 
Clear Victory, Continuing Struggle 
 Foraker, along with other school leaders in Hickman Mills, assumed a return to the 
routine, in a sense.  Even so, the threat of a Spainhower-like plan still loomed and residents of 
south Kansas City were wary.  A new “Spainhower Bill,” House Bill 714, which also never 
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succeeded, called for a reorganization of school districts on county levels.74  However, learning 
of the measure made Foraker and the school board nervous because it contained a provision 
calling for districts to be as economically, racially, and ethnically diverse as possible, as well as a 
requirement that the total assessed valuation of property in each district be as equal as 
conceivable.75  For the residents of Hickman Mills, this bill seemed to be a re-attempt at forced 
integration, where Jackson County might be given the authority to divide up the Hickman Mills, 
Raytown, Center, Kansas City, and Grandview districts to create “pie-shaped districts that extend 
to an apex on the Missouri river north of the downtown area.”76  The editor of the Jackson 
County Advocate warned its readers to contact their legislators because “James I. Spainhower 
didn’t lose the war two weeks ago; he just lost a battle.”77 
 Once again, the bill failed to gain support in the state legislature, but Hickman Mills was 
staying vigilant, wary of actions the state made towards education.  Because of their diligence, 
district leaders, along with the editorial board at the Jackson County Advocate, became aware of 
a study done by two former members of the Spainhower Commission, Clifford Hooker and Van 
D. Mueller.  The study, entitled, Equal Treatment to Equals: A New Structure for Public Schools 
in the Kansas City and St. Louis Metropolitan Areas, declared: 
Public education in the Kansas City and St. Louis metropolitan areas hurts.  Its pain is 
caused in part by a district structure which was created to serve a previous era…A major 
reorganization of school districts is called for.78 
 
The study was thorough in its comparison of levies, assessed valuation, graduation rates, and 
enrollment by race and ethnicity for both the Kansas City and St. Louis areas.   
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As pertaining to Hickman Mills, the authors suggested combining it with Grandview, 
Lee’s Summit, and Lone Jack to create a Jackson No. 2 school district.79  This re-organization, 
for Hickman Mills at least, did not involve combining with any district that was racially or 
economically very different than Hickman Mills was in 1969.  Yet, residents were concerned that 
they would be forced to join with an undesirable element and that their own tax dollars would be 
used to fund someone else’s education.  Once again, the editor of the Jackson County Advocate 
summed up common sentiment: 
…more money for the deprived students would be just lovely.  But I fear that extracting it 
from the suburban districts would jeopardize that one essential engredient [sic] that is 
responsible for the spectacular rise in educational quality—the enthusiasm of the local 
residents for making sacrifices to improve their schools.  Once the local residents see 
their tax money being siphoned off to support something other than their own children’s 
education their enthusiasm for the cause of public education is going to dive like a 
sounding whale.80 
 
Residents needed not worry about whales and siphons.  The report was given to Spainhower, he 
presented it to the governor and the state legislature, and then it was essentially shelved.  No 
further action was taken.  Still, the Spainhower commission’s efforts and Hickman Mills’s 
reaction led to hyper-vigilance in south Kansas City over becoming part of a “racial 
experiment.”81  Bad feelings towards Spainhower persisted in the community for some time; 
when the representative ran for nomination as state treasurer from the Democratic Party, a group 
of educators in the Kansas City area formed an opposition group to his campaign, with one of the 
founding members being A.A. McElroy, a member and former president of the Hickman Mills 
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school board.82  In an open letter, the group referred to Spainhower’s attempt to remove local 
control from the school districts and that Spainhower as treasurer would have “considerable 
influence…to promote his views from a position of power.”83  While claiming that the group was 
not campaigning for anyone in particular, it did suggest voters choose either the other 
Democratic nominee, or a Republican.84  Luckily for Spainhower, he did obtain his party’s 
nomination and won the position in general election.  He did not get many votes from Hickman 
Mills or Raytown.85 
Local Control, Suburban Solidarity, and Fighting Desegregation 
 In the wake of the Spainhower Plan and stirrings of metropolitan consolidation, suburban 
districts united to oppose alterations to the school funding structure and desegregation efforts in 
the 1970s.  The threat of the Spainhower Commission in 1968 and 1969 motivated Hickman 
Mills to unite with other suburban school districts in assuring that the state would not remove nor 
change its own individual ability to control levies and school boundaries.  Hickman Mills joined 
several other suburban school districts like Raytown, Independence, Center, and Lee’s Summit 
in creating The Cooperating School Districts of the Suburban Kansas City, Missouri, 
Metropolitan Area in 1971.  This was an officially organized body of suburban school districts 
with the superintendents of each district meeting as representatives for their respective schools.86  
Any district “wholly or partially within the corporate limits of Kansas City, Missouri” or 
                                                          
82 “Unleash on Spainhower,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 82, no. 29, August 17, 1972, 1.  Other members 
represented Grain Valley, Fairfax, Raytown, and Blue Springs school districts. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Spainhower, interview with John L. Rury. 
86 “Operating Rules for the Cooperating School Districts of the Suburban Kansas City, Missouri Metropolitan Area,” 
unpublished document, May 10, 1971, Arthur Benson Papers (1975), Box KC 250, Folder 319, State Historical 
Society of Missouri Research Center, University of Missouri-Kansas City University Archives, Kansas City, MO. 
 141 
contiguous with any member district could join the council, except for Kansas City itself.87  This 
would prove to be an important and powerful organization in that the suburban school districts 
created a support system they would later use to successfully oppose desegregation efforts. 
In October 1972, Raytown held a conference for the suburban school districts in order to 
discuss recent lower-court rulings questioning the constitutionality of funding schools with local 
property taxes.88  The courts were suggesting instead that states provide the school funding 
completely as an equalization measure and that local school boards focus on other duties, but not 
on passing levies.89  Missouri Department of Education representatives attended to inform the 
school district leaders, but the meeting essentially ended with local leaders expressing distrust 
toward state authorities.  Charles Berry, then mayor of Lone Jack, expressed what the group was 
thinking in linking the meeting with previous discussions with the state board: 
It goes back to the fact we don’t trust the state school board.  They agreed with 
everything we said, threw it all in the trash, and we were given the Spainhower Bill.90 
 
Foraker supported Berry’s statement, adding that the frustrating reality with the state board of 
education is that the governor appointed them: 
Maybe the state board should be named by the legislature.  At least then, if you don’t like 
what the state board is doing, you can get to it through your elected representatives.91 
 
Foraker was probably referring to how districts across the state were able to express their 
opposition to the Spainhower plan to their own representatives, effectively killing the measure.  
Cessation of local school levies never occurred, so the suburban districts were not long occupied 
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with this problem, but they continued to hold regular meetings in order to discuss their own 
concerns.   
 Another issue with Kansas City arose in 1975, when the KCMSD began a public 
discussion on its own dissolution and subsequent partitioning out to surrounding school 
districts.92  The neighboring districts, like Hickman Mills, completely opposed the idea and 
sought legal counsel to fight the possibility of busing.93  This time, Bill T. Wall, once again 
acting as school board president, vocalized resistance and argued that racial mixing was 
happening in a more organic, natural way that bussing would ruin: 
Minority people are moving gradually into the district, and they are being assimilated 
very nicely.  There’s no disruption of any kind—it’s a gradual sort of thing…That type of 
integration is working.  But to jump in and create a situation where children have to be 
bussed all around to achieve someone’s idea of proper racial balances is going to waste a 
tremendous amount of money that should be spent on educating the kids.94 
  
As shall be discussed later, black families were moving into Hickman Mills and sending their 
children to school, but the numbers were small and not threatening to white dominance, unlike 
bussing children from the Kansas City’s school district.  The suburban districts all began to make 
statements opposing Kansas City’s dissolution and then started hiring lawyers to work on a 
lawsuit if necessary.95 
 This fight between the suburbs and the city revolved around desegregation, which the 
suburban districts opposed, even if they employed language that tried to mask their reticence to 
taking in large numbers of black students.  Kansas City school authorities were planning on 
dissolving the school district and creating a metropolitan district or, barring that, dividing up the 
old school district and apportioning out pieces to surrounding suburbs.  The suburban school 
                                                          
92 Kevin Fox Gotham, “Missed Opportunities, Enduring Legacies: School Segregation and Desegregation in Kansas 
City, Missouri,” American Studies 43, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 25. 
93 Ibid.  “HM Board to Meet, Get Bussing Advice,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 85, no. 32, September 4, 1975, 5. 
94 “HM Board to Meet,” 5. 
95 “Oppose KC Racial Move—Gird for School Battle,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 85, no. 26, July 24, 1975, 1, 
3; Gotham, “Missed Opportunities,” 25-26. 
 143 
districts were not pleased, but they did know that recent legal events gave advantage to the 
outlying districts.  The Supreme Court’s 1974 Milliken v. Bradley decision effectively denied 
Detroit’s attempt to create a metropolitan district in order to accomplish the desegregation order 
inherent in Brown v. Board I and II.96  Bill Wall spoke about Detroit in public addresses, 
particularly how the court decided that suburban districts around the city were not actively 
promoting segregation, in order to show that Hickman Mills was safe from any lawsuit.97  
However confident Wall felt, Foraker promised his district that the school leadership would 
oppose the move by Kansas City—“we’ll take it all the way to the Supreme Court if 
necessary.”98 
 Apart from hiring lawyers and working with other suburban school districts for a possible 
fight with Kansas City, members of the Hickman Mills community found other ways to try to 
stop desegregation.  Representative John Sharp and state Senator Don Manford, the former from 
Hickman Mills and the latter from east Jackson County, led a campaign to adopt a state 
constitutional amendment “to abolish any threat of using bussing to insure integrated public 
education.”99  The effort to change the constitution failed, but ultimately, Hickman Mills and the 
other suburban districts were able to escape any ties with Kansas City’s desegregation efforts. 
 The Kansas City Missouri School District officially approved a metropolitan 
desegregation plan in May of 1977 and filed lawsuits against the surrounding school districts 
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both in Missouri and Kansas.100  For several years, the legal team representing the KCMSD 
conducted interviews and searched through records in the suburban school districts, finally 
presenting its case in court in October 1983.101  Judge Russell Clark reversed the suit in March of 
1984, dismissing the suburban districts listed as defendants, including Hickman Mills, instead 
labeling KCMSD, along with the state of Missouri, as the defendants and the children of the city 
school district as the plaintiffs, and thus Jenkins v. Missouri was born.102  Hickman Mills, like its 
other suburban counterparts, observed the long legal battle from a safe distance as the case 
traveled through the justice system until it ended with the Supreme Court.103  While Clark’s 
decision did not keep residents of Hickman Mills from feeling the pressures of desegregation and 
thus needing to stay hyper-vigilant against any integrative actions, removing the suburban 
districts from the court case did give residents of South Kansas City a little more time to deal 
with coming change.   
Fighting HUD 
 While the school district was occupied resisting desegregation efforts by Kansas City and 
Missouri, the Hickman Mills community at large fought against desegregation of housing.  
Opposition to low-income housing began somewhat in the 1960s with fair housing laws, but 
became much more pronounced during the 1970s when the department for Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) began planning housing and apartment complexes within district borders.  
While it was largely the community and not school leadership who organized opposition to 
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HUD, there was a pattern of using Hickman Mills’s school buildings as centers of operations, 
including meetings and rallies.  The proposed complexes that will be addressed in this section 
were all located near schools, and opposition to those complexes came together at those same 
schools.  
In 1978, a proposal to build a subsidized housing complex was met with a visceral 
rejection from the community.  On a May evening, six hundred people crammed themselves into 
Warford Elementary to oppose the construction of fifty separate one to three-room apartment 
units a few blocks from Warford in Terrace Lake, just south of Red Bridge Road.104  The 
apartments would charge forty percent of the residents the full rent, about $400, while sixty 
percent would pay a reduced rental rate.  The residents in Terrace Lake were furious.  Members 
of the community had learned of the apartments a week before the public meeting and 
immediately went to work sending out flyers, calling city and state representatives, as well as 
telling neighbors about the approaching danger.105  Kansas City councilman Arthur Asel, 
representing Hickman Mills, even compared the proposed buildings to the 1957 tornado.106  Asel 
continued, calling the development “a project of fuzzy-minded social thinkers in 
Washington.”107  In case he did not make himself clear enough in who the community was trying 
to block from moving in, Asel explained that the residents present at the meeting would “support 
subsidized housing for the elderly.”108  This statement affirms an embracing of older citizens, but 
seems to hint that the community would not welcome poorer residents, and probably persons of 
color. 
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When the date for the official public meeting came, the developer John Auld had no idea 
what was in store.  After ninety minutes of various members of the public speaking out against 
the HUD apartments and the crowd shouting at the man, Auld took the microphone and 
exclaimed, “I am therefore going to withdraw this project from HUD” and transformed an angry 
crowd into a cheering group of suburbanites.109 He announced that he had never built any project 
without community support, so he had decided to withdraw.110   
 This was the first time since the proposal for mobile houses in 1971 that residents fought 
against housing in the area.  The controversy marked the beginning of a long, protracted battle 
between Hickman Mills and the Kansas City HUD office, as HUD officials worked to provide 
cheaper housing for people who wanted to live in the suburbs, but could not necessarily afford it.  
In particular, the Housing Authority of Kansas City (HAKC), which worked in conjunction with 
HUD, was under pressure to build low-income housing in suburban areas so as not to continue 
concentrating poor black families in closed neighborhoods as the city had been doing in the 
past.111  The HAKC and HUD worked to build in the surrounding suburban communities for 
twenty years, but met heavy resistance from local authorities as well as community residents.112  
The advantage to placing housing in Hickman Mills was that the community already belonged to 
Kansas City and while resistance would be as strong as in other suburbs, the area had less 
political clout to fight HUD.  Hence the HAKC and HUD made repeated efforts to place low-
income housing in several neighborhoods in Hickman Mills.  While at first each of these 
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Major Investments With Modest Returns,” in Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of 
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attempts was unsuccessful, eventually housing authorities won out and had complexes built 
throughout South Kansas City. 
 Residents in the Terrace Lake area were feeling content with their victory, but HUD 
officials were not done.  Within a week of the meeting at Warford, residents learned that while 
Auld had removed himself as a developer for the housing project, HUD was determined to 
continue and build fifty low-income units.113  A relatively new group was formed among the 
Ruskinites, calling themselves the Southern Community Coalition (SCC), whose chief purpose 
was to oppose HUD housing.114  This group began a letter-writing campaign to city councilmen 
and joined the South Kansas City Chamber of Commerce in hosting public meetings and making 
proclamations against HUD housing.115  The SCC and its allies won, not because they got city 
officials to agree not to develop the area near Warford, but because they made the notion so 
unpopular in the region that no developers wanted to take the contract to build the HUD 
housing.116  Even though HUD and HAKC kept the option open to build low-income housing 
near Red Bridge Road, it never materialized. 
 If representatives from HUD and HAKC found it difficult to build in the Terrace Lake 
area, then attempting another low-income complex closer to the more upscale neighborhood of 
Ruskin Hills proved to be disastrous.  Several months after the failed Terrace Lake attempt, 
residents learned about HUD’s proposition to build Greenwood Manor, a collection of fifty-
seven low-rent units.  The community rallied and held a public meeting at Johnson Elementary, 
blocks away from the proposed site.117  Only a few days before the March 12, 1979 meeting, 
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Ruskinites formed another opposition group to join the SCC, called the Hickman Mills 
Community Development Association (HMCDA).118 
 The meeting at Johnson lasted two and a half hours, during which representatives from 
HUD explained the benefits of creating housing in the area and the neighborhood groups 
outlined why they opposed it.119  Again, like the Terrace Lake project, the public meeting was 
held at a school, with school officials present.  Additionally, the meeting was packed with 
upwards of six hundred local residents attending.120  Several Kansas City council members were 
also at the school and in their meeting the next day, the city council passed a resolution to order 
HUD to stop financing construction of the Greenwood project.121  Like the previous 
development at Red Bridge, HUD remained adamant it was going to keep the option to build 
low-income housing in Ruskin Hills, even if nobody was actively developing the land.  The 
president of the HMCDA called this “a wait-and-see attitude” and warned residents to stay 
vigilant.122 
 Hickman Mills’s residents continued organizing themselves and fighting against what 
they saw as an intrusion into their peaceful neighborhoods.  At the end of 1979, the HMCDA and 
the SCC successfully fended off a low-income apartment complex at 103rd and Hillcrest, just a 
few blocks from Baptiste Junior High.123  The pattern remained the same: opponents used 
Baptiste as a staging ground, public meetings were held, developers backed out, and HUD 
stalled.   In 1980, residents of Kirkside, a neighborhood in the southeast corner of the district 
close to Longview Lake, noticed that HUD proposed Longview Garden Apartments, a 130 unit 
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low-income complex at 116th and Stark Road close to Smith-Hale Junior High.124  The pattern 
of resistance held true, except it expanded to a degree in that not only did SCC and the Kirkside 
Homes Association intervene, but also representatives from Ruskin Heights, Ruskin Hills, and 
Crossgates Home Associations got involved in protesting the proposed complex.125   
 Statements made by opposition and neighborhood leaders reveal the motive behind the 
antipathy toward low-income housing.  Residents worried the proliferation of non-single family 
units would destabilize the area socially and economically as well as lead to increased crime and 
depressed property values.  Sidney Whitfield, a board member of the Kirkside Homes 
Association, kept his fellow homeowners abreast of HUD’s actions through a regular column in 
the local paper.  Whitfield made his own antagonism to HUD clear, arguing that perhaps “HUD 
was dispersing crime instead of low-income families” and that even if that were not true, the 
main issue with HUD’s actions was that the organization was “placing low-income housing 
where it isn’t wanted by the people who own property there.”126  When HUD and developers 
were working on plans for the Longview Garden apartment complex, Whitfield shared that one 
of the developers admitted that housing values were continuing to rise in the area, and would still 
do so with single-family houses, but would not do so with the construction of apartment 
complexes.127  Whitfield then expressed what must have been a common sentiment among 
Hickmanites, considering their outright opposition to any HUD projects: 
We want the National government agencies and the City to stop trying to force something 
on us we don’t want. In this area of interference in neighborhoods leave us alone in 
Kansas City.  I have no problem with the concept that ‘every citizen has a right to a 
decent place to live’ neither do I have a problem with ‘the neighborhood has a right to 
direct its environment.128 
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This statement encapsulates the interaction between Hickman Mills and the rest of Kansas 
City—residents of the suburb wanted the services and lower taxes the city provided by way of 
urbanization, but they did not want any part in housing equalization programs, whether for race 
or class.  Opposition in Kirkside was strong enough to block the development, just as was done 
three times previously in less than three years.  HUD, as usual, promised to try again in the 
future.129 
Unlike the Terrace Lake, Hillcrest, and Longview projects, a change in the pattern of 
opposition and defeat eventually occurred in a HUD project in Ruskin Hills, although it took 
them a decade for success to come to fruition.  In 1988, HUD granted a development plan to 
McCormack Baron Salazar and Associates, a St. Louis-based developer who specialized in low-
income housing across the country.130  McCormack named the complex “Bridgeport 
Apartments,” which is still operating today and has grown to 232 units.131  Opposition to the 
1988 construction was seemingly non-existent as no articles on the action appeared in The 
Jackson County Advocate and none of the residents interviewed remembered how Bridgeport 
Apartments appeared within district boundaries.   HUD victory in 1988 seemed to mark the 
beginning of a slow process in which HUD was able to successfully introduce more low-income 
housing units into Hickman Mills.132   
While HUD was eventually able to provide low-income housing in South Kansas City, 
Ruskinites staged winning campaigns against the efforts of city authorities, using the schools as 
central points of organization and opposition.  Again, it is instructive to remember that Hickman 
Mills did not exist as a political entity at this point, the area was officially part of Kansas City.  
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The identity neighborhood residents wanted to maintain was intertwined with the schools their 
children attended. 
Bonds, Enrollment, and the End of an Era 
 In the midst of community (and school) fights against outside intrusion by Kansas City 
and Missouri officials, against landfills, mobile-home parks, apartment complexes, bussing and 
desegregation, the Hickman Mills school district continued educating the local children and had 
to concern itself with the more mundane issues of funding and school operation.  The tenor of 
bonds, levies, and operating budgets for Hickman Mills drastically changed during the 1970s, 
largely because the local population stopped expanding rapidly and single-family housing 
development slowed.  While school leaders felt they were finally entering a point where the 
district was “leveling off” student-wise, in reality the 1970s marked the beginning of decline.133  
Strong disagreements over school funding would continue, but there began to be a clear change 
in the pattern of bond and levy elections in the district.  Arguments about taxation for schools 
were focused upon how to fund daily operations rather than school expansion.   
With all the discord that occurred in 1970 over an extended effort to pass a school levy, 
Superintendent Foraker and the school board were more cautious afterward in their financing and 
mostly did not raise levies at all.  In fact, from 1970 on, Hickman Mills would experience a 
gradual decreasing of its levy, which would not rise again until after 2000.  In January 1972, the 
community voted on and passed a $1,175,000 bond to build Santa Fe Elementary, which would 
become the last school building constructed in the district.  The bond came with a lowering of 
the levy, as a thirty-one cent levy expired in December of 1971, and the board saw no real need 
to renew it.134  School leaders felt justified in their decision because there had been some further 
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expansion of housing in Hickman Mills and the additional property taxes were adequate to 
replace any funding loss in the levy amount.135  The board continued for the rest of the 1970s 
into the 1980s occasionally asking for elections on bond issues without raising property taxes, as 
can be seen in table 1. 
Table 1: Bond Issues, 1973-1980136 
 
 Bond Use 
 
Votes For/Against Turnout as 
Percentage of 
Adult Population 
January 1973 $1 Million Santa Fe, High 
School Gym 
2,543 to 292 10.79% 
January 1974 $1 Million Santa Fe and High 
School 
2,042 to 299 8.90% 
January 1975 $825,000 High School Lab, 
Library at 
Westridge, 
Cafeteria at 
Baptiste 
1,439 to 297 6.60% 
January 1976 $1.4 Million Elementary 
improvements and 
repair 
1,831 to 469 8.75% 
January 1978 $600,000 New roof for 
Dobbs 
1341 to 333 5.90% 
January 1979 $700,000 Administrative 
Center near Santa 
Fe 
996 to 286 4.50% 
March 1980 $350,000 General Repair and 
improvement 
1088 to 342 5.02% 
 
The school district continued to request funding to operate the schools, but no longer asked for 
tax raises.  Additionally, voter turnout had greatly diminished when compared to the Levy War 
of 1970.  Foraker stated in 1974 that “the bond issue in a sense is the end of an era,” explaining 
that with little to no residential construction, the schools as they existed would be sufficient for 
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the population in Hickman Mills.137  In June of 1975, the school board voted to decrease the 
school levy from $5.68 to $5.63 because the district was beginning to pay off debts and board 
members were not planning new buildings.138  Except for the administrative center that was built 
in 1979 and opened in 1980, the rest of the bonds passed in the latter 1970s were for building 
maintenance.  As Foraker pointed out, the long period of expansion, with its accompanying 
tension between school supporters and anti-tax proponents, was over and has not returned yet.  
Instead, the district has been on a steady decline in population and status ever since. 
 By the fall of 1972, there were signs of a leveling off, even a decrease, in school 
enrollments, to the great relief of district leaders.  The drop was not particularly large, going 
from over fourteen thousand students in 1971-72 school year to just under fourteen thousand in 
1972-73, a difference of 270 students.139  The next school year, there were one hundred students 
less than in 1972-73, with most significant of the decrease coming from kindergarten and 
elementary grades.140  For the next four years, the district continued to see a slow decline in the 
number of children enrolling in school, to the point that in 1977, the district was able to contain 
all kindergartners in the elementary buildings for the first time, which meant it could stop renting 
space from the Ruskin Heights United Presbyterian Church near Ruskin High School.141  While 
district leaders were initially excited about the chance that there might finally be enough space in 
the school buildings to accommodate enrollments, they began to become concerned.  In 1978, 
acting Superintendent Joe Nesbit worried that declining enrollments were due to the closing of 
Richards Gebaur Air Base, and that some families were moving to “2nd or 3rd tier suburbs” like 
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Lee’s Summit.142  Hickman Mills C-1 School District was undergoing a new change, 
transforming from a rapidly expanding school district to a slowly shrinking one, which altered 
how the district approached funding.   
Additionally, leadership changes would occur within the district, beginning with an event 
the over which the school board had no control.  Early in the morning on June 17, 1976, 
Superintendent Tom Foraker died of complications from a heart attack.143  The man had been 
leader of the school district since July 1959, making him the longest serving superintendent in 
Hickman Mills’s history.  The board scrambled to find a replacement, first appointing Joe Nesbit 
as acting superintendent, as he had been before when Lewis Schultz was removed in 1959.144  
Board member Bill Wall awkwardly commented on the difficulty in replacing Foraker, “it wasn’t 
planned, it just happened that way!”145  Although the board set a goal to hire a new leader by 
July 1977, it was unable to recruit anyone to be superintendent until 1978 and the succeeding 
superintendents did not serve nearly as long as Foraker’s seventeen-year tenure, with the next 
long-term superintendent being Marjorie Williams from 2000 to 2012.   
 If the 1970s marked a period of organizational transition for Hickman Mills, then a brief 
examination of its operations in the 1980s is indicative of a new focus and reality.  Table 2 
compares Hickman Mills to Kansas City, Missouri school district as well as several other 
suburban school districts surrounding Kansas City.  It demonstrates some important qualities for 
the district in the 1980s, mostly revealing that Hickman Mills was somewhat mediocre when 
compared to its neighbors. 
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Table 2: Hickman Mills and Surrounding Districts, 1984-85146 
 
 Avg Income Levy 
Per Pupil 
Expense 
Avg 
Teacher 
Salary 
Dropout 
8-12 
grade 
Low 
SES 
%8th 
Grade 
Passing 
Best 
Hickman Mills $23,168 $4.21 $2,801 $23,556 7.5% .3% 75.2% 
Kansas City 21,599 3.26 3,328 22,344 12.2 26.8 58.4 
Center 23,442 4.49 3,617 26,720 5.9 .6 82.2 
Independence 22,047 3.61 2,422 23,360 7.1 5.7 83.7 
Grandview 24,196 4.55 2,939 22,814 5.4 2 92 
Raytown 23,931 4.30 3,041 26,363 4.9 1.2 81.9 
Lee’s Summit 26,725 4.93 2,598 21,381 3.6 1.4 84.8 
Blue Springs 27,143 4.42 2,092 21,046 4 .5 84.6 
State Average 20,978 3.34 2,834 20,452 32.9 9.7 N/A 
(Red numbers, lowest value in category.  Blue numbers, highest value.  State Average is excluded, for comparison 
purposes only) 
 
By the 1984-85 school year, Hickman Mills was a middling school district, not faring 
significantly better or worse than other suburban districts, except in test scores.  While its 
average salary is on par with most other districts in the area, Mills’s levy in 1984 was only 
higher than that of Kansas City and Independence.  Hickman Mills performed much better than 
Kansas City on test scores, Mills was not comparing well with the other suburban eighth graders 
on Missouri’s Basic Essentials Skills Test (BEST), a statewide test adopted in 1979.147  
Additionally, the school district’s dropout rate, while better than Kansas City, was worse than the 
other suburbs, except Independence.  By the 1980s, in light of objective measures, it is difficult 
to see Hickman Mills as a top tier school district in the Kansas City area.  To be fair, Hickman 
Mills was never the “best” district in the metropolitan area, it never had the best test scores or 
graduation rates and as shown earlier, it struggled to gain accreditation mostly because of 
overcrowding from insufficient facilities.  However, by the 1980s, the district was established, 
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was no longer focused on expanding, and had the lowest grouping of poor students in the Kansas 
City, Missouri area.  It should have been doing better. 
Color In South Kansas City 
 In addition to demonstrating that the Hickman Mills school district was underperforming 
in comparison to surrounding suburban communities, table 2 also indicates how small Hickman 
Mills’s low SES category was.  Even though the language used to express opposition to low-
income housing in Hickman Mills pointed the finger at issues of race and class as justification 
for preventing construction, the black families who were moving into the area were largely 
middle-class, on par with the whites who came during the 1950s and 60s, which can be seen in 
school and census data.  The next section will address the migration pattern of middle-class black 
families and the realities of race and class in Hickman Mills during the 1980s. 
Much has been written on the patterns of racial housing in Kansas City, almost always 
with an emphasis on the city center itself and Troost Street as the boundary between white and 
black citizens.148  A map of the greater Kansas City metropolitan area shows how African-
Americans moved south over time in search of better housing (figures 11-15, Appendix I), much 
as whites did only a few decades earlier.  Hickman Mills was on this “path,” as evidenced by the 
map and by residents’ opposition to HUD and HAKC.  While the 1980s were a period in which 
more black families were migrating into the neighborhoods and the school district, they were not 
poor.  White middle class and blue collar families who moved into Hickman Mills in the 1950s 
and 1960s now saw their black counterparts coming in the 1980s.  Table 3 compares the average 
salary for the census tracts containing major Hickman Mills neighborhoods by race. 
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Table 3: Hickman Neighborhoods, Race and Family Income (2012 dollars)149 
 % 
White 
1980 
% 
Black 
1980 
Avg. 
White 
Family 
Income, 
1980 
Avg. 
Black 
Family 
Income, 
1980 
% 
White 
1990 
% 
Black 
1990 
Avg. 
White 
Family 
Income, 
1990 
Avg. 
Black 
Family 
Income, 
1990 
Hidden 
Valley/Oakwood 
94.1% 4.2% $56,576 $21,213 85% 13.1% $50, 503 $63, 611 
St. Catherine 
Gardens/Royal 
Acres 
90.2% 8.7% 104,832 93,526 84.1% 13.4% 87,663 100,557 
Terrace Lake 
Gardens 
95.1% 3.2% 75,708 92,136 87.7% 10.8% 67,492 59,174 
Bannister Acres 94.4% 4.2% 81,762 76,133 83.6% 13.8% 75,523 98,171 
Fairway 92.7% 6% 82,235 95,680 89.5% 8.7% 66,754 61,169 
Robandee 92.7 6% 82,235 95,680 82.3% 15.9% 84,230 89,814 
Bannister 98.9% 0% 56,081 - 96% 0% 40,498 - 
Loma Vista 80.9% 16% 66,858 71,846 65.2% 32.3% 51,051 51,547 
Fairlane 91.2% 7.7% 78,253 86,465 79.4% 18.7% 66,078 76,187 
Hickman Mills 86.7% 11.6% 77,650 98,508 75.1% 23.2% 65,556 67,988 
Kirkside 67.2% 31.6% 79,585 82,267 40.3% 58.1% 72,761 71,419 
Ruskin Heights 95.5% 2.8% 69,764 69,272 86.4% 10.8% 57,803 40,864 
Ruskin Hills 95.5% 2.8% 69,764 69,272 78.4% 19.7% 64,508 67,761 
Robandee 
South/White 
Oak 
91.1% 7.3% 93,043 50,556 82.5% 15.8% 76,681 78,929 
(Red numbers indicate higher average income between white and black category.  Blue indicates when black 
percentage residents outnumbers whites.) 
 
It is telling that the average black family income was either on par with or above whites in 
neighborhoods in 1980 and especially 1990.  Economically, black families moving into South 
Kansas City were very similar to their white counterparts.  Additionally, by 1980, most 
neighborhoods in Hickman Mills were overwhelmingly white as concentrations of black families 
in single-family housing were limited except in Kirkside, where nearly a third of residents were 
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black in 1980 and half in 1990.  The following map of the school district, divided into census 
tracts, helps visualize the growth of Hickman Mills’s black community in the 1970s. 
Map 1: Black Population in Hickman Mills in 1980150 
 
 
(Numbers in bold=# black persons living in tract.  Elementary school locations written in red.) 
 
The outline in bold demarcates the district boundaries for Hickman Mills, with the smaller 
divisions being the census tracts from 1980.  The shading of each tract on the map above 
demonstrates the percentage of black persons within each tract, with the north central and 
southeast tracts having the highest concentrations of African American families.  The Loma 
Vista neighborhood, the tract with 362 black people, was 16% black, and Kirkside and 
Crossgates neighborhoods in the southeast had 929 black people and were 31.5% black.151   
                                                          
150 U.S. Census of the Population, 1980.  Census map and shading courtesy of Social Explorer. 
151 U.S. Census of the Population, 1980. 
 159 
When comparing map 1 with the metropolitan maps in the appendix, one can see that 
Hickman Mills was on the southern end of what was a fifty-year slow southern migration.  Some 
areas were skipped over and did not have a significant black population, most likely due to the 
highway system that made areas like Kirkside very accessible to and from Kansas City.  The 
neighborhood change is also reflected in the makeup of elementary students attending the 
schools within the district, as table 4 demonstrates. 
Table 4: Black Student Enrollment in Hickman Mills Elementary Schools, 1968-1982152 
 1968 1970 1972 1974 
School # Enrolled Percent # Enrolled Percent # Enrolled Percent # Enrolled Percent 
Dobbs 5 1 9 1 20 2 17 3 
Burke 2 0 3 0 9 1 34 5 
Ingels 1 0 2 0 27 3 98 15 
Johnson 2 0 4 0 8 1 6 1 
Symington 0 0 5 1 8 1 9 61 
Santa Fe - - 2 0 13 3 57 9 
Truman 3 0 3 0 13 2 27 4 
Warford 0 0 4 0 13 2 45 7 
Westridge 0 0 3 0 11 2 6 1 
 1976 1978 1980 1982 
School # Enrolled Percent # Enrolled Percent # Enrolled Percent # Enrolled Percent 
Dobbs 28 4 41 7 34 6 61 9 
Burke 42 7 67 12 88 17 102 17 
Ingels 137 21 224 36 270 44 299 45 
Johnson 19 3 29 5 26 4 - - 
Symington 11 2 7 1 15 3 33 5 
Santa Fe 61 10 97 18 112 20 120 19 
Truman 28 5 48 8 57 9 54 8 
Warford 60 9 78 13 79 13 88 13 
Westridge 23 6 27 8 47 10 - - 
 
Ingels and Santa Fe elementary schools had the highest number and percentage of black students 
through the 1970s and 80s because they were situated in the neighborhoods where black families 
were growing the fastest.  This does raise a question of why African American families settled in 
Kirkside and Crossgates in larger numbers than in Ruskin Heights or Ruskin Hills, one for which 
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I have not been able to find a satisfactory answer, other than the black community spread in the 
southland by loose kinship ties.  As families purchased houses in Kirkside, they encouraged 
friends and acquaintances to move close by, often for mutual support.153  Another explanation is 
that the concentration of black families in the southeast area of Hickman Mills in the 1970s and 
80s shows the early white flight from the district that would intensify throughout the district, 
particularly in Ruskin Heights and Ruskin Hills in the late 1990s through the present day.154  
Moving South, Redux 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, when the school leadership fought against the 
Spainhower Plan and then the metropolitan desegregation suit, they claimed that racial 
integration should be solved in a “natural” way, like what was happening in Hickman Mills 
itself.  Thus, there was no need for “forced integration.”  While migration towards South Kansas 
City was most definitely not “natural” because of color lines and housing discrimination, when 
African Americans settled in Hickman Mills in more significant numbers white residents felt the 
move was urbanization at its worst.  Eventually, black presence in South Kansas City made the 
community no longer a suburb, but instead urban in the minds of Ruskinites, so many left.  
By the 1970s and 80s, this quality was more pronounced even if Hickman Mills was 
much more developed and urbanized than it had been in the 1950s.  Highways 470, 435, and 71 
made travel to and from Hickman Mills extraordinarily easy.  Shopping was booming in the 
1980s with the growth of Truman’s Corners, a new Wal-Mart, and an extensive shopping mall 
near Bannister Road and Highway 71.155  Housing was affordable and the schools were seen as 
                                                          
153 Jacobs, Martin, and Solum interviews with author. 
154 This is a likely argument, as similar patterns have been found in other black middle class communities. See Bruce 
D. Haynes, Red Lines, Black Spaces: The Politics of Race and Space in a Black Middle-Class Suburb (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2001). 
155 James R. Shortridge, Kansas City and How It Grew, 1822-2011 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 
2012), 153; “Open New Wal-Mart,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 90, no. 19, June 19, 1980, 1, 3; “Bannister Mall 
opens doors,” 10-A. 
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better than Kansas City’s, if not as good as other suburbs.  Hickman Mills was inviting in many 
ways, but even so, some black residents interviewed expressed their own trepidation at moving 
southward. 
Stories of Daniel Mass and Alicia Solum exemplify the patterns inherent in black 
migration to Hickman Mills, as their families came for affordable houses and quieter 
neighborhoods, but encountered opposition and a hostile environment.  Daniel Mass, who moved 
into the Kirkside neighborhood in 1975 from central Kansas City, shared that he grew up 
learning to avoid going west of Troost and south of 39th.156  Mass added, “My father told me 
‘watch your own back when going south.’  South Kansas City was not a safe place to be in the 
early 1970s.”157  This was in particular a reference to Raytown, which had a reputation for 
harassing black residents or passersby.158  Mass recalled not having any significant problems 
moving into the community and not meeting outright racism, but he did feel cautious about 
living in the area at first.  When asked why he moved to Hickman Mills if concerned with white 
attitudes, Mass replied: 
I got a great house and a yard, for what I was paying for an apartment in the city—it was 
a no-brainer.  I came out the same way they [whites] did earlier, I came for the house, the 
space, and the quiet.159 
 
Mass moved into Kirkside with his wife, sent his two daughters to Ingels, then Smith-Hale 
Junior High and then to Hickman Mills High School.  He also saw his neighborhood and school 
district change from predominantly white to predominantly black in two decades.  “It was not a 
problem at first, some of us got along.  But with HUD and section 8 housing, especially after the 
                                                          
156 Daniel Mass, interview with author, August 14, 2012. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Shortridge, Kansas City, 153; Mass, interview with author; Solum, interview with author. 
159 Mass, interview with author. 
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90s, things got uglier.”160  Mass explained that the proliferation of section 8 housing brought 
property values down, and introduced housing speculation to the Ruskin and Kirkside 
neighborhoods.161  The rise of section 8 housing in Hickman Mills and the white flight that 
followed will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
Alicia Solum moved into Ruskin Heights from central Kansas City a little later than 
Daniel Mass, taking her two children to a suburban home after getting out of a bad marriage.  
She also returned to college in 1983.  “It was a tough time, and I thought that moving south 
would be better for my kids, which in a way it was, but our neighbors didn’t always make it 
easy.”162  Some months after moving in, Alicia’s house was vandalized—somebody pelted a 
wall with eggs and painted “get out, nigger.”163  The culprit was never discovered.  In recalling 
the event, Alicia pointed out that there were neighbors who became friends, and not everyone 
was openly hostile, but the attack still occurred and Alicia still wonders if one of her neighbors 
knew who was responsible and wasn’t sharing.164  Like Daniel, Alicia stayed in Hickman Mills, 
even as many of her neighbors left in the late 1990s.165  She has since become a respected 
member of the community and is involved in school and residential organizations. 
 While black families started coming to Hickman Mills in the 1960s in small numbers, 
African-American presence grew slowly but steadily in the 1970s and 1980s, then sharply 
increased in the 1990s.  Chapter five explores how the southland changed demographically from 
a predominantly white area to a primarily black one. A secondary transformation occurred during 
the 1990s as whites decided to leave Hickman Mills as a reputation of poverty and crime took 
hold, even if that reputation was not necessarily deserved.  Because of this, the community 
                                                          
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Solum, interview with author.  
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
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became known throughout the metropolitan area as an extension of the Kansas City core, and not 
as a suburb of the city.  The schools also began to experience a tarnished reputation because of 
violent events that occurred in 1990, which prompted outsiders to think of the area as poor, 
violent, and black.  Like other areas of the United States, middle-class black families moved to 
the suburbs of Kansas City to enjoy the good life their white counterparts sought twenty to thirty 
years earlier, only to find that their very presence led others to see the neighborhoods as urban, 
simply because they became black.166 
 
 
                                                          
166 Haynes, Red Lines, Black Spaces, 188-189; Emily Strauss, “The Making of the American School Crisis: 
Compton, California and the Death of the Suburban Dream” (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 2006), 212-13. 
 164 
Chapter 5: Death of a Suburb  
 
The Economics of Race and the Power of Perception 
 With expansion of roads and highways, explosive residential growth and the influx of 
large and small businesses, from 1950 on Hickman Mills was becoming increasingly urban in the 
sense that the area was more populated and even more economically prosperous.  However, 
during the last decade of the twentieth century developments influenced Kansas Citian’s 
perception of the community and the school district as having negative aspects of urbanization.  
Residents and outsiders worried about congestion and crime in Hickman Mills much in the same 
way 1950s suburbanites worried about central Kansas City.  It was in the 1990s then that 
Hickman Mills C-1 School District transformed from a suburban school district to an urban one.  
This chapter examines how a combination of factors including school violence, economic 
setbacks, revolving school leadership, and fears toward an increasingly growing black 
community led to the perception of Hickman Mills as an “urban” school, both in the literal and 
the pejorative sense.  Middle-class whites came to Hickman Mills to live a suburban life and left 
because, in their minds, the community became urban.   
In one sense, the change Hickman Mills underwent in the 1990s was a result of a power 
struggle residents had with Kansas City, dating back to annexation in 1961.  Ruskinites had no 
power to stop annexation, but they continuously exercised their ability to resist any changes to 
Hickman Mills perceived as detrimental for the community.  From 1964 on, residents refused to 
join with the Kansas City Missouri School District, they stridently opposed a metropolitan 
desegregation plan and they repeatedly resisted efforts in building low-income housing in the 
area.  In the 1970s and 1980s, many residents joined together and formed committees and 
neighborhood organizations to fight against what they saw as continued outside intrusions by 
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Kansas City.  Ruskinites feared threats to the status quo of having “quiet” neighborhoods and a 
“simple” suburban life that resulted from incursions from a powerful municipal force.   
However, white residents could not stop the racial change that was occurring in the 
community, even though some may have wanted to.  Ruskinites had no real power to block 
middle-class black families from moving into local neighborhoods, so the alternative for 
numerous whites at the time was to move to another suburb, which many did.  The reality is that 
as whites left in large numbers in the late 1990s through the 2000s, the community did decline 
economically.  What began as just perception on the part of middle-class whites became reality 
for both the white and black families who remained in Hickman Mills.  And by extension, the 
school district suffered. 
Demographic Change, 1990-2000 
A key element of the transition in the public’s perception of Hickman Mills likely derives 
from changes in the racial composition of the families living in the Hickman Mills 
neighborhoods.  In the previous chapter, I explored the idea that for many whites in Hickman 
Mills, the arrival of large numbers of black families meant the neighborhood was becoming 
“urbanized.”  This is a problematic sentiment, as families who entered the district were largely 
blue-collar/middle class regardless of race, yet fears of non-whites and apprehension about their 
moving to the area exacerbated and in some cases led to economic setbacks in Hickman Mills.  
As explained in chapter 4, the neighborhoods comprising Hickman Mills C-1 School District 
were shifting in color.  By 1980, the Kirkside neighborhood in particular had a strong black 
presence, made up of middle-class families looking to the suburbs for the same reasons their 
white counterparts did ten to twenty years earlier.  By 2000, the residents of the southern region 
of Kansas City looked increasingly different than in 1950, as shown in maps 1 and 2: 
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Map 1: African American Population in Hickman Mills, 19901 
 
 
(Shading=population density of black population; darker orange=higher density.  Numbers of actual black 
persons written for each census tract) 
 
                                                 
1 U.S. Census of the Population, 1990. 
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Map 2: African American Population in Hickman Mills, 20002 
 
 
(Shading=population density of black population; darker orange=higher density.  Numbers of actual black 
persons written for each census tract) 
 
The concentration of black families in 1990 looks similar to that in 1980 (chapter 4), with the 
highest concentration of African-American residents living in the southeast section of the 
district, primarily made up of the Kirkside and Crossgates neighborhoods.  However, by 2000, 
only the southwest corner of the district remained less than 40% black.  This area was made up 
of smaller and more spread-out neighborhoods, with much of the vicinity comprised of public 
land and historical sites.3   
 While some white residents saw this demographic change in their neighborhoods as a 
sign of economic downturn for the community, African-American families moving south were 
blue collar/lower-middle class, just as the whites.  Table 3 in chapter four demonstrates how 
income groups in Hickman Mills were largely similar, regardless of race.  Additionally, map 3 as 
                                                 
2 U.S. Census of the Population, 2000. 
3 The southwest corner of the school district includes a tract of land where Harry Truman lived as a child. 
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follows distinguishes between African-American families in Hickman Mills as opposed to their 
counterparts in central Kansas City, Missouri: 
Map 3:  African American Population in Kansas City Missouri Metro by Income, 20004 
 
(Black outline for census tracts in Hickman Mills C-1 School District) 
 
In terms of socio-economics, the patterns of suburbanization remained the same by 2000 as they 
did during the 1950s and 1960s in Hickman Mills.  The influx of new African-American 
residents to the southland were on average as solidly blue collar/middle-class as their white 
counterparts. Additionally, as map 3 shows, African-American families living in neighborhoods 
in South Kansas City on average displayed higher incomes than their counterparts in central 
Kansas City.  Hickman Mills was not transforming into a poor urban space. 
                                                 
4 U.S. Census of the Population, 2000. 
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Because of sudden and dramatic periods of change in neighborhood composition, by 
2000 the school district served a majority black student body.  High school enrollments reveal 
these rapid changes to the district’s student population. In 1988, 224 of Hickman Mills High 
School’s 1,284 students were black, about 17%.5  At Ruskin High, 393 of its 1,157 students were 
black, about 34%.6  In 1999, the numbers of African-American students climbed.  Hickman 
Mills had 246 white students out of 946 overall, or 26%; Ruskin had 178 white students in its 
total student body of 850, or 21%.7  For both Ruskin and Hickman Mills, the “flip” occurred 
within only two years, as both schools had a majority white student body in 1997.8  This rapid 
switch at the end of the 1990s came as a result of a slow, steady trickle of African-American 
families to Hickman Mills combined with an out-migration of white families.  
Thus, what occurred in Hickman Mills during the 1990s was an extension of white flight, 
a phenomenon that is almost always associated with movement out of city centers in the 1950s 
and 1960s.9  In this case, the trend continued in South Kansas City as whites preferred living 
near other whites and avoided residing near significant black populations.  Events that will be 
analyzed in this chapter, namely the rise in violence, media coverage of violence in and near 
                                                 
5 Data taken from pictures of student body in Hickman Mills Pride yearbook for 1988 to 1989.  Hickman Mills High 
School, Pride (Kansas City, MO: Hickman Mills C-1 School District, July 1989), yearbook collection, Midwest 
Genealogy Center, Mid-Continent Public Library, Independence, MO. 
6 Data taken from pictures of student body in Hickman Mills Mirage yearbook for 1988 to 1989.  Ruskin High 
School, Mirage (Kansas City, MO: Hickman Mills C-1 School District, July 1989), yearbook collection, Midwest 
Genealogy Center, Mid-Continent Public Library, Independence, MO. 
7 Data taken from pictures of student body in Hickman Mills Pride and Mirage yearbooks for 1989 to 1999.  
Hickman Mills High School, Pride (Kansas City, MO: Hickman Mills C-1 School District, July 1999), yearbook 
collection, Midwest Genealogy Center, Mid-Continent Public Library, Independence, MO; Ruskin High School, 
Mirage (Kansas City, MO: Hickman Mills C-1 School District, July 1999), yearbook collection, Midwest 
Genealogy Center, Mid-Continent Public Library, Independence, MO. 
8 Data taken from pictures of student body in Hickman Mills Pride and Mirage yearbooks for 1996 to 1997.  
Hickman Mills High School, Pride (Kansas City, MO: Hickman Mills C-1 School District, July 1997), yearbook 
collection, Midwest Genealogy Center, Mid-Continent Public Library, Independence, MO; Ruskin High School, 
Mirage (Kansas City, MO: Hickman Mills C-1 School District, July 1997), yearbook collection, Midwest 
Genealogy Center, Mid-Continent Public Library, Independence, MO. 
9 Leah Platt Boustan, “Was Postwar Suburbanization ‘White Flight’? Evidence from the Black Migration,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 125, no. 1 (February 2010): 441; Andrew Wiese, Places of Their Own: African 
American Suburbanization in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 247-48. 
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schools, and economic decline, are all heavily interconnected with race as more non-whites 
moved into Hickman Mills.  Thus, the presence of black families came to be synonymous with 
violence in the minds of many white Hickmanites.    
Violence 
Violent incidents made local news headlines in 1990, received a great deal of media 
attention, and served as a source for the shift in the perception of the district as urban rather than 
suburban.  The new decade began with a disturbing climb in the amount of criminal activity in 
the neighborhoods of Ruskin Heights, Ruskin Hills, and Kirkside.  By March 1990, documented 
rapes in South Kansas City had nearly doubled while robberies, assaults, and thefts increased 
over the previous year.10  These crimes were disconcerting to residents of the area, but what 
ultimately hurt the reputation of the school district (as well as the community) to a greater degree 
were three high-profile gun cases, with two ending in a high school student’s death.  For the first 
time the Hickman Mills School District became comparable with the Kansas City Missouri 
School District to the north in gaining damaging amounts of negative publicity in a short period 
of time.  People reading or watching the news in the greater metropolitan area were surely 
wondering what was going on in South Kansas City in 1990. 
In May, a seventeen year-old student was killed in a drive-by shooting while walking by 
Ruskin Way Park, a mere six blocks from Ruskin High.11  Adding to the school’s woes, in 
October a gun was found in a student’s locker, the owner of which had been into an altercation 
the morning with another student.  By the end of the day, one student was in jail, another was 
                                                 
10 “South Area Attacks Rise—New Rape Report,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 101, no. 5, March 1, 1990, 1.  
“Crime Up for South Patrol,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 101, no. 11, March 12, 1990, 1.  By March, southern 
Kansas City had 23 robberies, 110 assaults, 386 thefts, and 55 stolen vehicles.  Totaling 702 incidences, crime had 
increased from the previous year’s first quarter of 628 incidences. 
11 “Youth Shot In Ruskin,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 101, no. 15, May 10, 1990, 1. 
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sent to juvenile detention, with a third was suspended and sent home.12  School authorities 
hoping to end the year without any further violence were disappointed in December when a 
fifteen-year-old Ruskin High student was involved in a shootout in Longview Park which ended 
in his death.13  While walking by the park, Shannon Hawley was accosted by two older boys.  
During the fight, Shannon showed his gun, as did one of the two other boys, resulting in both 
parties firing their weapons at each other.  Shannon was shot in the head and died, one of the 
boys ran away, and the third was shot in the leg and then arrested.14   
These three incidents occurring within seven months fed a public perception of Hickman  
Mills as a dangerous urban space.  The school district itself responded to the shootings and the 
threat of guns in the schools by working on installing metal detectors and placing off-duty police 
officers in the two high schools and the junior high buildings.15  While increased safety for the 
children was important to the district, adding these measures made the schools look unsafe and 
unsettling.  In essence, the Hickman Mills C-1 School District took on the appearance of an 
“urban” district in metropolitan Kansas City with “urban” problems.   
Residents experienced both the fear and loss that the violent acts from 1990 brought 
about, but also felt the sting of being associated with a sub-par community.  Longtime resident 
Allison Wade remorsefully articulated, “the media broke our area.”16  She elaborated:  
…because of the things that were happening that year, and then the shifts in the 
neighborhoods, people started to have misperceptions of our district.  Started moving out 
to Lee’s Summit and Independence, they left because of their fear.  People thought we 
had gangs.17 
 
                                                 
12 “Gun Found in Locker—Ruckus at Ruskin,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 101, no 37, October 18, 1990, 1. 
13 “Shoot-out on Longview: Ruskin High Youth Dies,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 101, no. 46, December 20, 
1990, 1. 
14 Ibid. 
15 “CSD 1 Hiring Officers,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 103, no. 41, November 11, 1993, 1, 3. 
16 Allison Wade, interview with author, September 8, 2012.   
17 Ibid. 
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Wade’s lamentation was a common sentiment expressed by those interviewed who have stayed 
within the district.18  Violence around and among the youth of the community did not change 
Hickman Mills, as violent actions had occasionally occurred before 1990 as part of Hickman 
Mills’s history.  However, previously, no one declared South Kansas City an unsafe place to live 
or an unfit location to send children, but the shootings of 1990 and the media reports of the 
violence contributed to unease among established whites (as well as some black families) 
towards the district and the neighborhoods.19 
Landfill 
While the school district was dealing with the deaths of students, threats of violence, and 
a rising perception of the area as bearing stark similarities to Kansas City, neighborhood 
communities once again fought against the threat of what they perceived to be urbanization.  
Residents staged a bitter but winning campaign against adding a landfill to the Bannister Mall 
development.  They also struggled against the city itself by attempting to block the growth of 
low-income housing.  Once again, it was community groups like the Southern Community 
Coalition (SCC) that spearheaded efforts to block incursions by Kansas City that were viewed as 
potentially damaging to property values and community identity. 
 The SCC first learned of the desire on the part of Norcal Waste Systems, Inc., a San-
Francisco-based waste and recycling company, to build a landfill near Bannister Mall in March 
of 1990.  Mayor Richard Berkley and the city council placed Proposition 1, allowing Norcal to 
build the landfill, for public vote.  The SCC helped form a new neighborhood group, the 
“Neighborhoods for Responsible Solid Waste Management,” collected donations, and began an 
                                                 
18 Heather Davis, interview with author, December 4, 2012; Lilly Husman, interview with author, August 25, 2012; 
Robert Spearman, interview with author, August 25, 2012.  
19 Daniel Mass, interview with author, August 14, 2012. 
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anti-landfill campaign.20  This new organization, working in conjunction with the SCC, ran full-
page advertisements in newspapers declaring that the addition of a second landfill would lead to 
decreased property values and would effectively “stifle economic growth around Bannister 
Mall.”21  The connection with Hickman Mills School District became clearer as the SCC began 
holding meetings at Ruskin High from April through May, then convinced the school board to 
join in protesting the Norcal plan.22  In the past, the school board and the SCC had a somewhat 
tenuous relationship in that sometimes the community organization supported the board in 
attempting to pass bond issues, and at other times opposed those measures, largely depending 
upon whether bonds would raise taxes or not.  By the 1990s, however, even though their alliance 
was short lived, they became staunch comrades in fighting the building of a landfill within 
district boundaries.  This alliance was born out of a mutual desire to keep Bannister Mall from 
being associated with garbage, which seems to have been a logical move for Ruskinites.    
 The SCC, as in the past, began a letter-writing campaign with the mayor as the target.  
Hickman Mills’s superintendent Kirby Hall joined the vocal opposition, produced a unanimous 
declaration against the proposition from the school board, and encouraged parents and their 
children to join the campaign.23  The board and the SCC together presented a rousing argument 
that the landfill would “threaten the quality of our lives” and promised “we will work diligently 
for its defeat.”24  For the rest of the year, Hickman Mills’s neighborhood residents continued to 
meet, write letters, and plan actions to combat Proposition 1.  They turned to long-time resident 
                                                 
20 “Landfill Is Pro-Con Topic of Coalition,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 101, no. 9, March 29, 1990, 1;  “Set 
Landfill Meeting,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 101, no. 14, May 3, 1990, 1.   
21 “Vote No—Proposition 1!  Landfill Alert!,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 101, no. 9, March 29, 1990, 2.  
22 “Set Landfill Meeting,” 1; “Big Crowd at Forum on Bannister Trash Dump,” Jackson County Advocate vol. 101, 
no. 17, May 24, 1990, 1, 3. 
23 “Big Crowd,” 3. 
24 Ibid. 
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and Kansas City council representative John Sharp as their public and council voice against the 
landfill, who astutely observed that:  
even if the proposed landfill were a model of efficiency it would still give a negative 
perception to onlookers.  Investors and businesses from out of town would be wary of 
further investment here.25 
 
Popular protest and attempts at raising awareness on the part of the SCC worked, and Proposition 
1 failed.   
However, the issue was not settled as Norcal brought forward an idea to the city council 
that would allow them to change their development plan in order to include a landfill, without 
needing a public vote.26  The council was to vote on the measure in December, so the SCC 
continued to protest, holding regular meetings and encouraging letter-writing campaigns.  In 
September of 1990, Mayor Berkley visited the SCC at Ruskin High to address concerns over 
public housing and the proposed landfill, in which he attempted to reassure the present crowd 
that if the council were to vote on the issue the next day, it would fail.  He reiterated that the city 
did not know where to put the landfill, “but it was needed somewhere.”27  Before its vote in 
December, the city council held a hearing to share information about the proposal and to hear 
concerns from citizens.  The SCC provided busses that brought over one hundred opponents to 
the meeting.28  As before, protest was successful and the measure to allow Norcal to build a 
landfill on land adjacent to Bannister Mall failed to pass.29  The SCC won the battle against the 
city over the creation of the landfill, but almost immediately found a new threat to the safety and 
                                                 
25 “Over 1,000 at Ruskin High---Massive Landfill Turnout,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 101, no. 45, Dec. 13, 
1990, 1, 3. 
26  “No Mall Landfill,” Kansas City Star, December 18, 1990, B5. 
27 “KC Mayor Addresses SCC—Berkley Eases Fears on Housing and Landfill,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 101, 
no. 33, September 30, 1990, 1, 5.  
28 “Throng of Opponents at City Hearing on Landfill,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 101, no. 41, November 22, 
1990, 1. 
29 “No Landfill,” Kansas City Star, December 18, 1990, B4. 
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quiet of southern Kansas City.  The SCC’s new mission became one of keeping low-income 
families out of southern Kansas City.   
Low-income Housing 
Like their fight against the city landfill, residents who sought to resist the presence of 
low-income housing complexes were clearly working to maintain a suburban status and to repel 
“urban” influences.  Popular opinion expressed that housing for the poor was a project for inner 
cities, hence the moniker “projects.”30  For Ruskinites at the time, the eventual arrival of low-
income housing signaled the end of Hickman Mills’s status as a suburban community.  Many 
long-time residents of South Kansas City today believe that economic change in Hickman Mills 
occurred primarily because of the increased presence of low-income housing that followed the 
closing of a major low-income project named Wayne Miner in downtown Kansas City.31  To a 
certain degree, their perception matches reality.  The housing project, a large ten-story apartment 
complex named Wayne Miner Court (opened November 18, 1960), was demolished on February 
28, 1987 and its residents were helped into section eight housing throughout the metro area, 
including neighborhoods in South Kansas City.32   
Wayne Miner was planned and created at a time when Kansas City, Missouri was 
attempting to address poverty, low-income housing, and the negative perception of “slum” 
neighborhoods.  Even so, city leaders also had a vested interest in keeping housing racially 
                                                 
30 Spearman, interview with author. 
31 Carla Baker, interview with author, August 14, 2012; Gloria Cardona, interview with author, August 30, 2012; 
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segregated, because integrated housing, even for poor residents, was seen as anathema.33  Thus, 
Wayne Miner was for black families while its counterparts, Chouteau Court, West Bluff, and 
Pennway Plaza in other parts of town, were reserved largely for whites.34  Kansas City leaders 
hoped for the success of the high-rise apartments, but problems of crime, vandalism, and 
disrepair quickly arose to the point that they became permanent fixtures of life at Wayne 
Miner.35  By the late 1980s, Wayne Miner was widely considered “a blighting influence in the 
city of Kansas City.”36  Its demolition in 1987 coincided with pressures from the federal 
government and local authorities to desegregate housing in Kansas City.  However, efforts to 
desegregate led to clashes with residents of the Hickman Mills district. 
The case of housing desegregation in Hickman Mills illustrates the complex ties between 
a school district and its larger community, in that the efforts taken by the Housing Authority of 
Kansas City (HAKC) to provide low-income residences came at a time when the state 
government was demanding Kansas City resolve its issues of educational segregation, as per the 
Missouri v. Jenkins ruling in June of 1995.37  As discussed in chapter 4, the HAKC, together 
with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the U.S. Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), had been attempting to provide low-income housing 
throughout the Kansas City metro area since the late 1970s, with heavy resistance from the 
                                                 
33 Kevin Fox Gotham, Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City Experience, 1900-2000 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 75-76. 
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neighborhoods in Hickman Mills.38  Additionally, the Kansas City Missouri School District filed 
suit in 1977 against eighteen surrounding school districts in the Kansas City metro area 
(including Hickman Mills), the federal government, and the states of Missouri and Kansas.  This 
suit demanded a metropolitan desegregation remedy, chiefly in school assignments.39  However, 
Judge Clark changed the case, as the plaintiffs became the defendants.  The eventual ruling from 
the Supreme Court stated that Kansas City had to find a solution to its educational problems 
without turning to the surrounding school districts in the suburbs.  However, conveniently for 
Kansas City, Hickman Mills was part of the city, even if it had its own school district.  At the 
same time, Kansas City needed to desegregate its housing, yet only had authority to work within 
its own city borders, a court decision that mirrored that of Missouri v Jenkins.  Thus the 
neighborhoods of southern Kansas City became one of several attractive sites for providing 
section eight homes. 
 This effort on the part of the HAKC did not go unchecked by residents of Hickman Mills, 
particularly the SCC.  As Wayne Miner closed and families from the project were distributed to 
other housing, the Housing Authority began purchasing homes in southern Kansas City, 
primarily in the Kirkside neighborhood.40  Opposition from Hickman Mills’s residents was 
immediate with letter campaigns taking a central role.  The Kansas City HUD office began 
receiving dozens of letters, with the typical communication outlining the dangers low-income 
housing would pose to the rest of the community: 
We feel this will depreciate our property and turn our wonderful neighborhood into a 
high-crime area.  Also our neighborhood is kept up.  This does not happen when you 
                                                 
38 “Low-Income Housing in Suburbs Sought,” Kansas City Star, October 24, 1977, 16A; “Hickman School Board 
Protests Rights Survey Sought by HEW,” Kansas City Star, February 4, 1977, 2; Morantz, “Money and Choice,” 
245. 
39 Morantz, “Money and Choice,” 245-246. 
40 Ironically, this was the most non-white neighborhood in Hickman Mills, as many middle-class black families who 
moved south bought houses in Kirkside.  Thus, to a degree, the efforts to desegregate still clung to racial lines. 
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have low-income housing in your neighborhood.  These houses are never kept up, and it 
makes the rest of the neighborhood look run-down.41 
 
This notion of rental and low-income housing never being “kept up” was a common concern 
among residents, as they feared their own property values and neighborhood conditions would be 
adversely affected.  Longtime residents of Ruskin Heights and Ruskin Hills reiterated the same 
sentiments when asked about housing values in their area.42  Hickman Mills residents stated that 
their efforts in fighting the low-income housing were futile, but they also expressed that it was a 
battle worth having.43 
The SCC sued the Housing Authority in May 1990, joining with councilman Sharp’s 
objection to the plan.44  The lawyer representing the SCC explained its dissatisfaction with the 
low-income housing plan with a simple, yet brutally honest statement: “the residents of the area 
don’t object to the units there now, but they don’t want the Housing Authority to pour any more 
units into the area.”45  The judge, Forest W. Hanna, sympathized with the SCC and ordered a 
stop to any purchases of single-family homes in June.46  However, representatives from the 
Housing Authority countered that they were ordered by HUD to specifically purchase houses 
outside of the Kansas City Missouri School District.47  The HAKC was simultaneously ordered 
by Missouri Governor John Ashcroft and the Missouri legislature to scatter the section eight 
housing proportionally among school districts “according to population and…amount of public 
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housing in census tracts.”48  For the HAKC, these were contradictory orders, with one issued by 
the state government and another coming from a federal entity.   
The Housing Authority’s request was that the judge allow HUD and HAKC to continue 
to purchase housing in Hickman Mills.49  HAKC submitted several proposals to be able to 
continue to operate section eight housing in southern and northern Kansas City, and gained 
approval from HUD in early 1991 with a plan that placed sixty-one percent of the low-income 
housing in the KCMO school district, sixteen percent in the North Kansas City district, six 
percent each in the Center and Raytown districts, and four percent in Park Hill.  All of these 
houses would be within Kansas City, Missouri, as the HAKC did not have the authority to build 
beyond city borders.50  The neighborhoods of Hickman Mills were purposefully left out of the 
plan, as judge Hanna’s ruling from the previous year remained in effect and the HAKC was 
forced to sell eight of its already purchased properties within the Hickman Mills School District.  
This effectively decreased the number of section eight houses from nineteen to eleven.51  The 
result was essentially a draw for the SCC and HUD/HAKC as low-income housing would still be 
provided within Hickman Mills’s borders, but to a smaller degree. 
However, as before in their struggle to provide housing in South Kansas City, HUD and 
HAKC would continue efforts to build low-income apartment complexes or convert existing 
housing to section eight plans.  They succeeded after 2000, as many of the houses in Ruskin 
Heights and Ruskin Hills became section eight certified when their previous owners left.52  
Additionally, the neighborhoods in the Hickman Mills district were still adversely affected by 
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these battles as residents and outsiders began to see the southland as increasingly poor, black, 
and violent.  Local businesses, large and small, began to suffer, which led to an economic 
downturn in South Kansas City.  Hence, in the minds of the long-time residents, Hickman Mills 
spiraled from being a quiet suburb to dangerous urban blight.53 
Perception and Reality, Fear and Economics 
By the end of the 1990s, much of the battle to retain Hickman Mills as a suburb was lost 
inside the minds of people who created suburban Hickman Mills.  To a large degree, the 
problems Hickman Mills C-1 School District faced in the 1990s reflected and were results of 
economic decline within district boundaries.  The story of a major shopping center in Kansas 
City is indicative of this reality, as it was located within Hickman Mills, promised great 
economic and social benefits, but eventually failed, damaging the reputation and the economy of 
southern Kansas City.   
Bannister Mall opened in August of 1980 at the corner of I-435 and Bannister Road as a 
modern and elaborate shopping center, the largest up to that date in the Kansas City metro area.54  
Boasting a Macy’s upon opening and a J.C. Penney’s, Jones Store, and a Sears shortly after, 
Bannister Mall showed promise as an economic and shopping powerhouse for the Kansas City 
area and particularly for Hickman Mills.55  Some residents were concerned that the mall would 
take business away from Truman Corners, the shopping plaza that straddled the border between 
Hickman Mills and Grandview school districts.  However, excitement over a one million square 
foot center with over 150 stores, a movie theater, along with restaurants and businesses that 
would be built around the mall itself, overshadowed any fears of the potential demise of Truman 
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Corners.56  The mall provided work for almost two thousand construction workers and would 
employ over 2,400 employees.  The Hickman Mills School District would also benefit, with 
approximately $400,000 in yearly sales tax revenues heading to the schools.57  Within five years, 
developers such as J.C. Nichols Co. and Robertson Homes began planning and building office 
spaces and apartment complexes near the mall.58  In 1988, Wal-Mart added a then new 
“hypermarts” to the Bannister area, which had the distinction of being the fourth in the nation 
and the largest Wal-Mart to date.59  From its beginnings throughout the 1980s, Bannister 
continued to grow and thrive.  This reflected well on the school district, not only because 
economic development and trade led to more funds available for Hickman Mills’s schools, but 
also because housing values increased, which also directly boosted funding.  Hickman Mills as a 
school district was now associated with a seemingly new, thriving, and exciting part of Kansas 
City. 
The mall did not prove to be a panacea for the area and eventually met its demise due to 
expansions of other malls in the metropolitan area and the spread of fears on the part of 
suburban, middle-class whites over entering South Kansas City.  Just as the school district 
experienced racial change in greater numbers in the 1990s followed by both real and perceived 
violence, the economic corridor of shops, plazas, and restaurants along Bannister Road began to 
experience difficulties.  In the early 1990s, rumors of gangs, violent adults, child-molesters, and 
drug-dealing in the vicinity of Bannister Mall began to circulate, prompting the owners of the 
complex to begin a public relations campaign in order to convince shoppers to return to their 
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stores.60  Crime, especially shoplifting and theft, did occur at Bannister and happened more 
frequently than at other shopping locations in the metro area.  However, when considered in the 
context of how many people shopped at Bannister, the ratios were on par with other malls 
throughout Kansas City.61   
In order to address both the real and imagined instances of theft and crime, mall 
management installed additional security cameras and special safety booths spaced evenly 
throughout the parking lot.  These measures did decrease crime, especially in the parking lot, but 
were not effective in causing customers to perceive Bannister as a safe place to shop.62  Hickman 
Mills residents recall that some called the booths “sniper towers” and rumors spread that mall 
security had armed guards ready to shoot criminals in the parking lot.63  Additional staff at the 
mall implemented youth outreach programs, providing activities and adult “mentors” to 
teenagers who frequented the mall, particularly on evenings and weekends.64  Kansas City bus 
lines began running to Bannister Mall in the late 80s through the 90s and both shoppers and 
adolescents used the busses to travel to and from the mall.  Because many of these teenagers 
were black, discomfort toward the youth helped propagate the myth that gangs were employing 
the mall as a center of operations.  Bannister communications director Bev Livington alluded to 
this theory in stating one of the benefits of a Bannister Mall mentor program is that adults “learn 
that not everyone in a Starter jacket is in a gang.”65 
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Ultimately, attempts at reassuring customers that the mall was safe and a friendly place to 
shop failed.  As fewer paying customers frequented the mall, stores began to close and 
businesses left.  For example, after operating for eleven years at Bannister, dentist Dennis T. 
Myers moved out in 1994 with the explanation, “there’s perception of a problem with the mall.  
We believe it was very safe, but our clientele didn’t believe that.”66  Mall owners continued to 
implement new measures to convince customers to return, again without success.  By December 
of the same year, Bannister added a unit of bicycle-riding security officers, hoping to placate 
consumers during the Christmas shopping season.  Mall security chief Major John Coleman, the 
former police commander of Kansas City’s South Patrol Division, remarked that security at 
Bannister was largely a cosmetic issue, as “there really is much less crime than people perceive.  
This is more of a public-relations effort, since security problems are rather minimal.”67   These 
attempts to reassure shoppers all ultimately failed, as stores began to close or relocate from the 
mall because their owners were not receiving enough business.   
Facing years of decline and operational challenges, the owners of Bannister Mall 
eventually decided to close the facility in 2007.  At its zenith, Bannister offered 180 stores, a 
movie theater, and 27 restaurants.  When its closing was announced, Bannister had less than fifty 
stores, a barber shop, and a flea market.68  Burlington Coat Factory was one of the few major 
retailers to remain, managing to direct its merchandizing to the changing clientele.  Alicia 
Solum, a longtime resident of Ruskin Heights and among an early wave of African Americans to 
move to the neighborhood, shared her appreciation for stores like Burlington Coat Factory, 
which stayed while fears of uncertainty and economic decline loomed.   
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Those [stores] were the ones who stayed real, stayed true, and we have never forgotten it.  
I make a point to buy from the Factory, and so do all my friends.  They stayed with us, so 
we stay with them.69 
 
Merchants like Burlington and K-Mart that have remained in the Bannister area do continue to 
do steady business and have a loyal customer base, but not enough to convince other businesses 
to return.  Recent attempts at building a soccer stadium in the area or converting the site to an 
outdoor-style mall complex have stalled and failed, as, usually, the projects ultimately went to 
Kansas City, Kansas.70  What was briefly a thriving commercial center now stands largely as 
empty lots and concrete plains with occasional grass and weeds growing between the cracks.  
The existing K-Mart has boarded front windows and an armed guard.  Bannister Mall and its 
surrounding stores were a shopping haven for middle-class whites and, for a time, thrived.  Its 
transformation from a middle-class and upscale shopping center to an example of urban blight all 
occurred without the mall moving locations.  The city, and its accompanying “problems,” 
traveled to Bannister and Hickman Mills. 
Community Woes to School Woes 
The events in southern Kansas City during the last decade of the twentieth century were 
highly destructive to the Hickman Mills School District.  Due to changes in housing and 
economic decline within its borders, from 1990 on Hickman Mills began to experience extreme 
financial difficulties, more so than it ever had in the past.  Property values began to decline in the 
1990s, which translated to fewer funds for the school district.71  This reality, combined with fears 
of further decay, led to an outmigration from the neighborhoods, which also meant leaving the 
school district.  Older, more established families began to leave the chief neighborhoods in 
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Hickman Mills (Kirkside, Ruskin Heights, and Ruskin Hills), often for neighboring communities 
to the east such as Lee’s Summit and Independence.72  Alison Wade remembers her 
neighborhood in Ruskin Heights changing: “People left because they were afraid, then others 
would react and leave too.  Out of sixteen homes on these two blocks, nine became empty.”73  
Heather Davis, another long-time resident of Ruskin Heights, told the story of how her realtor 
neighbor tried to reassure residents that they could maintain stable neighborhoods: 
He told us ‘just don’t leave—if people leave, then it starts a panic.  So stay, and things 
will even out.’  He was the first to leave our block, sold his house and moved to 
Independence!74 
 
Davis expressed that she was not planning on leaving and still continues to walk in her 
neighborhood in order to show her neighbors that it is still possible.75  On the whole, many white 
families did leave the Hickman Mills neighborhoods.  Some residents who stayed and still 
remain expressed that as much as they want to leave, they feel they would not be able to sell their 
homes.76   
As white flight began to occur in Hickman Mills in the 1990s with subsequent decline in 
housing values, the school district received less funding from its mill levy, which made school 
operations more difficult to finance.  Tax changes on the city and state level also dealt a blow to 
how the school district helped fund its daily operations, compounding Hickman Mills’s financial 
woes.  The city of Kansas City declared it was ceasing sharing its sales tax revenue with 
Hickman Mills, Grandview, Raytown, Center, and North Kansas City school districts effective 
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December 31, 1994.77  This did hurt the other school districts to a degree, but it was additionally 
insulting to Hickman Mills considering the district was inside the limits of Kansas City.  
Residents paid a local sales tax whose monies did not fund their local school.  Additionally, 
Missouri state funding of public schools was changing at this time in an effort to address 
inequalities between school districts’ budgets throughout the state, which, in an ironic twist of 
fate, led to Hickman Mills receiving less state aid than in previous years.78   
In order to address decreased local and state funding, the school board proposed a tax 
levy hike of $1.60 for residents of the district, while at the same time it decreased the yearly 
budget by $300,000.  This decrease would remove funding for travel and meetings, retract the 
planned inclusion of new computer systems in the high schools, and delay the purchase of new 
books.79  Even with a large get-out-the-vote campaign and the use of election consultants, the 
levy failed when voted upon in February of 1995, with 3,278 voting against the tax increase and 
2,020 voting in favor.80  School board president George Flesher despaired, “I feel like a boxer 
after a losing fight.  It’s hard to come up off the mat.”81  Flesher and the rest of the board did 
recover, then proposed a fifty-two cent levy increase for an April vote, which did pass.82  While 
considered a win for district leadership, the school budget was still not sustainable when 
considering lower commercial and residential property values in Hickman Mills. 
Hence, even with the levy increase, by 1995 and 1996, many of Hickman Mills’s 
programs were closed, teachers dismissed, and classes cancelled.  The school board fired fifty 
teachers, cut “minor” high school sports such as soccer, baseball, golf, tennis, wrestling, and 
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eliminated all athletic activities at the junior high level.83  Hickman leadership was extremely 
concerned.  Resurrecting fears of consolidation from the 1960s, President Flesher lamented:  
what we’re looking at here is the potential collapse of the school district.  In the worst- 
case scenario if the state were to eliminate the Hickman Mills school district, it would 
have to combine it with another district.84   
 
While the state did have power to close a school district, it would have been very difficult to do 
so, requiring the political will to merge two districts together, even against the wishes of the 
residents within the districts.  Flesher’s dire warning probably served to attempt to scare long-
time residents who were in the district during the 1960s into supporting tax levies. 
In the 1990s, the school board was unable to obtain enough funds to maintain school 
operation, pay for staff and equipment, as well as building maintenance.  This was much worse 
of a problem to have than thirty years earlier in the 1970s when the district was not able to fully 
accommodate its growing populace.  Hearkening back to financial problems in the 1950s, the 
district even tried raising funds from students’ families in order to absorb costs.  In the 1950s and 
60s, parents had to pay a fee to send their children to kindergarten.  In the 1990s, families paid to 
have children take part in school activities.  For a time during the 1990s, a $25 activity fee was 
instituted for high school students for available extra-curricular clubs and sports, with its 
subsequent removal in 1996 because of parent complaints.85  The district virtually limped along 
through the end of the 1990s in operating its schools, paying its teachers, and hosting activities 
for its youth.  The situation for the schools would become more severe at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, as the district struggled to afford increasingly expensive school repairs.86 
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The End of Long-Term School Leadership 
 Some changes in school leadership helped strengthen the perception that Hickman Mills 
was a declining district.  After leading the schools for three years, Superintendent Hill resigned 
in 1993 to head a school district in South Dakota and the board named Deputy Ron Goodwin as 
superintendent.87  Two years later, Superintendent Goodwin resigned and the school board 
elected to have Jerry L. Cooper serve as interim superintendent until the position could be filled, 
though searches for a new superintendent were unsuccessful.88  Cooper became the de facto 
superintendent until he announced his resignation in 1999 in order to take a professorship at the 
University of Missouri-Kansas City.89  The board named then-principal Marge Williams as 
interim superintendent for the 2000-01 school year, after which she became full superintendent, 
serving until 2012.90  While Williams ended up providing the stability of a long-term leader, by 
the end of the 1990s, residents were not sure how long any superintendent was going to last, as 
the previous three only stayed for a few years.91  This injured the reputation of Hickman Mills as 
a stable school district, as it appeared it was a district that could not hold on to leadership.92  To 
be fair, as has been shown throughout this study, leadership for Hickman Mills was historically 
less stable than residents would care to admit.  However, by the 1990s and into the 2000s, the 
school district’s leadership woes were more public.  
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Declining Status 
 The last few years of the 1990s continued to be very difficult for the school district.  In 
October 1997, there was another shooting at Ruskin Park close to Ruskin High.93  Two high 
school students began an argument at school and when classes were dismissed at 2:12 pm, they 
walked to the park to have a fight when one pulled out a gun and shot the other.  By that evening, 
one student was dead and the other was in juvenile detention.94  This event brought memories of 
the shootings in 1990, made local metropolitan news, which again raised questions about the 
reality and the perception of violence in the neighborhoods of South Kansas City.95  In April 
1999, somebody started a fire in the Ruskin gymnasium.  Although it was quickly contained, the 
fire caused $15,000 in damage.96  Again, this unfortunate event made local news in Kansas City 
and questions were raised once more about the safety and quality of the school district.97   
 Further markers of decline appear in testing data that reveal Hickman Mills’s similarities 
to the urban Kansas City Missouri School District instead of the other suburban districts that had 
once been its compatriots.  In August 1999, Missouri gave a report of ACT scores among high 
school students across the state, with the national and state average being about 21 points.  
Hickman Mills students scored an average of 18.9 and Ruskin students scored 18.7, well below 
any of the students in surrounding suburban districts (who scored well above the state and 
national average), but on par with the high schools in Kansas City, Missouri.98  Both by 
reputation and by objective standards, at least on a national test for students wanting to enter 
college, Hickman Mills was like Kansas City in its status as a failing school district. 
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The 1990s marked the beginning of the shift Hickman Mills took from being a largely 
white, lower middle-class suburb of Kansas City with a middling school district, shopping, and 
affordable housing into what essentially became an extension of Kansas City, Missouri, with all 
the problems and negative perceptions that came with that association.  While the district never 
in its history had an “easy” period free of strife, it also never had a reputation of being an 
embattled district like KCMSD.  This perception changed in the 1990s and was cemented in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, as Hickman Mills completed its transformation from a 
quiet village, to a first-ring suburb, and finally, to an extension of the Kansas City urban core.  
The shift Hickman Mills went through in becoming a suburb in the 1950s and 1960s was largely 
the result of housing and commercial development, which ultimately benefited the school 
district, even if that change was difficult.  The later transformation to an urban space began as 
one of perception.  The entrance of low-income housing and larger numbers of black families 
seemed to signal to the white residents that the city was coming their way; either they had to 
adapt to Hickman Mills’s urbanization, or they should leave.  One of the long-term residents of 
Ruskin Hills expressed her view on the change the district underwent as inevitable: 
It is all urban sprawl, and it is happening everywhere.  I talk to my friends, and they see it 
where they live too.  I don’t live in a suburb anymore, but who does?  The cities, they just 
keep expanding.99 
 
While the resident seems to be adapting well to the changes, her pointing out that cities keep 
expanding reveals a view of cities that was not pervasive in 1961, when Kansas City annexed 
Hickman Mills.  While Ruskinites had no say in annexation, many were mollified by the 
increased services that would result from Kansas City’s action, along with a decrease in local 
taxes.  Nobody at the time (as far as I can tell) stated dejectedly that the annexation was an 
example of the city expanding.  Yet, by the 1990s through the 2000s, that seems to be the 
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common sentiment, as Hickman Mills’s decline became yet another example of urban sprawl and 
the ruination of quiet neighborhoods.   
In interviews I conducted with both white and black residents of Hickman Mills, there 
seems to be a perception that there was nothing that could be done to prevent the ultimate 
transformation of Hickman Mills into an urban community and school district.  Persons 
interviewed tended to believe that Hickman Mills’s fate was sealed by its location relative to 
Kansas City, Missouri, as well as the economic ruination that whites blame on violence and that 
blacks blame on white fears of violence.100  The two groups do come together in that both white 
and black residents equally blame economic decline in the area on the proliferation of section 
eight housing.101  However, as examined in this chapter, economic decline started before section 
eight housing grew to large numbers in Hickman Mills.  It is only after 2000 that HUD opened 
many homes, particularly in Ruskin Heights, Ruskin Hills, Crossgates, and Kirkside, to be 
designated as section eight.  Hickman Mills became a “ghetto” in the minds of some residents, 
ex-residents, and even surrounding communities before it truly became the economically 
depressed place it is today.   
                                                 
100 Baker, Cardona, Davis, Hamilton, Hill, Husman, Jacobs, Martin, Solum, Spearman, Wade, interviews with 
author. 
101 Baker, Cardona, Davis, Hamilton, Hill, Husman, Jacobs, Martin, Solum, Spearman, Wade, interviews with 
author. Everyone I spoke with had strong opinions on section eight housing and unanimously consider it to be 
disastrous for the community. 
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 Conclusion: From Suburban to Urban Space 
Hickman Mills as a Community and a School District in the 21st Century 
The popular narrative among residents of Hickman Mills, both white and black, is that 
the introduction and spread of section eight homes by HUD and HAKC in the 1990s and 2000s 
destroyed the community.  White residents reported that when children from these homes entered 
the schools, they made teaching more difficult.1  One teacher pointed out that after the 1990s, it 
was not uncommon to have students whose parents were in jail.2  Thus the degradation of 
Hickman Mills was a result of the degradation of the family.3  This may have been partially true, 
but is an overgeneralization of a larger problem.  The roots of Hickman Mills’s “decline” are 
more complex and far-reaching.  Hickman Mills suffered as a school district because for much of 
its operation in the twentieth century, leaders focused on school growth without gaining the 
community’s full support in terms of taxes.  This of course, was made much more difficult by 
virtue of the fact that schools in Missouri had to obtain two-thirds of voter approval in order to 
raise mill levies.  Added to the taxation woes, when whites left the district as black families 
entered in significant numbers at the end of the twentieth century, property values decreased, 
which proved detrimental to Hickman Mills’s funding.  As perception towards the 
neighborhoods in South Kansas City fed a myth of a dangerous urban space, businesses left, 
which also harmed the school district’s finances. 
Unfortunately, the perception that Hickman Mills was an area of Kansas City that was 
declining, unsafe, and poor and black became more of a reality in the first decade of the twenty-
                                                          
1 Carla Baker, interview with author, August 14, 2012; Colleen Hamilton, interview with author, August 14, 2012. 
2 Hamilton, interview with the author. 
3 Baker, Hamilton, interview with author; Gloria Cardona, interview with author, August 30, 2012; Heather Davis, 
interview with author, December 4, 2012; Robert Spearman, interview with author, August 25, 2012; Allison Wade, 
interview with author, September 8, 2012.  The idea of the “degradation of the family” most likely comes from the 
famous Moynihan Report of 1965.  Daniel P. Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Policy Planning and Research, U.S. Department of Labor, 1965). 
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first century.  Section eight housing proliferated in Ruskin Heights and Ruskin Hills and 
ultimately had the effect of transforming the neighborhoods, but only with the help of white 
flight.  Houses that were left vacant became HUD/section eight homes, which were often bought 
by out-of-state companies searching for a cheap investment in housing speculation schemes.4  
When visiting the neighborhood association office for the two Ruskin developments, it is 
possible to see a map of each house in the community with section eight houses marked in green.  
Green sections mark over half of the homes. Designating houses as section eight did not solve 
the problem of vacant buildings, as often landlords who lived miles away were not aware of 
renters abandoning homes.  Today, many of the neighborhoods in Hickman Mills have deserted 
and empty homes, which serve as an eyesore and a source of shame for surrounding residents.5   
While researching Hickman Mills, I spent some time with the leaders of the homeowners 
associations for some of the major neighborhoods in Hickman Mills.  These same organizations 
who played a significant role in the growth of Hickman Mills as a suburban community, for 
involvement in the schools, for fighting against HUD and the HAKC, were now a shadow of 
what they used to be.  For the continued association fee of thirty-five dollars (relatively 
unchanged from when the association started), residents receive a free weekly subscription to the 
Jackson County Advocate, which is the only tangible benefit homeowners or renters receive.  
The few volunteer workers in the association offices collect the money, usually in the form of 
checks written by large businesses from out of state, often Texas.  The workers record the 
payments, and deliver the newspapers.  They also collect donations for the schools and the 
elementary children.  On one of my visits, the volunteers were buying large numbers of socks 
                                                          
4 James R. Shortridge, Kansas City and How It Grew, 1822-2011 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 
153. 
5 Baker, Cardona, Davis, Husman, Spearman, Wade, interviews with author; James Hill, interview with author, 
August 30, 2012; Graham Martin, interview with author, September 8, 2012; Alicia Solum, interview with author, 
January 26, 2013. 
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and knitted gloves, to give a pair to each child at Johnson, Burke, and Symington elementary 
schools.   
South Kansas City is hurting in other areas as well, not just in housing.  Many of the local 
businesses and restaurants are gone from Ruskin Heights and Hills, replaced by paycheck loan 
services, liquor stores, or empty lots.  Bannister road still has heavy traffic from motorists 
heading to or from I-435 or Highway 71, which brings business to the local Burger King and 
McDonalds, but little else.  Bannister Mall, the symbol of how South Kansas City has declined, 
itself is largely empty buildings and open space, with grass growing through cracks in the 
parking lot. 
Kansas City officials have been trying to find somebody willing to redevelop the 
Bannister site, coming close in 2009 when they almost convinced the Kansas City Wizards, a 
prominent professional soccer team, to build their stadium in South Kansas City at Bannister 
Mall.6  Negotiations over tax breaks stalled the deal and the owner of the soccer club had the 
stadium built in Kansas City, Kansas.  Specifically, the team plays in Village West, part of 
Wyandotte County where I-70 meets I-435.7  The Bannister Mall was purchased by a group 
called Trails Properties II, who renamed the Bannister area “Three Trails,” a reminder that the 
Oregon, Santa Fe, and California trails all went through Hickman Mills.8  Trails Properties began 
promising they would find a buyer to redevelop the Bannister Mall, but nothing has materialized. 
For the school district, while the racial and economic status of the children attending the 
schools largely changed, much of the approach towards school operations did not.  Just as 
presented in this study, school leadership in Hickman Mills continued to strive to pass levies in 
                                                          
6 “Kansas City Wizards choose Kansas City, Kan., for new stadium” Kansas City Business Journal, December 18, 
2009, http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2009/12/14/daily48.html. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Steve Vockrodt, “Bannister Mall redevelopment could get new life,” Kansas City Business Journal, February 13, 
2013, http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2013/02/13/bannister-mall-redevelopment-could-
get.html?page=all. 
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order to maintain an operating budget, but most of these levies have failed.  The school bonds 
that passed, like decades before, tended to come without any tax increase.  As if to recreate the 
infamous “Langford & Co.”, board and superintendent intrigue continued, most recently with an 
ousting of Breman Anderson Jr, the school board president who had been antagonistic to the 
superintendent and other board members, as well as breaking district rules for personal power.9  
Most recently, a state financial audit of the school board has raised questions of mismanagement 
and embezzlement by some members of the school board.10  The present school board and new 
superintendent Dennis Carpenter have promised to fully investigate the matter and make the 
necessary changes to have transparent and honest finances.11   
The district has had stability of leadership in that Marjorie Williams stayed as 
superintendent from 2000 to 2012, but her tenure has not been without controversy.  As the first 
black and female superintendent for the district, some whites complained she was a “diversity 
hire,” an “outsider” who did not live in the district and was not fit for the job.12  Additionally, the 
district’s loss of full accreditation in 2012 and its status since as a provisionally accredited school 
by Missouri tarnished William’s reputation among locals.13  Opinions toward Williams among 
residents I interviewed diverged according to race, as white interviewees tended to describe her 
as a Kansas City interloper who brought cronies to the district.  Black interviewees describe her 
as a long-time fixture for the district, first as principal then superintendent, who fought to keep 
                                                          
9 Joe Robertson, “New superintendent at Hickman Mills witnesses more trouble,” Kansas City Star, April 18, 2013, 
B6; Joe Robertson, “Hickman Mills school board stages a coup and ousts its president,” Kansas City Star, May 23, 
2013, B5. 
10 Joe Robertson, “Missouri audit paints a dysfunctional portrait of Hickman Mills School District,” Kansas City 
Star, March 4, 2014, A1.   
11 Joe Robertson, “Hickman Mills audit exposes past turmoil,” Kansas City Star, March 5, 2014, A1. 
12 Heather Davis, Lilly Husman, Robert Spearman, personal interviews with the author.  Previous superintendents 
also did not live within district boundaries, which also brought some complaints by residents. 
13 Alex Smith, “Hickman Mills District Struggles Through Tough Year,” KC Currents, Kansas City Public Media, 
December 5, 2012, http://kcur.org/post/hickman-mills-district-struggles-through-tough-year; Donald Bradley, 
“Hickman Mills School District slips to provisional accreditation,” Kansas City Star, September 19, 2012, B6. 
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Hickman Mills going during tough times.14  Williams had also made difficult decisions in the 
face of declining enrollment and funds.  She led the resolution to decrease the district’s operating 
budget by $5 million in 2009, to close Hickman High School and merge it with Ruskin High in 
2010, then cut the budget by another $3 million with 28 teachers eliminated in 2011.15  Finally, 
one more round of cuts came in early 2012 with another $3 million and fifty positions 
removed.16  In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Hickman Mills was experiencing the 
inverse of its history in the mid-twentieth century.  Finally, the word decline took a literal 
meaning as the district’s budget, open buildings, and enrollment shrank.  After decades of 
fighting for appropriate funding to grow the district, Hickman Mills found itself fighting to get 
enough funding to operate the schools.  Eventually, beaten by the realities of decreasing property 
revenues, lack of sufficient funding, as well as a declining student population, Hickman Mills C-
1 School District had to reduce in size. 
Williams retired in December 2012 and controversy continued around who would be her 
successor, with the district accepting one interim superintendent, then replacing her within 
months with another interim leader.17  Finally, the district hired Dennis Carpenter, previously a 
deputy superintendent in a Georgia school district, to head Hickman Mills beginning in July 
2013.18  So far the focus of his tenure has been along the lines of the cliché of turning a 
                                                          
14 Dell Jacobs, interview with author, December 4, 2012; Graham Martin, interview with author, September 8, 2012; 
Alicia Solum, interview with author, January 26, 2013. 
15 Susan B. Wilson, “Hickman Mills School District Slashes Budget,” KCUR News, March 16, 2009, 
http://kcur.org/post/hickman-mills-school-district-slashes-budget; Dr. Marjorie Williams and John Baccala, “Letter 
to the Editor,” Jackson County Advocate vol. 110, no. 7, March 9, 2010, 3;  “Ruskin Remains, No More HMHS,” 
Jackson County Advocate vol. 110, no. 7, March 9, 2010, 1; Aaron Heintzelman, “Hickman Mills approves $3.38 
million in budget cuts, including elimination of 28 positions,” 41 Action News, April 13, 2011, 
http://www.kshb.com/dpp/news/education/hickman-mills-approves-3.38-million-in-budget-cuts-including-
elimination-of-28-positions.  
16 “Hickman Mills Proposes Teacher Layoffs,” Jackson County Advocate vol. 112, vol 1, February 15, 2012, 1. 
17 “Tate Replaces Williams as Hickman Mills Superintendent,” Jackson County Advocate vol. 112, no. 43, October 
26, 2012, 1. 
18 John Baccala, “District Hires Georgia Educator as New Superintendent,” Hickman Mills C-1 Schools Press 
Release, January 2, 2013. 
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struggling district around, with language similarly used in the Kansas City Missouri School 
District.  Currently Hickman Mills has a little over six thousand students enrolled, 78% of whom 
are black, 86% receive free and reduced lunch.19 
As apparent through the recent history of Hickman Mills as a community and a school 
district, there is no rosy or particularly hopeful ending to this study.  As illustrated in the 
introduction to this dissertation, multiple scholars have pointed out that the root problem for 
urban and suburban communities and struggling school districts comes from the inequitable 
distribution of resources.20  Communities like Hickman Mills that began as havens for middle-
class white families escaping life in the city are now often part of cities themselves.  Again, this 
questions popular definitions of suburban and urban space as it applies to communities and 
schools.  Hickman Mills serves as another example of a community that gained a large enough 
population of black residents, hence it became “urban.”  White middle and upper-class families 
move on to greener pastures in suburban communities that are even further away from the urban 
core, and the cycle continues, even while places like Hickman Mills get left behind.  At the time 
of the writing of this conclusion, some attention is being given to the fact that it is the fiftieth 
anniversary of the War on Poverty started by LBJ in 1964.  Arguments abound on each side of 
the debate, but consensus is that the policies enacted in the name of fighting poverty have not 
solved inherent inequalities in America, inequalities that are often predicted by race, residence, 
and location of school. 
 And yet, even as I have been writing the conclusion to this study, hope returns for South 
Kansas City.  In recent developments, Cerner Corp. a medical technology firm originating in 
                                                          
19 Hickman Mills C-1 School District Overview, http://www.hickmanmills.org//site/Default.aspx?PageID=63. 
20 Gary Orfield and Susan E. Eaton, eds., Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of 
Education (New York: The New Press, 1996), 361;  Jeffrey Mirel, The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System: 
Detroit, 1907-81 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 401; John L. Rury and Argun Saatcioglu, 
“Suburban Advantage: Opportunity Hoarding and Secondary Attainment in the Postwar Metropolitan North,” 
American Journal of Education 117, no. 3 (May 2011), 333. 
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North Kansas City, has announced plans to build a $4.3 billion campus replacing Bannister 
Mall.21  Cerner promises to employ 15,000 people at the location, which it expects to have 
completed by 2024.22  On January 17th, 2014, representatives from Cerner announced that they 
would begin demolition immediately and have the first office operating by 2016, with 1,500 
employees working.23  During the press conference, Mayor Sly James told South Kansas Citians, 
“I know people felt abandoned when the stadium didn’t work, but this is absolute proof Cerner 
does what they say they’re going to do.”24  Excitement over a brighter future was palpable.   
 It is naïve to state that this new development will transform Hickman Mills and its 
schools, yet if Cerner is able to build a large complex and invest such a large amount of money 
into the economic development of South Kansas City, other businesses may follow.  Again, these 
announcements are new as of the writing of this dissertation and there are important details that 
are missing.  Will the school district gain tax monies from the Cerner complex?  Will the new 
development change the surrounding neighborhoods?  Will it draw new people to live in the area 
and send their children to Hickman Mills’ schools?   
 Hickman Mills C-1 School District, with or without Cerner, still has to gain full 
accreditation to be considered a successful district. The district needs more funding, whether 
from federal, state, or local sources, in order to appropriately respond to the needs of an ever-
growing population of poor and underprivileged children.  Hickman Mills is like any other 
district in that it is strongly linked to the community in which it exists.  Thus when there is an 
economic boom in South Kansas City, the school district most likely benefits.  When the 
community is struggling, often so is the school.  Because the funding formula for America’s 
                                                          
21 Devin Collison, “Cerner will formally announce Three Trails expansion Friday,” Kansas City Star, January 16, 
2014, B8. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Kevin Collison, “Cerner officially launches its $4.3 billion Three Trails office campus,” Kansas City Star, January 
17, 2014, http://www.kansascity.com/2014/01/17/4760042/cerner-officially-launches-its.html. 
24 Ibid. 
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schools depends so heavily upon locally-raised revenue in the form of property taxes, schools are 
held to the whim of the housing market.  For the part of Hickman Mills’s school leadership, their 
great mistake over the past sixty years has been to not raise the tax levy high enough in order to 
be more self-sufficient and not depend upon federal aid.  However, as has been explained, there 
was not a lack of effort on the part of Hickman Mills as a district to raise levies and be 
financially secure.  Instead, the public’s own apathy and willingness to fight bond and levy 
issues in the name of lesser taxation, combined with the state rule that levies have to be passed 
with a 2/3 majority, severely harmed Hickman Mills C-1 School District.  Perhaps Cerner can 
alleviate the problem, but again, the entrance of a large company is an “outside” solution, the 
district will probably, as always before, struggle to fund itself in its educational endeavors.  
Additionally, the damage to Hickman Mills’s reputation is probably done—the area is perceived 
to be an extension of Kansas City; poor, black, and unattractive.  The suburban has become 
urban. 
 This raises a point made in the introduction to this study.  While the geographic definition 
of a locale like Hickman Mills would have determined it to be unquestionably “urban” in 1961 
when it was annexed by Kansas City, the neighborhoods in South Kansas City did not identify as 
urban until the 1990s and 2000s when economic decline, racial change, and school deterioration 
led residents to believe they were living in the city.  The story presented here of Hickman Mills, 
like Emily Strauss’s work on Compton, California, demonstrates the concept of the social 
construction of space.25  Ruskinites saw themselves as suburbanites for much of the latter half of 
the twentieth century because their neighborhoods and school district were perceived as safe, 
white, and middle-class (in this case, blue-collar).  When the community began to experience 
                                                          
25 See Emily Strauss, Death of a Suburban Dream: Race and Schools in Compton, California (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). 
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greater crime and a larger influx of African-American residents, then Hickman Mills became 
urban.  The change the district and the neighborhoods underwent was largely social, with 
economic, political, and educational ramifications.   
 This change in the school district and in the larger community supports part of an older 
theory of metropolitan segregation called “tipping point,” which was recently adapted by 
Malcolm Gladwell to explain various phenomenon in American society.26  The political scientist 
Morton Grodzins coined “tipping point” in 1957 when he addressed racial change in 
metropolitan areas, and the term enjoyed a period of popularity during the 1960s and 1970s as an 
explanation for white flight.27  Grodzins argued that neighborhoods changed from having one 
dominant race to another, usually white to black, because whites had varying levels of 
tolerability to non-whites.  When a “tipping point” was reached (usually more than 30 percent 
according to his findings), then whites moved away from neighborhoods in larger numbers and 
non-whites filled the vacancies.28  Other social scientists, particularly sociologists and some 
historians, took Grodzins’s theory and applied it to school change, as school racial composition 
tended to reflect that of the surrounding community.29  This theory was most popular among 
urban scholars in the 1960s and 1970s, but has largely fallen out of favor, particularly with more 
recent modeling of neighborhood movements from U.S. Census data which reveal that 
                                                          
26 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: Little, Brown 
and Company, 2000).  Interestingly, perhaps disturbingly, Gladwell never cites political scientist Morton Grodzins, 
who created the term “tipping point.” 
27 Morton Grodzins, “Metropolitan Segregation,” Scientific American 24 (October 1957): 33-41.  See also Gary S. 
Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); Thomas C. Schelling, “A 
Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping,” in Racial Discrimination in Economic Life, ed. 
Anthony H. Pascal (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1972); Karl Taeuber and Alma Taeuber, Negroes in 
Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change (New York: Athenuem, 1969). 
28 Grodzins, “Metropolitan Segregation,” 37. 
29 Charles Clotfelter, “School Desegregation, ‘Tipping,’ and Private School Enrollment,” The Journal of Human 
Resources 11, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 28-50; Donald Steinnes, “Models of Neighborhood Change,” Social Forces 55, 
no. 4 (June 1977): 1043-1057. 
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neighborhood change, as well as white flight, are more complex than the tipping point theory 
posits. 
While the tipping point theory does not exactly explain the changes in Hickman Mills 
over time, it serves as an interesting lens or framework to white flight both to and from the 
suburban communities forming the school district.  If tipping point is not satisfactory enough to 
be a complete model for Hickman Mills, perhaps it does shed light on perceptions of long-time 
white residents, who often expressed in interviews that friends, neighbors, or they themselves left 
the district once they felt a major shift in local demographics.30   
Another important consideration in the history and development of Hickman Mills is the 
viewpoint of African-American residents, particularly those who did move from central Kansas 
City, Missouri.  For them, moving to Hickman Mills was not the death of the community, but a 
change.  Additionally, amidst the fears of whites in neighborhoods such as Ruskin Heights and 
Ruskin Hills, black neighbors were living a quieter, safer life than their counterparts in the 
extremely violent downtown blocks in Kansas City.  While Hickman Mills’s schools were never 
as noteworthy as some of the nearby districts, they were measurably better than Kansas City, 
Missouri School District, and their students performed better.   
Understanding the history of a suburban school district and community like Hickman 
Mills helps question the dominant narrative of the excellent, white suburb as a refuge from the 
dangerous, dirty city.  Hickman Mills was never exactly idyllic, as the district and the 
neighborhoods it served argued over taxation, the role and scope of education, and questions of 
identity as soon as the community itself substantially grew in the 1950s on.  The problems faced 
by Hickman Mills C-1 School District today are not especially new, as some of the funding 
issues the district experiences now are a result of poor long-term planning on the part of the 
                                                          
30 Baker, Cardona, Davis, Hamilton, Husman, Spearman, Wade, personal interviews with the author. 
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district itself, as well as an unwillingness on the part of the community to consistently support 
the schools by paying a higher school levy.  Race and racial change complicated, even 
highlighted this problem, but the “decline” of Hickman Mills is securely rooted in its “rise.” 
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Appendix I: Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of the first elementary schools in Hickman Mills.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Jami Parkison, The Journey to Our Future: The History of Hickman Mills C-1 School District, 1902-2002 (Kansas 
City, MO: Hickman Mills C-1 School District, 2002), 12. 
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Figure 2: One-Day Teacher Strike, March 16, 1970.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 “School Shut-down is Short,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 80, no. 7, March 19, 1970, 1. 
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Figure 3: Editorial Cartoon, March 5, 1970.3 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Harold Johnson, “Concerned Parents,” Cartoon, Jackson County Advocate, vol. 80, no. 5, March 5, 1970, 1. 
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Figure 4: Editorial Cartoon, May 7, 1970.4 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Johnson, “Our School Song,” Cartoon, Jackson County Advocate, vol. 80, no. 14, May 7, 1970, 1. 
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Figure 5: Editorial Cartoon, May 28, 1970.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Johnson, “Voter Apathy,” Cartoon, Jackson County Advocate, vol. 80, no. 17, May 28, 1970, 1. 
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Figure 6: Editorial Cartoon, September 17, 1970.6 
 
 
                                                          
6 Johnson, “C’mon, pardners,” Cartoon, Jackson County Advocate, vol. 80, no. 33, September 17, 1970, 1. 
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Figure 7: St. Luke’s United Methodist Church message to those who voted against the levy,   
July 2, 1970.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 “Shame—You Put Children Last!,” Consolidated School District No. 1 School Gazette, vol. 1, no. 2, July 2, 1970, 
6. 
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Figure 8: Detail view of full-page ad for levy vote, September 10, 1970.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 “VOTE YES!” Two-page Advertisement, Jackson County Advocate, vol. 80, no. 32, September 10, 1970, 12-13. 
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Figure 9: Picture of House Education Committee hearing at Jefferson City, Spainhower Plan 
abandoned, February 6, 1969.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 “Spainhower Plan is Dead,” Jackson County Advocate, vol. 79, no. 4, February 7, 1969, 6. 
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Figure 10: Suggested reorganization of Jackson County No. 1 school districts, 1969.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Clifford P. Hooker and Van D. Mueller, “Equal Treatment to Equals: A New Structure for Public Schools in the 
Kansas City and St. Louis Metropolitan Areas” (Jefferson City, MO: Missouri School District Reorganization 
Commission, June 1969), 72. 
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Figure 11:  African American Migration in Kansas City, 1960.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 U.S. Census of the Population, 1960. 
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Figure 12: African American Migration in Kansas City, 1970.12 
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12 U.S. Census of the Population, 1970. 
 
 215 
Figure 13: African American Migration in Kansas City, 1980.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 U.S. Census of the Population, 1980. 
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Figure 14: African American Migration in Kansas City, 1990.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 U.S. Census of the Population, 1990. 
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Figure 15: African American Migration in Kansas City, 2000.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 U.S. Census of the Population, 2000. 
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Appendix II: Informed Consent Statement 
 
 
I am conducting an oral history on the Hickman Mills school district as part of my dissertation 
project at the University of Kansas. The University of Kansas supports the practice of protection 
for human subjects participating in research.  The following information is provided for you to 
decide whether you wish to participate in the present study.  You should be aware that even if 
you agree to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without penalty. 
 
I am interested in learning about the experiences of those who lived within the boundaries of 
Hickman Mills or attended/taught at its schools.  I will be asking you to participate in an 
interview.  It is estimated that this will take no more than an hour of your time.  
 
The content of the questions concerns your personal experiences and observations from the past.  
You may or may not feel comfortable with some of these questions.  Although participation in 
my study will not directly benefit you, I believe that the information will be useful to better 
understand the history of suburban southern Kansas City.   
 
Your participation is solicited although strictly voluntary.  I assure you that your name will not 
be associated in any way with the research findings.  Interviews will be audio recorded, all 
participants will be assigned pseudonyms, and only I will have access to the audio recordings.  I 
will perform the transcriptions of these recordings, and will have sole access to such.  You are 
not required to be taped and may refuse to be recorded at any time during the interview.  The 
recordings will be erased upon completion of the transcripts.  You are not required to sign this 
Consent and Authorization form and you may refuse to do so without affecting your right to any 
services you are receiving or may receive from the University of Kansas or to participate in any 
programs or events of the University of Kansas.  However, if you refuse to sign, you cannot 
participate in this study. 
 
 You may withdraw your consent to participate in this study at any time.  You also have the right 
to cancel your permission to use and disclose further information collected about you, in writing, 
at any time, by sending your written request to Aaron Rife. 
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Appendix III: Interview Protocol 
 
Tell me about yourself, how did you come to live in Hickman Mills? 
 
Why did you move to your neighborhood?  Did anything draw you here, or was it something 
else? 
 
Where else have you lived, if you have lived anywhere else? 
 
Why did you move out? 
 
What can you tell me about the Hickman Mills school district? 
 -If you raised children here, what was your experience sending them to the schools? 
 
What did you see as important events occurring in Hickman Mills while you were here? 
 
How did you or others you knew feel about the annexation with Kansas City? 
 
How did you or others you knew feel about joining or working with the Kansas City school 
district? 
 -If you remember the Spainhower Plan, what were your thoughts about it? 
 
How has Hickman Mills changed since you have been here? 
 -How is it the same? 
 
How do you feel about the schools in Hickman Mills now? 
 
What would you want me to know about Hickman Mills as a community and a school district? 
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